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Public procurement policies requiring frequent tenders and defined contracts give rise to 
expectations of low cost quality services and present management challenges for the post 
tender contract. Frequent tendering undermines the principal agent relationship and contract 
incompleteness allows unforeseen contingencies to threaten the specified outcomes. 
This thesis examines seven cases of facilities management contracts in three third-level 
educational institutions. Using a qualitative and interpretative methodology, the study takes 
an inductive theory building approach to how and why managers address challenges, and 
develops a conceptual model of ex post management mechanisms through the lenses of 
agency theory, the psychological contract, and signals. It finds that the principal agent 
relationship is based on both written and psychological contracts, and mechanisms include 
incentives, information systems, and psychological contract signals. It also finds that, rather 
than pursuing the terms of the written contract which are frequently incomplete, the principal 
and agent work together towards the broader goals of the psychological contract to maintain 
the contract benefits. 
While it has the limitations of a theory building and social constructionist approach, it offers 
theoretic and management relevance. It extends agency theory in public contracts by 
highlighting the importance of information systems, and the psychological contract in the 
principal agent relationship by identifying the principal’s influences and the relevance of 
agent’s perceived obligations in deciding responses. Through understanding these ex post 
mechanisms, managers may address the inevitable challenges of incomplete contracts, and 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
While public contracts share with private inter-firm contracts objectives such as cost 
efficiency and service quality, public contracts have additional policy objectives which 
provide unique management challenges. This thesis is motivated by the researcher’s 
perspective as a practitioner managing contracts in the area of facilities management.  The 
author was a facilities manager working in the private sector from 1986 to 1995 before 
moving to the public sector, where he continues to manage such contracts. With increasing 
scrutiny of public contract performance, how to explain to stakeholders the value of these 
contracts is a growing challenge. The articulation of what constitutes facilities management 
value in the public sector may be poor and lack relevancy to the core business (Price, 2002, p. 
62).  This may lead to reduced budgets and a declining contribution of the procured contracts 
to the organisation. Research exploring what practitioners do is important in understanding 
how public procurement challenges may be managed (McKevitt et al, p. 335). Through this 
study, this researcher endeavours to acquire improved theoretic and management insights to 
better contribute facilities management value through public procurement contracts. 
While there are significant literatures on public procurement and contract theory, these 
address the issues around the public tender process and contract design comprising the ex-
ante mechanisms intended to secure the contract outcomes. Despite ex-ante controls, 
administrative procedures, and legal constraints to reduce performance uncertainty (Potoski, 
1999, p. 625), the reality is that ex post trade is, at best, only partially contractible (Hart and 
Moore, 2008, p. 3).  After a contract is signed, unexpected situations arise ex post which are 
not addressed by the written contract and threaten the intended contract outcomes. In contrast 
to the ex-ante aspects of public procurement, little research exists on the ex post mechanisms 
to guide managers when faced with situations unforeseen by the written contract.  
In this chapter the research problems and the research questions are set out. Next the potential 
contributions to the literature and management practice are discussed. Finally, the 






 1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEMS 
Public procurement may be broadly defined as the acquisition of works, supplies and services 
by public bodies (National Public Procurement Policy Unit, 2009, p. 6) giving rise to public 
contracts between government agencies and private suppliers. Public procurement differs 
from private procurement in that governmental purchasing administers money belonging to 
all taxpayers, the numbers of customers are high, and despite the availability of numerous 
suppliers, information asymmetry may cause uncompetitive bids (Costantino et al, 2012, p. 
189) and resulting in calls for better transparency and value from customers and taxpayers. 
Unlike contracts between private firms, public contracts are regulated by public procurement 
legislation which has commercial, regulatory, and social objectives (Erridge and McIlroy, 
2002, p. 53). This results in significant management attention to the public tender and 
contract design processes and the design of the contract to accommodate these objectives.  
Given the public nature of the contract forming process, these ex-ante contract terms may not  
easily be re-negotiated to address unforeseen risks and contingencies which arise in the ex 
post management stage. Public sector organisations, then, have less flexibility than their 
private sector counterparts in structuring contracting arrangements to align vendor interests 
with those of the client (Ngwenyama and Sullivan, 2007, p. 633). Within these contracting 
arrangements it is possible to identify three ex post management challenges as research 
problems.  
The first relates to the contract itself. While frequently designed by experienced managers, it 
appears that despite the lengthy ex-ante procurements procedures, public contracts do not 
address ex post management situations. Public contracts tend to be inflexible, leave little to 
the contractor’s discretion, lack flexible incentives, and not to address all contingencies 
(Walls, 2005, pp. 217 - 218).  Modifications of existing contracts into longer-term 
arrangements result in poor contract design (Kim and Brown, 2012, p. 688) and managers 
often prefer to rely on building trust with suppliers to overcome contract incompleteness 
(Merkert and O’ Fee, 2013, p. 125). Therefore, public contracts do not sufficiently address ex 





Table 1.1 - Research Problems for ex post Contract Management 
No. Problem Statements Source 
1 Public contracts do not sufficiently address ex post 
contingencies. 
Merkert & O’ Fee (2013) 
Kim & Brown (2012) 
Walls (2005) 
2 Public contract ex post outcomes differ from those 
specified in the contract. 
Comptroller & Auditor General 
(2008) 
Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2001) 
Domberger and Jensen (1997)  
3 Public contract relationships do not sufficiently foster ex 
post collaborative solutions.  
Loader (2010) 
Murray (2009) 
Leiringer, Green and Raja 
(2009) 
Erridge and McIlroy (2002) 
 
 
The second research problem concerns the outcomes of public contracts where the contract 
outcomes specified ex ante are not fully realised during the ex post management stage. Public 
contract managers’ performance is identified as a reason for the failure to achieve expected 
contract outcomes. Empirical evidence suggests that public sector organizations do not secure 
the required performance from outsourced suppliers (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001, pp. 
401 – 41) due to the unwillingness or inability of the public sector manager to enforce the 
contract terms (Domberger and Jensen, 1997, p. 71) or inadequate contract information 
systems (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2008, p. 10). While managers undoubtedly make 
decisions and take actions that influence the contract outcomes, such decisions and actions 
appear to be aimed selectively towards certain outcomes over others. A problem exists where 




The final research problem relates to the contract relationship arising from the public tender 
and public accountability requirements. While value for money is achieved by competitive 
tendering and contracting monitoring, once the public contract is awarded, a closer co-
operative working relationship is the optimal approach but may not obtain (Loader, 2010, p. 
42). From a public procurement perspective, the relationship may be viewed as the 
management, monitoring, review, and closing down of the contract (Murray, 2009, p. 200). 
There may be an absence of collaborative working in the contract relationship. For example, 
Darwin, Duberley and Johnson (2000, p. 53) finds that while collaborative working 
arrangements are evident in contracts between private firms, public sector managers are 
required by tax payers to demonstrate transparency through a rigid management style and 
maintaining a formal adversarial contract relationship. Indeed some argue that public 
tendering rules for enhanced competition and transparency restrict opportunities for 
collaboration and do not achieve the desired procurement efficiency and effectiveness 
(Leiringer, Green and Raja, 2009, p. 275, and Erridge and McIlroy, 2002, p. 53). Therefore, 
whatever the causes, there is a research problem where public contract relationships do not 
sufficiently foster ex post collaborative solutions by both parties to the contract. 
 
The research problems are shown in Table 1.1. In summary, these identified research 
problems are that during the ex post management stage, public contracts do not sufficiently 
address contingencies, the outcomes differ from those specified in the contract, and the 
contract relationships do not sufficiently foster collaborative solutions to difficulties. The 
arising research questions are now discussed. 
 
1.2  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
From the above discussion of the insufficiency of the written contracts, the emergence of 
unspecified outcomes, and lack of collaborative relationships, two research questions arise in 
relation to the ex post management of public contracts. These are shown in Table 1.2.  
The first research question stems from consideration of the management challenges in public 
contracts which may be incomplete and without the support of a collaborative working 
relationship. The literature suggests ex post controls such as monitoring performance, 
imposing financial penalties, and replacing the contractor in cases of outright performance 
5 
 
failure (Domberger and Jensen, 1997, p. 68). However, replacing a poorly-performing 
contractor risks disruption to a public service, may be difficult to effect in a timely way, and 
may be problematic (Farneti and Young, 2008, p. 94).   Problems may include a legal 
challenge making a dismissal of a contractor a high risk approach for the public authority. In 
addition there are competing expectations in relation to public procurement contracts. The 
demands of consumers and taxpayers for cost reductions and quality improvements (Erridge 
and McIlroy, 2002, p. 56), the objectives of efficiency (Parker, 1990, p. 653), and the 
optimisation of contract cost and quality (Jensen and Stonecash, 2004, p. 10) may not be fully 
realisable with the limited scope of the contract. Faced with such competing demands, how 
do public sector managers endeavour to achieve the required contract outcomes, and why do 
they focus on some requirements rather than others? Therefore the research questions may be 
framed as how   are ex post management mechanisms used by managers to secure 
optimum contract outcomes? and why are ex post management mechanisms used by 
managers to secure optimum contract outcomes? 
 
Table 1.2 - Research Questions for ex post Contract Management 
 
No. Research Question 
1 How are ex post management mechanisms used by managers to secure 
optimum contract outcomes?     
2 Why are ex post management mechanisms used by managers to secure 
optimum contract outcomes?     
 
 
 In addition to the research questions, a research objective may be developed from the 
apparent discord between the public tender and contract design process, the actual contract 
outcomes, and the performance by the public managers. It appears that ex post management 
of public contracts is a simultaneous collaborative and adversarial balancing of costs, quality, 
and accountability to the customers and the taxpayer. How can this dynamic be better 
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examined and understood? As it is the job of the researcher to abstract from the particular to 
the general to develop concepts (Mintzberg, 1979, p. 587) a conceptual model would assist 
better understanding of ex post contract management. This gives the  research objective, can 
a conceptual model be developed that would better support the understanding of ex post 
contract management?  




A study to understand how and why managers of public contracts endeavour to secure 
successful outcomes during the ex post contract is a topic with potential management 
implications and theoretical contribution. These are now discussed in turn. 
Public contracts are designed by public managers who frequently have experience of the ex 
post management of such contracts.  Therefore the absence of sufficient contract clauses to 
deal with contingencies, the divergence between expected and actual contract outcomes, and 
lack of collaborative contract relationships all require explanation by formal research. The 
potential for contribution to management learning arises from the apparent divergence 
between expected and actual contract outcomes in public contracts, highlighting potential 
inadequacies of the ex post contract management mechanisms currently identified in the 
literatures. This may be due to a focus by practitioners on those literatures which highlight 
the ex-ante aspects of the tender process and contract design.  While public procurement 
policies are framed as the pursuit of commercial, regulatory, and social objectives (Erridge 
and McIlroy, 2002, p. 53), such policies are socially constructed by participants with varying 
perceptions coming together to negotiate  and achieve a concerted action (Colebatch, 2005, p. 
21). Therefore a research study on ex post contract management has the potential to 
complement public procurement literatures and to provide a deeper understanding of the 
available mechanisms to management practitioners. This is likely to be of interest to both 
public and private sector managers who are involved in public contracts. 
The potential for theoretical contribution from this study stems from the dissonance in 
theoretic approaches to the ex-ante and ex post stages in public contracts. Contracting public 
7 
 
services to private firms entails the formation of principal-agent relationships and the 
potential for agency problems due to goal differences between the parties. While agency 
theory focuses on designing the most appropriate contract agreement to manage the parties’ 
interests and the contract goals (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58) it is an ex-ante approach set down at 
the beginning of the contract relationship. As complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete 
(Williamson, 1999, p. 1089), unforeseen situations arise during the ex post implementation 
stage to which the designed contract fails to provide an agreed management mechanism. As 
real world contract relationships generally continue despite unforeseen situations, it appears 
that agency theory overlooks important non-contractual aspects of managing and 
implementing contract outcomes. Therefore some additional theoretical perspective is 
required to more fully understand this important ex post stage of the principal-agent 
relationship. This potential theoretical contribution of this research has application for all 
contracts whether public or private. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH APPROACH AND THESIS ARRANGEMENT 
To address the ‘how’ and ‘why’ research questions and build theory towards a fuller 
understanding and better management of ex post public contract mechanisms, this thesis uses 
an inductive approach and  qualitative methods to investigate the contract workings between 
public organisations and private contractors. The study draws on economic contract theory, 
the psychological contract, agency theory, and signalling theory to develop a conceptual 
model and answer the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. As there are both economic contract and 
psychological contract perspectives in relation to ex post contract management, the empirical 
work is divided into an Initial Study underpinned by an economic contract perspective, and a 
longer Main Study drawing on both the economic and psychological contract perspectives. 
The thesis is an essential part of a Doctor of Business Administration programme, and was 
conducted over a four year period following two years of preparatory work. The preparatory 
work consisted of six structured assignments focussing on the theme of public contracting of 
services to private firms. The assignments are entitled Philosophical Issues in the Research 
Area (5,000 words), Initial Study (10,000 words), Reflective Critique (3,500 words), Formal 
Research Proposal (5,000), General Literature Review (10,000), and Reflective Portfolio 
(minimum of 1,500). As the Reflective Portfolio recorded the main personal learning 
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elements of experiencing, reflecting, interpreting, and action to develop the thesis learning, 
this assignment was continued to the completion of the thesis. The above assignments are 
preparation of the background for this thesis.   
The thesis is arranged into the following chapters. First the Literature Review chapter reviews 
the development of public contracts together with the main theories underpinning the 
management of contracts, and sets out an initial conceptual model for ex post contract 
management. Next the Methodology chapter develops the research questions, and outlines the 
philosophy and methodological approach. The Initial Study chapter explores five cases of 
public contracts using an economic contract theory perspective on contracts and develops an 
improved conceptual model. The Main Study explores in depth two case studies using both 
an economic and psychological contract perspective to provide the final conceptual model to 
more fully explain the ex post contract management mechanisms. The Discussion chapter 
reviews the findings in the context of the research questions, and outlines implications for 
existing theory, management practice, and policy. Finally, the Conclusions chapter 
summarises the limitations and contributions. 
The findings from the data of this study suggest three main points. The first is that rather than 
relying solely on the written contract terms, principals work with agents to achieve broader 
unwritten contract goals in preference to the written objectives. Also, while written contracts 
often prove incomplete and inflexible, a positive principal agent relationship provides 
solutions to contingencies, and secures the continuity of the contract for both parties. Finally, 
both agency theory and the psychological contract are required to better understand how and 










CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
Public contracts to private firms are wide-ranging and include services such as cleaning, 
refuse collection, transportation services, heavy equipment maintenance, road maintenance, 
fire protection services, prison management, and support services to the military (Jensen and 
Stonecash, 2004, p. 8).  Such contracts have the dual themes of individual self-interest and 
the joint achievement of common objectives. After all, government agencies as buyers enter 
into contracts seeking products providing benefits greater that the price paid, and sellers offer 
products at a price greater that the cost of producing them (Kim and Brown, 2012, p. 688). At 
the same time, both parties have shared experiences since both public and private contracts 
require management of government and industrial policies, regulations, technology standards, 
client and supplier management contributions, and stakeholder expectations (Harland et al, 
2005, p. 845).  Understanding how and why managers of public contracts endeavour to 
secure successful outcomes during the ex post phase requires consideration of government 
agencies as buyers, the response of private suppliers, and the theories underpinning these 
practices. 
This chapter reviews the literatures on contracts. First the development of public procurement 
and public contracts is reviewed, together with the response of private suppliers. Next the 
literatures of pertaining to written and unwritten contracts are discussed. Following this, the 
theories underpinning the management approaches to contracts are reviewed. Finally, an 
initial conceptual model of ex post management of public contracts is proposed. 
  
2.1 DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
Public procurement may be broadly defined as the acquisition of works, supplies and services 
by public bodies (National Public Procurement Policy Unit, 2009, p. 6) and these in turn 
create public contracts between governmental agencies and private providers. Public 
contracts have developed as a result of a growing trend by government to procure rather than 
produce public goods and services. This is evident in the growth in value of public 
procurement, the increased use of competitive tendering, more complex contracts, and 




2.1.1  Growth in Publicly Procured Services 
 
Public procurement of goods and services from private firms is growing. Over a decade ago, 
public sector procurement by US federal, state, and local government accounted for over 10% 
of gross domestic product in the U.S. (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, p. 387). In Europe, between 
2004 and 2008 the 27 EU Member States’ total public expenditure on works, goods, and 
services rose from approximately €1,736 billion to €2,155 billion equating to a rise in the 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP from 16.37% to 17.23% (Commission of the European 
Communities (2010, pp. 1 - 11). More recently, it is suggested that public procurement 
expenditure is 20% of gross domestic product for most nations, with developing nations 
spending up to 50% (Kidalov and Snider, 2011, p. 1). Part of this growth is due to increased 
outsourcing of public services to private suppliers. While the mission of public procurement 
in the US during the 1930s was the acquisition of goods to enable public employees to 
discharge activities, during the 1970s and 1980s, new social, economic, and political thinking 
viewed the market as a means to provide core public services using independent contractors 
(Lawther and Martin, 2005, p. 212). Therefore the role of public procurement has developed 
beyond acquisition from suppliers to that of introducing efficiencies into the provision of 
services to the public. US government procurement policies and practices included movement 
towards deregulation, paperwork reduction, government reengineering, and improved 
performance (Thai, 2001, p. 13).  Public procurement has grown in value and extended its 
scope beyond acquisition to a wider management role. Much of this is as a result of 
contracting out public services.  
Contracting out of public services is done with the objectives of efficiency (Parker, 1990, p. 
653), and the transformation towards leaner, more effective public organizations (Farneti and 
Young, 2008, p. 91).  It is based on the concept that firms may access private sector 
incentives provided by the capital markets and have relative freedom from political 
interference, so that public procurement may bring the efficiency of competition into public 
services (Jensen and Stonecash, 2004, p. 4). In countries such as Holland, Sweden, and 
Australia, local authorities have been encouraged to use contracting as a means of organising 
service delivery (Reeves and Barrow, 2000, p. 130). In Turkey, public administration 
outsourcing is encouraged legislatively and practically, resulting in public organisations 
outsourcing services such as cleaning, security guards, meter-reading, patient visiting, 
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computing services, waste-collection and catering services (Bensghir and Tekneci, 2008 p. 
97). Public sector reform initiatives in New Zealand require municipalities to use public-
private competition to improve local public services, while in Australia some states require 
half of all local public service expenditures to be subject to competitive bidding (Farneti and 
Young, 2008, p. 91). While it has become readily assumed that the growth of contracting out 
of public services to private firms has increased efficiency, it has also provoked debate.  
The debate concerns the assumed cost reductions, service quality, and the transfer of 
employment from the public to the private sector. For example, there is research evidence to 
support reduction of costs through the use of public contracts to private firms (Reeves and 
Barrow, 2000, p. 147). However, such cost reductions may be accompanied by a reduction in 
service quality, since the agent’s efforts are most easily directed towards measured tasks 
(Jensen and Stonecash, 2004, p. 10) and the monitoring of performance quality is difficult 
(Domberger and Jensen, 1997, p. 74). Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2000) suggest that while 
public contracts may result in cost-savings and improved client responsiveness where a large 
pool of providers is available to generate competition, there is also evidence to suggest that 
difficulties arise in relation to employment, accountability, cost savings, quality, and 
monitoring (p. 705). For example, Leiringer, Green and Raja (2009) argue that contracting of 
highway maintenance by public authorities has resulted in contracts with fewer and fewer 
contractor firms, many comprising ex-public authority staff (pp. 274 - 275).  Indeed, as a 
result of private sector outsourcing being one of the strongest recent business trends (Fill and 
Visser, 2000, p. 43), the market of larger providers offering more complex services has 
developed. For example Miozzo and Grimshaw (2008, pp. 8 - 9) highlight the growth of 
multinational service suppliers (pp. 8 - 9), with management capabilities to provide more 
strategically important and bundled services (Barthelémy, 2003, p. 95,Ventovuori, 2007, p. 
39). Interestingly, the literature on private sector outsourcing may offer a more balanced view 
of the benefits and risks associated with such contracts. While the potential opportunities 
include increased focus, innovation, scale without mass, and strategic positioning (Leavy, 
2004, p. 20), there are the risks of service lock-in, contractual amendments, unexpected 
transition and management costs, and possible disputes (Bahli and Rivard, 2003, p.213). The 
outsourcing decision requires consideration of the importance of the service to the 
organization’s customers and employees, the market’s service quality and responsiveness 
when compared to in-house provision (Ventovuori and Lehtonen, 2006, p. 75), and the 
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number of suppliers capable of providing goods or services to the required standards and 
volumes in the required geographical area (Lonsdale, 1999, p. 179).  While the debate on the 
benefits and drawbacks of contracting out of public services will continue, it does appear that 
the risks of such decisions are more explicit in the literature concerning private outsourcing. 
Contracting out is closely associated with the growing use of competitive tendering to 
determine the most efficient method of service provision (Domberger and Jensen, 1997, p. 
69). For example, in the UK, the Conservative Government's 1988 Local Government Act 
extended compulsory tendering to a wide range of local authority services supplied in-house 
by public departments (Parker, 1990, p. 653).  There is widespread public policy commitment 
to competitive tendering. For example, U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations strongly favour 
the use of open auctions for goods and services where competitive bidding by potential 
suppliers enables fair market price discovery, promotes equal opportunity for suppliers, and 
makes it easier to prevent corruption where procurement officers may have incentives to rig 
the system (Tadelis, 2012, p. 297). In Europe, seven EU Procurement Directives initiated 
between 1991 and 2002 apply to all state contracting authorities for contracts above specified 
thresholds, making contract awards based on the lowest price or objective quality criteria, 
obliging transparency of tender information through publication in the Official Journal of the 
EU, and specifying three types of tender procedures (open, restricted, and negotiated) 
(Europe Economics, 2006, p. 3).  There is debate that such policies place burdens on the both 
the public authority and the market supplier since public procurement costs comprise the 
transaction costs to the contracting authority and the bidders in the tender process (Costantino 
et al, 2012, p. 191). A benefit of a tender process to a public procurement manager is 
attainment of a quality ranking of the service provider (Dalen, Moen, and Riis, 2005, p.270).  
Indeed, contracting authorities have some freedom in the way it provides performance 
criterion, or provide potential tenderers with relevant information on how they may best tailor 
their tenders (Mateus, Ferreira, and Carreira, 2010, p. 207). Also suppliers have to bid more 
often for the same total volume of work, administrative costs are a substantial burden on 
smaller contracts, and service contracts suffer additional compliance costs due to the 
complexity of specifications (Europe Economics, 2006, pp. iii - vii). The required tendering 
resources are significant and can adversely affect the participation rate and success of smaller 
firms in the public tendering process (Flynn, McKevitt and Davis, 2013, p. 5). Finally, public 
markets often have limits of imperfect information, entry barriers, and relatively few 
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suppliers (Caldwell et al, 2005, p. 243). For example, perceived lack of legal expertise, 
administrative resources, and e-systems may reduce the success of small or medium 
enterprises in the public procurement bidding process (Karjalainen,   and Kemppainen, 2008, 
p. 238). While competitive tendering of public contracts provides a demonstration of value 
for taxpayers, it adds administrative and management requirements to public authorities and 
suppliers alike. 
The growth in publicly procured services has been accompanied by developments in public 
contracts of increasing complexity. For example, in the US public procurement policies since 
the 1940s have viewed bundling as an obstacle to the entry of small and medium enterprises 
into the federal market, while the EU policies have encouraged the break-up of consolidated 
contracts to provide such firms with sub-contracting opportunities (Kidalov and Snider, 2011, 
pp. 14 - 16). Rather than bundling, public procurement policies have suggested collaborative 
tendering or aggregation, where public sector procurers are encouraged to join together in 
their sourcing requirements to increase leverage and produce cost savings using 
collaborations such as purchasing consortia, nationally agreed contracts or collaboration on a 
regional or functional basis (Loader, 2010, p. 43). Universities have been encouraged to 
design larger and shared contracts to obtain better value than with individual arrangements 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 1996, p. 8).  
 
Traditionally, due to EU regulations requirements for many contracts to limit the period to 
four years, strategic partnering contracts were used solely for private sector facilities 
management contracts (Ventovuori and Lehtonen, 2006, p. 84). These contracts were bundled 
and long-term arrangements. Therefore, while private sector suppliers had developed 
management capabilities to deliver such arrangements, public sector agencies delayed in 
benefiting from such contracts. More recently, and particularly with PPPs, bundling and 
longer contracts have become common. Public sector outsourcing of facilities management 
may now be done by a single contract for each service, a bundled contract for a range of 
services, or a public private partnership where a strategic alliance is formed through a 
competitive process demonstrating substantial risk transfer to the private party, sound project 
management, affordability, and value for money (Anacarani and Capaldo, 2005, pp. 234 - 
235). In the EU, the public private partnership contract (PPP) is characterised by (i) a long 
duration cooperative relationship between the public and private for a planned project, (ii) an 
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arrangement of public and private funding, (iii) the private partner focussing largely on the 
project implementation role while the public partner defines the objectives (public interest, 
service quality, pricing policy) and takes responsibility for monitoring compliance with these 
objectives, (iv) risks are distributed between the parties according to the respective ability of 
the parties to assess, control, and cope with this risk (see Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004, p. 3). Franchising contracts, such as for cable TV in the US or Rail 
Franchising in the UK, are typically 15 years in length and give government means of 
sanctions such as fines for breaches in regulations or termination for serious service failures 
(Dalen, Moen, and Riis, 2005, p.270).   It is evident that the role of public procurement has 
significantly extended beyond acquisition to include the administration of complex 
procedures and contracts over extended periods. 
 
In summary, the development of public procurement with its increased use of competitive 
tendering and more complex longer contracts has resulted in challenges for public 
procurement managers with responsibility for the ex post management of such contracts. 
These are now discussed. 
  
2.1.2 Management Challenges 
The ex post management challenges of public contracts arise in the context of the regulatory 
procurement framework, the design and implementation of the contract, and the management 
of contract relationship. These are discussed in turn.  
Public tender processes affect ex post contract management. Some see the process as a 
procurement decision. Through competitive tendering the lowest-price tender wins the right 
to supply for the duration of the contract term (Domberger and Jensen, 1997, p. 68). 
However, deciding the most appropriate contract arrangements is more complex. An 
appropriate public procurement governance model entails assessing the consumer sensitivity 
of the service, surveying the market for the availability of suitable suppliers, and estimating 
the costs of having to switch suppliers in the event of breach of contract (Padovani and 
Young, 2008, p. 218). It is argued that competitive tendering procedures give rise to arms-
length relationships which limit the ability of buyers and sellers to forecast the risks and 
eventualities in the contract (Erridge and McIlroy, 2002, p. 56). Frequent market testing by 
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public tenders is perceived by suppliers as an inhibitor to collaborative partnerships, a critical 
inhibiter (Leiringer et al, 2009, p. 275). Therefore a key challenge for public procurement 
managers is to have sufficient competencies to adopt a relational approach with suppliers 
during the pre-tender period (McKevitt et al, 2012, p. 335), and the above examples suggest 
that contract outcomes do not realise all the potential benefits of the public tender process and 
contract design. 
Studies suggest that there exists a lack of contract design and accompanying systems design 
by public sector contract managers. For example, a study of thirty European air traffic 
authorities found that many do not adjust template contracts to their local context, preferring 
to rely on building trust with operators to overcome contract incompleteness (Merkert and O’ 
Fee, 2013, p. 125). In a study of three US Federal Agencies, short-term fixed price contracts 
were extended into longer-term contracts with little modification (Kim and Brown, 2012, p. 
688). There is also evidence of over-optimistic assumptions or inadequate approval systems 
that may undermine the contract regardless of its design. For example in two Australian 
public infrastructure projects, over-optimistic presentations to ensure the projects proceed 
were causal factors in cost and delivery over-runs (Love, Edwards, and Irani, 2012, p. 570). 
There may also be deficiencies in the supporting system. In a study of catering procurement 
in three Welsh hospitals, the authors’ recommendations to reduce food waste go beyond 
improving the criteria used in food supply contracts, and suggest the creation of training and 
feedback mechanisms that mobilise all the actors in the food chain (Sonnino and 
McWilliams, 2011, p. 829). Also the public procurement management organisational 
structure may be complex with the responsibilities shared between individuals. It may prove 
difficult to control an agent operating in a public setting because multiple principals mean the 
absence of a homogenous group monitoring the actions of the agent, or the high cost to the 
principal of implementing sanctions leave the agent at a low risk of punishment for poor 
performance (Hansson, 2010, p. 126).  The design of public contracts and the organisational 
supports pose challenges that become evident during the ex post management stage. 
Another challenge is the management of the contract relationship. Public contracts may be 
procured by one manager ex-ante, and managed by another ex post who acts in the role of 
principal. Such public sector managers acting as principals of ex post contracts are likely to 
face particular challenges. From a public procurement perspective, the contract relationship is 
viewed as the management, monitoring, review, and closing down of the contract (Murray, 
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2009, p. 200).  While this may originate from a public policy sense of providing transparency 
and value, it is in some tension with the stated policy aims of relying on the market for 
innovative solutions. A number of studies find that public procurement managers acting in 
the role of principal may prefer an adversarial approach or miss the opportunities of a closer 
relationship with suppliers. For example, in a study of UK local authority contracts, public 
sector managers are required by tax payers to demonstrate transparency through a rigid 
management style, maintaining a formal adversarial contract relationship (Darwin, Duberley 
and Johnson, 2000, p. 53). In a survey of UK local authorities a significant minority of 
procurement officers professed having arm’s length or adversarial relationships with 
suppliers (Loader, 2010, p. 47). Adversarial relationships may be due less to a preferred 
position and more to insufficient competencies regarding relationships. Some research 
suggests potential improvements for public procurement manager capabilities.  For example, 
in a UK study of managers involved in the contracting out of hospital services, it emerged 
that personal relationship, personal charisma, and interpersonal skills are required to bridge 
contractual conflicts (Cooke, 2006, p. 274). A study of three significant UK public contracts 
with negative outcomes suggests that public procurement professionals need to address the 
more strategic issues particularly the ex post management (Caldwell et al, 2005, p. 249).  
Finally, it is worth remembering that the management of the contract relationship is a 
challenge common to both private and public contracts. Although perfunctory performance to 
the letter of the contract is enforceable, consummate performance is not, and optimum 
outcomes depend on the parties being happy to perform to the spirit of the contract (Hart and 
Moore, 2008, p. 3). Indeed, private sector considerations of outsourcing particularly stress the 
benefits of managing the contract relationship. While mutual commitment seems 
fundamentally to be built on a fair market exchange (Sia, Koh and Tan, p. 431), contract 
relationships which become partnerships are viewed to offer the highest benefits to both 
parties (Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther, 2006, p. 210) and the ability to create strategic alliances 
is seen to give competitive advantage to the firm (Zineldin and Bredenlöw, 2003, p. 456). 
However, there are also risks associated with such close contracting relationships. It is noted 
that while pursuing the economies gained from cooperative buyer-supplier relationships, the 
parties remain competitors for profit, and there is a need to actively manage the relative 
power dependence between buyer and supplier (Leavy, 1994a, pp. 50 - 51).  Indeed, some 
sources recommend a portfolio approach to closeness of relationships with suppliers 
depending on the criticality of the service supplied (Olsen and Ellram, 1997, pp. 106 – 107, 
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Nellore and Söderquist, 2000, p. 249, Ventovuori and Lehtonen, 2006, p. 84). It is also noted 
that for more critical and knowledge-intensive contract relationships, the more important are 
the management competences (Hätönen and Eriksson, 2009, p. 144).  From consideration of 
public and private contract relationships, it is clear that to secure optimum outcomes the 
public procurement manager is required look beyond performance monitoring, to effectively 
manage the contract relationship, and to ensure the supplier is motivated to fulfil the spirit of 
the contract. 
That the procurement manager is increasingly required to be actively involved in the ex post 
management of the contract, is pointed out by a number of sources. For example the role of 
the purchasing manager in running contracts is stated to be crucial to the provision of high 
quality, cost-effective public services (Lyne, 1996, p. 4). Indeed, public sector management is 
now required to demonstrate the twin requirements of economic analysis and leadership 
capabilities to manage the cooperative relationships crucial to effective contracting 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000, p. 670). The demands of this expanded role are increased 
by pressures to perform with fewer resources. As Lawther and Martin (2005, p. 214) 
summarise, the changing role for public procurement officers now includes positively 
enabling programme managers and contractors, working in new contracting areas such as 
services, information technology, and knowledge development, and using partnerships to 
obtain external expertise in these contracting efforts, all in the context of a decreasing 
workforce. The required competencies of the purchasing manager extend to a wider range, 
including skills in organisational politics. Public procurement professionals now require 
commercial, pragmatic, political, and person-centred management competencies (McKevitt et 
al, 2012, pp. 347-348). 
 
In summary, the above discussion highlights the development of public procurement and 
public contracts, and the increasing demands on the procurement manager to manage the ex 
post contract, including the contract relationship. Implementation and management actions in 
relation to the contract stem from the contract terms itself. Prior to reviewing approaches to 
the ex post management of contracts, it is necessary to consider the literature concerning the 





2.2 CONTRACT THEORIES 
The written contract concerning the exchange and the commitments to fulfil future 
obligations is linked to the contract relationship between the parties. Formal contracts 
between organisations represent promises or obligations to perform particular actions in the 
future, specifying responsibilities, monitoring, penalties, and the outcomes to be delivered, 
and usually complement inter-organisational relationships based on cooperation (Poppo and 
Zenger, 2002, p. 708). Contracts therefore look towards the future and entail commitments to 
long-term business objectives and relationships which are strategic for the parties. As 
business strategy implicates economics, contracts, and organisation theory (Williamson, 
1999, p. 1087), a literature review should consider contracts from an economics and 
organisational theory perspective. Indeed, proponents of economics perspectives of contracts 
refer to organisational theory which emphasises socialization practices to harmonise values 
and goals among the parties as a form of performance management control (Eisenhardt, 1985, 
p. 138).  Since within organisations all contracts are fundamentally psychological (Rousseau, 
1995, p. 6), socialisation practices in contract relationships may be best understood through 
the psychological contract. The two perspectives of economics and leadership to manage 
effective contract relationships (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000, p. 670) are therefore 
economics and the psychological contract. 
The next sections discuss the economic and psychological contract perspectives. 
 
2.2.1 Economic Perspectives 
Economics focus on the transaction and the obligations of the parties to facilitate this. 
Williamson describes contracting as the efforts of the immediate parties to a transaction to 
align incentives and form governance structures to mitigate contractual hazards and realise 
mutual advantage from the voluntary exchange (Williamson, 2002, p. 172). Others highlight 
the contract specification of obligations to perform future actions, and that successful 
outcomes depend on ex ante monitoring and controls written into the contract terms, for 
example those clauses relating to the asset ownership and contestability (Domberger and 
Jensen, 1997, pp. 69 – 70, Walls, 2005, p. 214). Therefore contracts may have ex ante 
mechanisms requiring parties to undertake transaction-specific investments and credible 
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commitments, or ex post mechanisms which provide parties with rights and sanctions over 
others in the event of non-performance of other pre-specified situations (Ahimbisibwe, 
Muhwezi, and Nangoli, 2012, p. 440).  
Williamson (1979, pp. 236 – 238 and pp. 248 - 251) outlines three transaction cost economics 
contract models: classical, neoclassical, and relational. Classical contracting attempts to make 
present all the intended future outcomes pertaining to the supply of future goods or services, 
where the identity of the parties are assumed irrelevant, and contingencies, where formal 
terms are delimited, informal terms contested, and remedies are narrowly prescribed. It 
assumes that market alternatives and claims litigation are available at little cost. For example, 
if a supplier failed to deliver some relatively inexpensive equipment, the buyer may easily 
choose another supplier or easily sue the original supplier in a court of law. Neoclassical 
contracting assumes long term contracts executed in uncertain conditions, occasional 
transactions with specialised investments which have much lower opportunity costs in 
alternative uses, and their transfer to another supplier would pose asset valuation difficulties. 
For example, if government tendered and awarded a contract to supply and manage a prison, 
the supplier would likely provide a significant and long-term investment which government 
would wish to remain until the end of the contract. Indeed, there would likely be few 
suppliers in the market available to provide such an investment and service Therefore, 
whatever the difficulties arising from an incomplete contract, both parties have strong 
incentives to see the contract through to completion. From a theoretical perspective, such 
contracts are incomplete, market relief is unsatisfactory, and litigation has transaction-
rupturing features, all of which parties will endeavour to avoid. Therefore, in neoclassical 
contracting third party arbitration to resolve disputes and evaluate performance is employed. 
Relational contracting assumes recurring idiosyncratic transactions involving specialised 
assets, no obvious scale economies to be realised by inter-firm trading, and any reliance on 
market governance to be hazardous. Each party to the contract appropriates a separate profit 
stream and agrees to continue to supply or purchase. Adaptability to market changes is 
expressly provided for by contract, for example price or quantity escalation clauses, or by 
follow-on agreements. For example, a buyer may agree consultancy services whereby the 
supplier and buyer become reliant on each other, and therefore agree mechanisms to adjust 
the contract from time to time. In summary, the economic perspective on contracts describes 
the classical, neoclassical, and relational models. 
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It can be argued that the public procurement policy of frequent competitive tendering as a 
mechanism for introducing contestability into contracts (Domberger and Jensen, 1997, p. 69) 
fundamentally presumes readily available market providers, and indeed, some degree of 
market relief in the event of a dispute. In addition, EU public procurement remedies lean 
more towards litigation than arbitration (Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p. 
L335/34).  Indeed, some sources argue that public arbitration is simply one specialised type 
of legal setting for settlement of disputes (Ashenfelter and Bloom, 1984, p. 111). Therefore, 
given the assumptions of available market relief and viable recourse to litigation, it is 
possible to categorise many public contracts into the classical model.  
 
In contrast to this classical contract model of public contracts, the literature also describes 
public contracts as real world contracts. Walls (2005, p. 208) argues that the literature on 
transaction cost economics ignores three important factors making real world contracts 
incomplete: it is difficult for parties to plan ahead for all contingencies, parties have 
difficulties negotiating over such plans, and even with viable planning and negotiating the 
agreed outcomes may not be verifiable to a third party and may be unenforceable in a court of 
law. Therefore while the procurement problem is assumed to be one of ex ante asymmetric 
information coupled with moral hazard, where the supplier has additional information to the 
buyer, observations suggest that the problem is actually about ex post adaption (Bajari and 
Tadelis, 2001, p. 387). Due to the contract incompleteness, as time passes and uncertainties 
are resolved, the parties re-negotiate terms which results in some sharing of prior and non-
contractible relation-specific investments between the parties (Hart and Moore, 2008, p. 2). 
However, this description fits well the Williamson neoclassical contract model.  
 
Frequent competitive tendering makes it difficult to categorise public contracts as 
Williamson’s relational contracting. Such relational contracting assumes recurring 
idiosyncratic transactions, extensively specialised assets, and the preferred avoidance of 
market governance. It is difficult to reconcile the avoidance of market governance with the 
frequent competitive tenders required by public procurement. However sources note the 
existence of behavioural norms which emerge as a result of relational contracting between 
parties (see Austen-Baker, 2009, Jensen and Stonecash, 2004, Paulin, Perrien, and Ferguson, 
1997, and McNeil, 1974). Indeed, Macneil (1974, p. 785) observes that transactions with 
future obligational effect can only occur in some kind of social matrix providing a source of 
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obligation.   Therefore, within the economic literature there is an acknowledgement of some 
reciprocal social obligations which accompany the formal contract.  
 
In summary, while competitive tendering and the assumption of available market relief 
categorise public contracts as classical contracts, research suggests that public contracts may 
also be categorised as real world or neoclassical contracts, where the parties seek to 
overcome contract incompleteness through some re-negotiation of the terms and sharing of 
information. The economic reasons for doing so are to preserve the value of the parties’ 
‘specialised investments which have much lower opportunity costs in alternative uses’ 
(Williamson, 1979, p. 249) or to ‘leverage the potential benefits of the parties’ ex ante 
relation-specific investments’ (Hart and Moore, 2008, p. 2). While this economic perspective 
gives some insight into why parties address ex post difficulties such as contract 
incompleteness, it does not explain how they manage such difficulties. It also makes no 
reference ‘socialization practices to harmonise values and goals among the parties’ 
(Eisenhardt, 1985, p. 138) which must undoubtedly play an important part in the re-
negotiation of the contract terms. To understand more fully how parties continue and 
negotiate such contract relationships, some examination of the psychological contract is now 
required and this is discussed in the next section. 
 
2.2.2 Psychological Contract Perspectives 
The psychological contract is the belief that a promise, that is a communication of future 
intent, is accompanied by a perceived obligation (Morrison and Robinson, 1997, p. 228) in 
the context of an exchange agreement between the employing firm and its agents (Rousseau, 
2004, p. 121).  Unlike written contracts or implied contracts based on the party’s actions 
established by a court of law, the psychological contract is inherently perceptual and based on 
one party’s understanding of the contract which may not be shared by the other party 
(Robinson, 1996, p. 575). However, psychological contracts regulate behaviour though a 
variety of mechanisms including forming commitment to accepted goals of behaviour, the 
promise-keeper’s self-image, concern for potential losses by the other contract party, and the 
concern for reputation (Rousseau, 1995, pp. 24 – 26). Therefore, while the psychological 
contract is an important influence on the behaviours of parties to a written contract, these 
influences are based on beliefs and perceptions which are likely to be fragile. This section 
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discusses the origins of the psychological contract, some categories identified in the 
literature, and its relevance to inter-firm contracts.   
Cullinane and Dundon (2006, p. 115) propose that the antecedent of psychological contract 
literature is social exchange theory where social relationships have unspecified obligations 
and there is the unequal distribution of power between the parties. For example, Bottom et al 
(2006, p. 33) highlight that following social exchange theory maintains agents receiving a 
guaranteed fixed wage will feel an obligation to repay the debt and provide a high effort to 
discharge this obligation. Other sources emphasise less the distribution of power, and 
highlight the expected benefits of the relationship. For example, Robinson, Kraatz and 
Rousseau (1994, p. 138) view social exchange as cooperation between two or more 
individuals for mutual benefit, and this cooperation permeates organisational activities where 
benefits are expected to result from past or anticipated contributions. Therefore, in addition to 
any written contract obligations, there will be a psychological contract where parties will 
perform actions to meet perceived social obligations for reasons of economic power or 
expected benefits from the relationship. 
There are a number of categorisations of the psychological contract and these are usually 
discussed in the context of the employer-employee relationship. For example, O’ Neill, 
Krivokapic-Skoko and Dowell (2010, p. 7) identify two. The first addresses the concept of 
mutual obligations explicitly communicated through formal contracts or implicitly through 
expectations, and the second, adopted by most writers since the 1990s, focuses on the 
psychological contract as formulated only in the mind of the employee.  Most of the literature 
takes this individual approach. Within the individually held psychological contract, two types 
of contract are distinguished. The first is the transactional psychological contract which 
relates to brief specific monetizable exchanges, and second is the relational psychological 
contract which relate to open-ended and less specific agreements (Robinson, Kraatz and 
Rousseau, 1994, p. 138). De Cuyper et al (2008, p. 544) suggest that all psychological 
contracts are likely to have a strong economic focus with transactional psychological 
contracts based on performance and monetizable exchange, while the relational psychological 
contracts include both monetizable and non-monetizable exchanges aimed at maintaining 
long-term employment relationships. In addition to these categories, there is also a more 
recently observed hybrid or balanced psychological contract where open-ended commitments 
are combined with performance demands and flexibility towards economic conditions, 
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sharing risks between parties (Rousseau, 2004, pp. 122 - 123). Much of the research into the 
psychological contract concerns breaches or lack of fulfilment of the perceived obligations by 
the employer. Robinson and Rousseau (1994, p. 254) find that psychological contracts are 
frequently violated, and such violations are negatively associated with satisfaction, trust, and 
intention to remain with the organisation. Robinson (1996, p. 592) finds that the 
psychological contract breach may be enduring over long periods of time and impacts three 
forms of employee contribution: performance, civic virtue behaviour, and intentions to 
remain with the organisation. Robinson and Morrison (2000, p. 541) suggest a form of 
mirroring behaviours may emerge where the organisation is unwilling to fulfil promises 
because of poor performance and the employees reduce performance in response to a 
perceived breach, and each party to the contract maintains its side of the bargain only to the 
extent that the other party does. Interestingly, this performance deficit is addressed by 
management efforts to ensure the individual’s perceptions match those of the contract 
between the parties, establishing the explicitly communicated mutual obligations identified 
by O’ Neill, Krivokapic-Skoko and Dowell (2010). 
Rousseau (2004, p. 123) suggests that since it is the individual’s beliefs that a common 
understanding binds the parties to the course of action, the agreement between the parties on 
what each owes the other is critical to the relationship success, and managers need to initiate 
discussions that allow parties share perspectives and create mutuality in the psychological 
contract. While the focus of the psychological contract literature is often the individual’s 
beliefs regarding obligations (Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998, p. 680), a mutual psychological 
contract can exist where the parties hold the same beliefs regarding their obligations to one 
another (Rousseau, 2001, p. 534). Freese and Schalk (2008, p. 270) suggest that while the 
unilateral view with its individual perceptions is methodologically easier to measure, the 
bilateral view of the earlier literature is useful in clarifying differences in perspectives 
between employees and supervisors which could resolve organisational conflicts. Indeed, the 
foremost problem underlying the psychological contract is how to create agreement between 
parties to the exchange, and this requires effort towards promoting mutuality and contract 
fulfilment for parties (Rousseau, 2001, p. 538). 
While most discussed in the context of the employees in organisations, the literature also 
demonstrates application of the psychological contract to the principal agent relationship in 
other types of contracts.  For example, Lusch and Brown (1996, p. 32) find in an empirical 
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study that when wholesaler-distributers and suppliers have a high need for each other, there is 
greater reliance on the normative contract and this increases performance of the wholesaler. 
Hill et al (2009, p. 283) argue that it is reasonable to extend evaluation of the psychological 
contract theory to the inter-organisational level of the buyer-supplier relationship, since the 
sentiment of the individual in the boundary-spanning role is expected to mirror that of the 
organisation’s members collectively. Kingshott (2006, pp. 727 - 734) posits that given the 
highly interactive nature within the supplier-buyer relationships, psychological contracts will 
exist between these exchange partners based on promises of future intent inferred implicitly 
through signalling, initiating, and disclosing behaviours which signify relational longevity. 
He finds that while failure to perform some of the inter-firm psychological contract promises 
is inevitable, not all contract violations are inevitable and the development of the 
psychological contract leads to better relational bonds. Llewllyn (2001, p. 224) uses the 
psychological contract in an exploratory study of internal service relationships in a 
telecommunications company and finds that expectations of reciprocity support the quality of 
internal services between departments. Sabherwal (1999, p. 81) highlights that resolving 
issues in inter-organizational relationships requires attention to the formal written contract as 
well as the psychological unwritten one. Heiskanen et al (2008, 270) note that a formal 
written contract and a psychological contract may support outsourcing governance.  Koh, 
Soon and Straub (2004, p. 359) highlight that psychological contract theory offers a highly 
relevant and sound theoretical lens for studying contract management because of its reliance 
on mutual rather than one-sided obligations between the parties, the psychological rather than 
the legal obligations, and its emphasis on the individual rather than the inter-organizational 
level of analysis. Since inter-organisational agreements are vested in individual personal 
relationships (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994, p. 103), it is possible to view the contractual 
relationship between the principal and agent as a psychological contract.  
This dissertation’s central proposition argues that the management of real world incomplete 
contracts during the ex post implementation stage requires additional theoretical perspectives 
to those explained by the economic perspective. The psychological contract where open-
ended commitments are combined with performance demands and flexibility towards 
economic conditions, sharing risks between parties (Rousseau, 2004, pp. 122 - 123), may 
form a model for understanding the actions of the principal and the agent who endeavour to 
optimise ex post outcomes for incomplete written contracts.   
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Complete shorter term 
contracts, formal rules, 
available market relief, and 
disputes relsoved through 
litigation 







Incomplete longer term and 
flexible contracts, 
commitment to complete 
contract, and disputes 






Social  Exchange 
Theory 
Performance based on the 
individual’s  perception of 
obligations in anticipation of 
reciprocal contributions from 
the other party. 
Kingshott (2006) 
Koh, Soon & Straub (2004) 
Rousseau (2001) 
Sabherwal (1999) 




2.2.3 Summary of Contract Perspectives 
In summary, the literature on contracts describes three models, two written contract models 
based on the economic transaction, and one psychological contract relying on the social 
exchange. These are summarised in Table 2.1. Public contracts frequently fit a classical 
contract model, with the emphasis on available market relief for new or failing contracts, 
legal rules having precedence over oral arrangements, and litigation in the event of disputes. 
Public contracts may also be described as real world contracts which fit the neoclassical 
model. These are frequently longer term contracts with more flexible workings that 
acknowledge incompleteness and accept arbitration in order to preserve the contract 
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relationship and complete the contract goals.  Finally, in parallel with the two economic 
models, there is a psychological contract which relies on beliefs about the required 
behaviours to fulfil the social obligation due to the other party. Here, parties will endeavour 
to repay perceived obligations in anticipation of past or future reciprocal contributions.  
Having identified these main contract models, it is necessary to review the literature in 
relation to the management of such contracts during the implementation period after the 
written contract is signed. The next sections discuss the ex post management approaches to 
influence performance in the context of the written and psychological contracts. 
 
2.3 MANAGEMENT APPROACHES 
The ex post management approaches to public contracts may be viewed from a public 
administration and a contracting perspective. In public administration, the management of 
agencies is frequently viewed as a matter of procedural techniques for monitoring those with 
decision-making powers (Croley, 1998, p. 167). For example, politicians impose 
administrative procedures on agencies as constraints to improve control by ensuring 
consultation prior to decision thereby reducing uncertainty surrounding bureaucratic 
performance and outcomes (Potoski, 1999, p. 625). These administrative procedures result in 
ex post mechanisms similar to that of contract management. For example, McCubbins, Noll, 
and Weingast (1987, p. 244) describe the political control of agencies as a principal-agent 
problem requiring two types of controls: administrative procedures and oversight comprising 
monitoring, rewarding, and punishing bureaucratic behaviour. In relation to contract 
management, Williamson (1999, p. 1090) notes that it should be farsighted whereby parties 
recognise hazards and devise safeguards to realise mutual gain such as information 
disclosure, discussion, and dispute settlement which permit the parties to work through their 
differences and get on with the job. Therefore formal ex post management mechanisms 
recorded in the written contact will include agreed information systems and means of 
resolving disputes. The literature concerning the management of contracts is agency theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1985, p. 136). 
In addition to these formal mechanisms of ex post management, there are also informal 
mechanisms which rely on the relationship between the contracting parties. For example, 
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Coase (2006, p. 206) finds that long term supply contracts between independent firms are 
partly governed by the informal relations between the parties. The management of the 
informal relationships rely on mechanisms which influence the perceptions of a party in 
relation to their expectations and obligations within the contract relationship. These 
influencing mechanisms are signals which are discussed in the literatures of economics and 
the psychological contract. For example, in information economics, Spence (1973, p. 654) 
proposes that spending interpersonal time and demonstrating willingness to spend 
interpersonal time with the other party functions as a signal communicating commitment, and 
greatly assists resolving disputes. In the psychological contract literature, signals are 
observed spoken and unspoken communications of future intentions, from administrative and 
organisational practices, which individuals interpret as promised commitments and make 
judgements to fulfil obligations which arise from these (Rousseau, 1995, pp. 36 – 40).   
In summary, the ex post management of contacts may be reviewed from the literatures of 
agency theory in relation to the written contract mechanisms, and the literatures of 
information economics and the psychological contract in relation to influencing signal 
mechanisms of the contract relationship. The next sections review first agency theory, and 
then economic and psychological contract signals. 
 
2.3.1 Agency Theory Approaches 
The theory underpinning the management of public tendering, the written contract, 
incentives, and the contract relationship is widely held to be agency theory (Sappington and 
Stiglitz, 1987, p. 569, Eisenhardt, 1985, p. 136, Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 65, Moe, 1984, p. 754 
and Logan, 2000, p. 22). The agency relationship arises between two parties when one, the 
agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as a representative for the other, the principal, in the particular 
domain of decision problems (Ross, 1973, p. 134). The principal agent relationship is 
examined in a number of literatures including sociology, law, management, political science 
(Shapiro, 2005, p. 265 - 274), legal (Seavey, 1920, p. 860), political (Moe, 1984, p. 766), and 
public regulatory behaviour (Mitnick, 1975, p. 27).  Well known agency problems are 
adverse selection of a low quality agent and the moral hazard of poor performance (Moe, 
1984, pp. 754 – 755).  The adverse selection of an inappropriate agent is the agency problem 
relating to the ex-ante contract, especially the competitive tender process. The ex post 
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management issue concerns the agency problem of how to manage poor performance. This 
section discusses the development of agency theory, its assumptions, and its proposals for ex 
post contract management. 
Donaldson (1990, p. 370) maintains that both agency theory and transaction costs economics 
emerged from organisational economics to become theoretical paradigms for management. 
The main aspects of this paradigm are that efficiencies of economic organisation may link to 
human, transaction, and technology issues. Of particular importance are the human factors of 
bounded rationality, opportunism, and atmosphere (non-pecuniary benefits), and the 
transactional factors of uncertainty, small numbers, and information impactedness 
(Williamson, 1973, pp. 316 – 318). Eisenhardt (1989, pp. 59) takes a narrower view and sees 
the roots of agency theory in information economics.  Information economics holds that 
market information about other parties must be acquired through expenditure on information 
gathering or by making inferences based on their behaviour (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 472). Since 
limited information may result in good projects being rejected and bad projects being 
accepted, information asymmetry is a problem within economic organisational design 
(Stiglitz, 2004, p. 19). Therefore agency theory literature is much concerned about the 
information asymmetry between the parties, and the view that relevant information for 
contract arrangements may be obtained provided a sufficient price is paid. Eisenhardt (1989, 
pp. 59 - 64) identifies two lines of research: the principal-agent which is concerned with the 
general theory of the principal-agent relationship, which may be applied to employer-
employee, lawyer-client, or buyer-supplier relationships, and the positivist agency theory 
which focuses on the special case of the principal-agent relationship between owners and 
managers of large corporations, and identifies goal conflict situations, contract alternatives, 
and governance mechanisms comprising information systems or outcome based incentives to 
align managerial behaviours with the owner preferences. Therefore, positivist agency theory 
offers useful recommendations regarding governance of contracts during the ex post stage. 
Agency theory is underpinned by a number of organisational, human, and informational 
assumptions. The organizational assumptions are held to be goal conflict among participants, 
efficiency as an effectiveness criterion, and information asymmetry between principal and 
agent (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 58 - 59). The human assumptions of agency theory are self-
interest, bounded rationality, and risk aversion (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 58 - 59). The 
informational assumptions centre on the fact is that it is a purchasable commodity 
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(Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 58 - 59). Therefore Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) note that in 
most agency relationships, the principal incurs positive monitoring costs as a result of the 
agent not making optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint.  The reduction to a 
purchasable commodity is challenged, at least in part, by the so-called policing paradox 
(Mitnick, 1975, p. 27) due to the observer’s lack of knowledge about the principal and agent 
goal states and information levels. Indeed, Moe (1984, p. 754) notes the unobservability of 
the information, beliefs, and values on which the decisions of others are based. It is this 
unobservability that challenges the information assumption. Hodgson (2004, p. 408 - 412) 
argues that the agent’s understanding of the principal’s intentions will never be identical to 
that of the principal, and sometimes principals cannot monitor agents even when information 
on behaviour is costless, because they do not have the necessary knowledge about production 
processes or outcomes. Therefore, agency theory assumes that parties to organised 
endeavours have goal conflict, self-interest, and information asymmetry. It also assumes that 
significant relevant information may be purchased to manage these endeavours. 
Agency theory proposes two approaches that a principal can take to manage the issues of goal 
conflict, self-interest, and information asymmetry within the working of the contract. The 
first is an information system to facilitate the measurement of the agent’s performance in 
terms of behavioural inputs or contract outcomes, and the second is a set of contract 
incentives or penalties that induce the agent to accept the contract outcome risks and work to 
secure the outcomes desired by the principal (Eisenhardt, 1985, pp. 135 - 139). Therefore the 
initial work of the principal is to carefully specify ex ante contract terms which contain the 
most appropriate incentives and information systems to induce the agent to perform and to 
monitor the behaviours or outcomes to ensure the contract objectives will be achieved. For 
example, in public contracts, it is held that frequent tendering is a strong incentive as it 
imposes ‘contestability’ into publicly funded services (Domberger and Jensen, 1997, p. 69).  
Or in the case of a building contract, the client may incentivise the inputs by paying on a 
‘time and materials’ basis, or the outputs by paying a fixed price for the project completion. 
In fixed-price contracts, the buyer offers the supplier a pre-specified price for completing the 
project, while a cost-plus contract does not specify a price but rather reimburses the supplier 
for costs plus a stipulated fee (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, p. 388).  These measures require 
appropriate information systems. As a minimum, the input approach requires the client to 
monitor the hours and materials spent. Therefore, cost-plus contracts offer lower incentive to 
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the supplier, allocate more risk to the buyer, are flexible and cheap to change, incentivise 
quality, and result in a less adversarial relationship (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, pp. 388 - 389). 
This approach assumes the agent and principal maintain a collaborative approach during the 
contract. The output contract requires the client to monitor the quality. Fixed-price contracts 
have higher design costs for the buyer, are less incentivising of quality, create strong cost-
reducing incentives for the supplier through ex ante competition, but leave the buyer at risk of 
losing these cost savings when an incomplete contract leads to re-negotiations arising from 
the suppliers private knowledge of the contract costs (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, p. 399).  All 
such monitoring entails some cost to the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308) and 
has associated risks. For example, since quality is more difficult to measure than costs, cost-
reduction incentives may overwhelm quality improvements and lead to shading by the 
contractor (Jensen and Stonecash, 2004, pp. 3 - 10).  
 
 
Table 2.2 - Agency Theory Management Approach to the Written Contract 
Theoretical 
Perspective 




Information Systems Domberger & Jensen (1997) 
Sappington & Stiglitz (1987) 
Eisenhardt (1985) 
Incentives & Penalties Domberger & Jensen (1997) 




The ex post contract management mechanisms derived from agency theory are shown in 
Table 2.2. In summary, while ex ante control mechanisms are requirements and incentives, 
such as contract agreements applied to prevent agency problems, ex post requirements and 
incentives are applied after the agreement is reached, such as monitoring, reporting, audits, 
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and investigation by the principal or a third party incentivised to observe and influence the 
agent (Hansson, 2010, p. 125).  
 
The ex post management mechanisms offered by agency theory have strengths and 
limitations. For example, agency theory stresses the use of information systems for 
performance measurement and incentives to motivate the acceptance of risk (Eisenhardt, 
1988, p. 490). These aspects draw attention to the importance of the principal specifying in 
the written contract sufficient incentives and information systems as can be envisaged at the 
time of the contract design. However, unless the required measures are specified ex-ante in 
the written contract, they will not be available as agreed ex post mechanisms. Also, agency 
theory does not address power issues within the relationship. For example while close joint 
working suggests a collaboration of equals and mutual interdependence, the principal must 
have sufficient power in the relationship to counteract that of the agent (Loader, 2010, p. 44). 
However, agency theory seems to reflect public procurement management models for the 
allocation of risks and rewards (for example, see the requirements for EU public works and 
concession contracts in Commission of the European Communities, 2000, p. 3).  It must be 
borne in mind that the central procurement problem is not that the supplier knows more than 
the buyer at the beginning of the contract, but rather that both the buyer and the supplier share 
uncertainty after the contract is signed due to design failures, unanticipated conditions, and 
changes in regulatory requirements (Tadelis, 2012, p. 297). Dispute settlement (Williamson, 
1999, p. 1090) is also absent as an agency theory mechanism. The specified incentives and 
information systems of agency theory are therefore not complete ex post management 
mechanisms.  
In summary, while the agency theory mechanisms of incentives and information systems 
address important ex post management challenges of the written contract (Eisenhardt, 1985), 
complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete (Williamson, 1999, p. 1089) and subject to 
unforeseen contingencies (Walls, 2005, p. 208). Unforeseen contingencies are those 
challenges to the contract goals for which no agreed remedies are specified in the written 
contract. They represent crises for the principal and agent who no longer have an agreed basis 
to continue working together to return the benefits of the contract to their respective 
organisations. As they are an unavoidable challenge to ex post contract management, some 
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alternative mechanisms, outside those specified in the written contract, must be sought and 
used by the principal and agent. 
Sources maintain that successful contracting also depends on the preparedness of the parties 
to realise mutual gain despite difficulties (Williamson, 1999, p. 1090) and some informal 
means of governance arising from the relationship between the contract parties (Coase, 2006, 
p. 206). Such preparedness and informal means of governance rely on the expectations and 
perceived obligations by the parties to the contract. The mechanisms which influence 
expectations and perceived obligations are signals (Rousseau, 1995, pp. 36 – 40, and Spence, 
1973, p. 651). To consider the influencing mechanisms available to the principal in the 
management of the ex post contract relationship, the next sections consider economic and 
psychological contract signals.  
 
2.3.2 Signals Theory Approaches 
Signals may be understood using Shannon’s theory of communication model (Shannon, 
1948, p. 381) from which a more general model may be developed. Shannon identifies the 
fundamental problem of communication as reproducing at one point a message selected at 
another point, and he proposes a general model that comprises an information source sending 
a message, a transmitter transforming the message into a signal, which is assumed to import 
noise, with an inverse process undertaken by a receiver, which then passes the message and 
noise to a destination or person intended to receive the message (Shannon, 1948, pp. 380 - 
381).   Eliminating the transmitter, receiver, and noise from Shannon’s model corresponds to 
a practical understanding (Warner, 2007, p. 318), and leaves the three essential terms of 
communication theory: the sender, the receiver and the information or communication that 
relates them (Stichweh, 2000, p. 10). This approach reflects the situation of a principal 
seeking to influence an agent. The signalling view of communication is important because it 
broadens communication to include actions as well as words. The expenditure of the sender’s 
time in social interaction (Spence, 1973, pp. 651 - 652) or spoken and unspoken 
communications of intentions (Rousseau, 1995, pp. 30 - 40) are signals which may influence 
the decisions of the receiver. Therefore the sender’s demonstrations or actions are means of 
communication which, in addition to spoken and written communication, are significant in 
influencing the receiver and have application as an ex post  contract management mechanism. 
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Figure 2.1 – Signals Communication Model (Source: Author, based on Warner, 





A signals model of communication between a sender and receiver may now be developed 
(see Figure 2.1). This has application for communications between the principal as the sender 
and the agent as the receiver. While the principal may discuss with the agent the revised 
requirements, he also needs to influence the agent’s perception towards a new mental model 
of the contract and a perceived obligation to fulfil the new requirements. Signals, therefore, 
are important mechanisms by which the sender influences interpretation and reinforces roles 
within a contractual relationship.   The principal, through words and actions, sends a signal to 
the agent. These observed words and actions are interpreted by the agent as promises to 
continue the partnership and influence the agent’s sense of obligation. The literature offers 
examples of signals used in the context of influence within relationships. For example, 
professions such as auditors use vagueness in labels and policy statements because they 
represent explicit signals of the profession’s usefulness, assist them in power relations with 
management and regulators, and are interpretable as a strategic resource for the audit 
profession (Lee, 1994, p. 37 - 43). Also, in the human resources management context, it is 
recognised that signals allow understanding by managers of those mechanisms that create 
psychological contracts (Suazo, Martínez and Sandoval, 2009, p. 163). The signals approach 
is now discussed from the economic and the psychological contract perspectives. 
 
2.3.2.1 Economic Perspective of Signals 
Information economics holds that human actions convey information leading people to alter 
behaviours and changing how markets function (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 473). Signals are visible 
actions intended to communicate information from those with more to those with less 
(Spence, 2002, p. 434) to which rational informed receivers respond positively if the signal 
expenditures are observable, even if not perfectly so (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986, p. 797). 
Sender Signal Receiver Influence Intentions 
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There are a number of assumptions underpinning such actions that influence behaviours. For 
example, as individuals have a self-interested incentive to present themselves as more able 
than they actually are, only costly actions convey information (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 473).  In 
economic and social interaction, signals entail the expenditure of time (Spence, 1973, pp. 651 
- 652). Therefore signals may be viewed as meaningful actions comprising the expenditure of 
human time in economic and social interaction, which can influence the observer towards 
new behaviours. The more non-functional or less transactional the action is, the greater it’s 
informational content as a signal (Spence, 1973, p. 654).  Because the principal’s 
communication can reduce the agent’s misinterpretation of the written contract (Hodgson, 
2004, p. 409), the principal is likely to send signals to reinforce understanding of the contract 
requirements, and the agent is likely to be sensitive to any indications of the principal’s 
intentions for the desired outcomes. The literature notes signals of relevance to the ex post 
contract management which may be sent by the principal to show his intentions for the future 
and influence the agent. These signals by the principal and the signal influence on the agent 
are shown in Tables 2.3, and from this an economics signals communication model for the 
principal and agent is developed. This is shown in Figure 2.2. 
A principal sends signals to influence the agent’s interpretation of the written contract. These 
are actions by the principal including demonstrations of their time spent, their resources, or 
their seniority of position in the relationship. The expenditure of interpersonal time is 
interpreted as a signal of interest which increases influence with the amount of time spent 
(Spence, 1973, p. 653).  Influence on interpretation also derives from the communicator’s 
resources including budgetary control, expertise, and social skills (Lawrence et al, 2005, p. 
184).  The influence of the signal is stronger the more senior the figure spending the time, 
resulting in the non-functional attendance of leadership figures as signals at events (Spence, 
1973, p. 653). Therefore, a principal’s signals influence the agent’s interpretation of the 
written contract requirements. The influence of these signals relate to the observed 
expenditure of time sending the signal, the resources of sender, and the organisational 
authority of the sender. These signal influences may be labelled time, authority and resource 
influences respectively. Therefore the principal endeavours to influence the agent’s 
interpretation of the written contract by demonstrating time, resource, and position through 
his signals. For example, the principal demonstrates interest in the agent by showing a 
willingness to spend interpersonal time with the agent; the principal shows that he has control 
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of the contract budget and the necessary skills to manage the contract; and the principal 
proves that he is in a senior position in his organisation or has ready access to such figures in 
his organisation. 
  
Table 2.3 – Economic Perspective of Signals 
Signals from Sender (Principal) Influence on Receiver (Agent) 





Spence (1973) Lawrence et al 
(2005) 
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An agent’s observation of the signals provides additional information, incentives, and mutual 
interest in relation to the written contract, and influences interpretation of the required 
performance.  An agent’s observation of principal’s signals may reinforce the written contract 
information. For example, problems in the management of projects are indicated by changes 
from verbal to more formal written communication such as writing a letter (Nikander and 
Eloranta, 2001, pp. 387 - 388).  An agent’s observation of such communication changes are 
information signals that the performance is unacceptable to the principal. A principal’s 
36 
 
signals may act as incentives to the agent, complementing those of the written contract. For 
example, a principal sends signals to incentivise the agent’s performance by reinforcing their 
self-confidence in their ability to complete the task, and highlighting how a good 
performance will improve the agent’s future prospects (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003, p. 491). 
An agent observing demonstrations of confidence by the principal receives an incentive 
signal to continue through contract difficulties. An agent will view certain principal’s signals 
as demonstrating a community of interest towards achieving the contract goals. For example, 
a demonstration of willingness to spend time to discuss a disagreement between parties 
contributes more to a resolution of a dispute than any verbal declaration (Spence, 1973, p. 
654). An agent observing such a demonstration realises that both he and the principal have a 
mutual interest in finding a resolution to contract challenges, and preserve the expected 
benefits of the contract for their organisations. Therefore, signals by the principal act as 
influences on the agent by demonstrating information, incentives, or mutual interests. For 
example, the agent observes information signals comprising changes from informal verbal to 
formal written means of communication highlighting concerns of the principal; the agent 
receives incentive signals in the form of positive assurances from the principal on his ability 
to perform the contract and for future contracts; and the agent receives assurances on his 
ability to perform the contract or receives positive indications for future contracts from the 
principal.  
 
Figure 2.2 – Economics Signals Communication Model (Source: Author, based on 



















In conclusion, the principal’s signals of time spent, their resources, or their seniority of 
position in the relationship may be used to provide to the agent additional information, 
incentives, and mutual interest in relation to the written contract, and influence the agent’s 
interpretation of the required performance. The next section reviews the psychological 
contract view of signals that may be used in the ex post management of contracts.  
 
2.3.2.2 Psychological Contract Perspective of Signals 
An alternative signals perspective is given by psychological contract theory. Rousseau (1995, 
pp. 36 – 39) gives the external factors contributing to psychological contracts as (a) 
organisational events signalling intentions for the future (including overt statements, 
observations, expression of policy), and (b) social constructions and social cues received 
from co-workers which shape how the individuals interpret the organisation’s messages and 
provide social pressure to conform. In addition, Rousseau (1995, pp. 40 – 43) details that the 
receiver of such messages or signals will encode the message, that is interpret the observed 
actions as credible promises depending on their perceptions of the contract maker as (i) 
operating in a context appropriate to promise making such as communicating required 
performance standards, (ii) behaving in ways consistent with the commitment made, such as 
reinforcing the message through the compensation system, and (iii) having power, authority, 
or capacity to make the commitment.  
Therefore, in a principal agent relationship, the principal communicates performance, 
reinforces the message by linking the contract payment to satisfactory performance, and 
displays authority as the contract maker. Therefore managers play the central role in actively 
shaping the worker’s psychological contract in the way they reward, motivate, and signal to 
employees what to expect from the firm in the future, tailoring recruitment efforts to signal 
broader requirements, and using top-down communication on performance deliverables 
(Rousseau, 2004, p. 124). As mental models of contracts tend to continue until a noticeable 
signal conveys an interruption (Rousseau, 1995, p. 30), during the ex post contract stage a 
principal may communicate change information to the agent by sending signals which shape 
and change the agent’s psychological contract. These signals and the influences on the agent 
are shown in Table 2.4, and from these a psychological contract signals communication 
model for the principal and agent is developed. This is shown in Figure 2.3.  
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Table 2.4 – Psychological Contract Perspective of Signals 
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capacity to make 
contract 
commitment on 
behalf of own 
organisation. 
The agent focuses 
on the information 
that is relevant to 
his interests or 
prospects. 
The agent decides 
the standards of 
behaviour that are 
to fulfil his 
perceived 





Psychological contract signals comprise organisational events and social cues which 
influence how individuals interpret the organisation’s messages and exert social pressure to 
conform (Rousseau, 1995, pp. 36 – 39).  Such events or social cues in the contract 
relationship are signals communicated from the contract maker or principal as the sender to 
the individual or agent as the receiver. Psychological contract signalling events or social cues 
comprise those which communicate performance standards, apply the compensation system, 
and demonstrate the authority to make the contract commitment (Rousseau, 1995, pp. 40 – 
43). These are termed as performance communication signals, message reinforcement 
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signals, and authority display signals respectively. Therefore, to shape the agent’s 
psychological contract using signals, the principal must act to demonstrate his role as the 
contract maker to the agent. For example, a performance communication signal appropriate to 
a contract maker is the communication of the required performance standard to the agent. A 
message reinforcement signal is an action by the principal reinforcing the agent’s 
performance such as linking payment to performance through audits. An authority display 
signal is any action to display to the agent that the principal has the support of his 
organisation to make decisions about the contract. 
Signals influence individuals’ perceptions or misperceptions about their psychological 
contract with the other party (Suazo, Martínez and Sandoval, 2009, p. 155). In the situation of 
a principal seeking to influence an agent, the  agent will observe these signals from the 
principal and interpret them, and decide how to act on the information contained in them. The 
psychological contract is formed in the context of the wider social relationship and the 
expected benefits arising from the contract. Such social relationships entail unequal 
distribution of power between the parties and unspecified obligations (Cullinane and Dundon, 
2006, p. 115). In addition, parties cooperate where benefits are expected to result from past or 
anticipated contributions (Robinson, Kraatz, and Rousseau, 1994, p. 138). Therefore the 
agent will decide whether the observed signals from a principal are credible, interpret them as 
promises or future intentions, and make judgements of his required behaviour to fulfil his 
obligations under the psychological contract. How signals are interpreted depends on the 
observer’s own individual predispositions, which include cognitive biases, such as focusing 
on information directly relevant to one’s own interest, and motives, such as how the job 
affects their long-term career (Rousseau, 1995, pp. 43 – 44). The observer then makes 
behaviour judgements regarding the standards of behaviour to fulfil these commitments, since 
psychological contracts are a form of self-control encouraging people to keep their 
commitments (Rousseau, 1995, p. 44). Therefore, through the psychological contract which is 
influenced by signals from a credible contract maker, the individual may make a commitment 






Figure 2.3 - Psychological Contract Signals Communication Model (Source: author, 










In summary, from the psychological contract view of signals, the principal’s signals of 
performance communication, message reinforcement, and authority display may be used to 
address ex post contract management contingencies, influencing the agent’s perceived 
obligations and his response to these contingencies. This is to a degree parallel to the 
economics view of signals as a means to address contingencies arising from the unwritten 
contract incompleteness. Interestingly, the psychological contract view highlights the concept 
of the agent’s individual dispositions towards information relevant to his prospect as 
influencing his judgements. To decide which view of signals gives the most understanding of 
how and why managers use ex post mechanisms is a matter for empirical work. However, the 
literature review enables a first conceptual model to be presented, and this is the subject of 
the next section. 
 
2.4 FIRST CONCEPTUAL MODEL  
This thesis investigates how and why management mechanisms are used and whether a 
conceptual model can be developed to better understand ex post contact management. To 
form a view of what constitutes desirable performance to make purposive analysis possible, it 
is first necessary to construct an abstract version of the problem (Bowers, 1972, p. 281). 
Figure 2.4 shows the first conceptual model. The objective of this first conceptual model is to 
    




















summarise from the literatures reviewed a view of the mechanisms used by managers of 
incomplete contracts as they endeavour to manage ex post challenges towards optimum 
outcomes.    
 











Recall that the contract objectives, incentives, and information systems are specified by the 
principal in the written contract terms. When events proceed as envisaged by the terms of the 
ex-ante contract, the incentives and information systems suffice as ex post contract 
management mechanisms to enable the contract outcomes to be achieved. The principal’s ex 
post contract management tasks consist mainly of administering the information systems and 
incentives as defined by agency theory.  
However, due to the incompleteness of contracts, the objectives are likely to become 
challenged by unforeseen environmental events, and the written contract incentives and 
information systems no longer suffice. Both the principal and the agent are motivated to find 
solutions to enable the contract to continue, and will develop approaches based on the 
informal relational governance or indeed the psychological contract. For the purposes of the 
conceptual model, the informational relational governance and psychological contract are 
jointly termed the unwritten contract. Signals, whether understood by the economics or 
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psychological contract perspectives, may influence this unwritten contract.  Therefore, in 
addition to the means offered by the written contract, the principal may send signals to the 
agent and influence the unwritten contract obligations perceived by the agent.  These revised 
obligations, together with the mechanisms of the written contract, induce a response from the 
agent.  
In conclusion, this model proposes that ex post contract management mechanisms comprise 
the principal’s administration of the written contract incentives and information systems 
together with the unwritten contract mechanisms of signals as defined by either the 
economics or the psychological perspective. As underspecified formulations often serve well 
the investigation of conceptual problems, the notion of a loose coupling may be useful in 
describing such organisational puzzles (Orton and Weick, 1990, p. 204). Loose coupling 
imagery argues that any one means is loosely coupled to the end in the sense that there are 
alternative pathways to the same end (Weick, 1976, p. 4). Therefore either or both 
mechanisms of the written contract or signals may be used to induce a response from the 
agent. That is, based on either or both the written contract mechanisms and his interpretation 
of the principal’s signals, the agent decides his response to the contract requirements.  
There are a number of findings from the literature review. A finding on the first conceptual 
model based on the literature is that ex post contact management mechanisms have a dual 
aspect, based on the written and the unwritten contracts. The individual perspectives of the 
economic contract or the psychological contract are insufficient as theoretical explanations of 
ex post management of incomplete contracts. In addition, as complex contracts are 
unavoidably incomplete, all ex post contract management entails the management of change, 
and may therefore be viewed as part of organisational change management. This management 
of change also uses both economic and social mechanisms, and this finding allows an 
appropriate definition for such mechanisms. Therefore organisational mechanisms describe 
how interacting elements produce an effect not inherent in any one of them, and may be used 
to explain how ideas are implemented and perceptions cue actions in times of economic and 
social change (Davis and Marquis, 2005, p. 336). This definition assists the understanding of 
the ex post contract mechanisms, including the incentives, information systems, and signals. 
Having formed an abstract version based of what constitutes desirable performance from the 
literature, more purposive analysis is now possible. It is necessary to develop a 
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methodological approach towards an empirical investigation taking into account the agency 
theory mechanisms, and the signalling mechanisms available under the economics and 























CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the methodology used to address the research questions, and proposes 
a problem-driven and theory building research strategy using interpretative and qualitative 
methods applied to a number of case studies.  Recall that the literature review highlights that 
neither the economic nor the psychological contract perspectives are individually sufficient to 
explain ex post contract mechanisms of incomplete contracts, and that a theoretic gap existed. 
It also highlights for practitioners that a change management approach is required to 
understand the required social and economic mechanisms to address unforeseen 
contingencies. When the research challenge lies in finding either good postulates to support 
theory or good theory relevant to the problem, normatively orientated field research can 
provide propositions to build theory relevant to practitioners, and provide new insights into 
practical problems (Bowers, 1972, p. 25). The choice of methodology, then, revolves around 
certain basic assumptions about what the organisational researcher is investigating and how 
they should go about it (Morey and Luthans, 1984, p. 27). The research questions seek to 
understand how and why managers of public contracts endeavour to secure successful 
outcomes, and develop a conceptual model of ex post contract management. This is of both 
theoretical and management relevance since the literature does not provide a complete 
explanation of written and unwritten contract mechanisms during the ex post stage of the 
contract. Such research relevant to both theory and practice presents challenges of rigour to 
the researcher. However, Phillips and Pugh (2005, pp. 50 - 53) propose that research to 
address such real world applications may be conducted through a logical and rigorous 
process. To develop such a logical and rigorous process, this section uses the research 
questions to develop the research strategy, philosophy, methodology, and methods to guide 
the empirical work, and schematic of the research approach is shown in Figure 3.1. These 
topics are now discussed in turn. 
 
3.1 RESEARCH STRATEGY 
This thesis’s research questions concern how and why management mechanisms are used by 
managers and whether a conceptual model can be developed to better understand ex post 
contact management. Therefore, the research goals are driven by how and why questions, a 
focus on a real world problem and events, and aims to develop theory to fill a gap in the 
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existing theoretical frameworks. These goals, then, impose a certain direction on the research 
strategy.  
The conventional scientific approach is based on a deduction of hypotheses from theory, 
expression of operational variables, and a test of these to evaluate the theory (Saunders, 
Lewis, and Thornhill, 2003, p. 86). However, Davis and Marquis (2005, p. 334) argue that 
while paradigm-driven work begins with hypotheses deduced from theory and uses events to 
test these hypotheses,  problem-driven research in contrast  is oriented towards explaining 
events in the world starting with the question of why. Therefore, while deduction is part of 
the logic of scientific enquiry, inductive research methodology generates new theories and 
explanations (Mintzberg, 1979, p. 584). For example, Van de Ven (1989, pp. 486 - 488) notes 
that inconsistencies between theories may provide opportunities to develop more 
encompassing theories, and the essential ingredients of a new theoretical contribution are 
explicit treatments of how and why. Driven by its research questions, this study has essential 
explanatory and theory development goals and requires a strategy appropriate to these. 
Bowers (1972, pp. 25 - 26) explains his theory building research strategy for real world 
problems as a two-step inductive approach to arrive at a deductive system. The first step is to 
describe the forces that affect the process, seeking patterns from the data and using evidence 
from other studies as well as existing theory. The second step is, from the empirical findings, 
to invent more general propositions to derive other findings and an improved model of the 
process.  
Bowers’s research strategy for theory building with real world problems has two useful 
implications to offer for this study. In the first place, the above strategy is a significantly 
inductive approach which is apt to provide a more encompassing conceptual model and 
explain the ex post management of contracts. While contrasting with the deductive approach, 
the inductive research strategy is logical and rigorous in that is immersed in existing literature 
and theory as well as empirical data. In the second place, the above strategy views real world 
problems as processes. Process thinking assumes that social reality is not in a steady state, 
human conduct is in a process of becoming, and the aim of the researcher is to catch this 
reality in flight (Pettigrew, 1997, p. 338). This appears in contrast to the focus of problem-
driven research comprising a system of actors, actions, and relations (Davis and Marquis, 
2005, p. 337) which emphasises studying more fixed and defined entities rather than 
processes. The consequence for this study is to integrate a theory building process approach 
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with a real world problem-focused study of defined entities. This paradoxical challenge is 
highlighted by considering the two traditional extremes views of the world. In ancient 
philosophy Democritus pictured all of nature as composed of stable material substances or 
things that changed only in their positioning in space and time, while Heraclitus viewed 
reality, not as a constellation of things, but one of processes where only varying activities 
exist (Van de Ven and Poole, 2005, p. 1378). To study ex post contract managers engaged in 
the process of securing outcomes it is critical to form a philosophical distinction about the 
entities and processes in the social reality relating to the contract between organisations. 
Therefore it is now necessary to examine the potential ontological views and epistemological 
approaches that would usefully underpin this study of ex post contract management. To do 
this it is first necessary to establish the fundamental nature of ex post contract management.  
 
3.2 PHILOSOPHY UNDERPINNING THE RESEARCH 
The literature review highlights the challenges of incomplete contracts (Walls, 2005, p. 209) 
which lead to ex post management of unexpected events, service extensions (Padovani and 
Young, 2008, p. 229), and the optimisation of contract cost and quality (Jensen and 
Stonecash, 2004, p. 10). Such unexpected events, extensions, and optimisations comprise 
changes to the initial ex ante view of the contracted services, and lead to management 
responses by both the principal and agent. Management scholars view organisational 
innovations and transitions in individual’s roles as part of the study of organisational change 
(Van de Ven and Poole, 1995, p. 510). Researching how and why managers endeavour to 
secure successful contract outcomes in the face of unexpected events is fundamentally a 
study of the management of change. How organisational change may be studied depends on 
the ontological view of organisations as things or processes, and on the appropriate choice of 
variance or process methods or epistemology to study this change (Van de Ven and Poole. 
2005, p. 1377).  Applying this model to the study of change in the principal-agent 
relationship, the contract relationship between the principal and the agent is substituted for 
the organisation. Therefore to choose a methodology to study how and why managers secure 
contract outcomes, it is first necessary to identify the ontological views of the relationship 
between the actors inherent in the economic and psychological contract literature theories, 
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and then choose an appropriate method or epistemology to study the change managed by 
these actors.  
Ontological views of contract relationship are evident in the economic and psychological 
contract literatures. In the economic contract literature, agency theory assumes it is that it is 
the contract that governs the relationship between the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p. 58).    The contract governs competing interests towards a shared organisational 
goal. Therefore the agency theory view concerns self-interested economic agents while the 
organisational psychology view is one of role-holders motivated towards intrinsic satisfaction 
through challenging work (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, p. 51). In addition, unlike written 
contracts, the psychological contract is inherently perceptual and based on one party’s 
understanding of the contract which may not be shared by the other party (Rousseau, 1996, p. 
575). Therefore, one view is of an external contract specifying agreed actions by the parties, 
the other is an internal perceived contract. On first consideration it is difficult to consider the 
relationship arising from the economic contract and the psychological contract as 
ontologically similar. However, both views see the relationship as a process of balancing the 
individual needs by both parties. As one source puts it, agency theory is aligned with 
management theories from psychology that acknowledge the struggle between individuals 
and deal with human motivation, inducement, and compliance (Donaldson, 1990, p. 371).  
Therefore, the appropriate view of the relationship arising from the economic and 
psychological contracts is an ontological process. 
The choice of epistemology used to research change depends on the study’s definition of 
change.  Variance epistemologies are used to study observed changes over time as dependent 
variables statistically related to independent variables, while process epistemologies study 
change as a narrative describing a sequence of events on how change and development 
unfolds (Van de Ven and Poole, 2005, p. 1380). Both the economic and psychological 
contract literatures highlight management of changes though social and organisational signals 
to communicate information, incentives, and changes to the psychological contract. For 
example, agency theory stresses the use of contract information systems for performance 
measurement and contract incentives to motivate the acceptance of risk (Eisenhardt, 1988, p. 
490). The principal wants to send signals to boost the agent’s performance by reinforcing 
their self-confidence in their ability to complete the task, or by highlighting how the agent’s 
performance will benefit his future (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003, p. 491). Indeed, Spence 
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(1973, p. 654) proposes that social time spent, and demonstrations of willingness to spend 
time, can function as signals and communicate commitment to resolving disputes. 
Additionally, the psychological contract highlights that promises are communicated by 
words, actions and organisational signals (Rousseau, 1995, p. xiv), and signals influence 
individuals’ perceptions or misperceptions about their psychological contract with the other 
party (Suazo, Martínez and Sandoval, 2009, p. 155). Therefore the study of how and why 
managers secure contract outcomes is not about discrete changes to organisations or actors, 
but rather about how change unfolds through a sequence of events and actions. According to 
the teleological process theory based on the philosophical doctrine that purpose or goal is the 
final objective of the change, purposeful actors, sufficiently like-minded to act as a collective 
entity, act as a motor for change without overriding the natural laws or constraints of the 
environment and resources (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995, p. 516). The view of the actors, the 
principal and the agent, conscious of the desired contract goals and endeavouring to secure ex 
post optimum contract outcomes within the natural constraints of the incomplete contract, 
closely follows the model of teleological process theory. Therefore this study’s epistemology 
is a process one.  
The above sections argue that the most appropriate approach to the study is an inductive one, 
with an ontological view of the relationship between actors as a process, and a process 
epistemology seeking to form a narrative describing a sequence of events. In addition, with 
its theory building goals, it is significantly inductive. The process, narrative and inductive 
directions of the epistemology have implications for the research methodology and are now 
discussed in turn. In teleological process theory, development is a change process of events 
that unfold during the duration of the entity’s existence, and is viewed as sequence of goal 
formation, implementation, evaluation, and modification emerging through purposeful social 
construction among individuals in the entity (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995, p. 520). A key 
implication of this process model applied to the contract is that the principal and agent 
endeavour to secure solutions through purposeful social construction.   
In narrative theory, the story is an abstract model identifying the generative mechanisms at 
work by describing a progression which includes the sequence in time, the focal actors, the 
identifiable narrative voice, the evaluative frame of reference, and other indicators of content 
or context (Pentland, 1999, pp. 712 - 713). Again a key implication is the identification of the 
narrative voice, which should appropriately support the narrative of the events that unfold in 
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this study. As the researcher has some twenty seven years’ experience of facilities 
management contracts in the private and public sectors, the narrative voice is inescapably that 
of a practitioner seeking to fill theoretic gaps in understanding and apply appropriate 
management response to unforeseen challenges. The narrative voice in the study must be 
sympathetic to the purposeful social construction of the principal and agent. This places the 
narrative voice of the researcher in the social constructionist paradigm or interpretive 
research tradition.  
The essence of the research paradigm of social constructionism is that reality is determined 
by people rather than external factors, that human actions arise from the sense people make of 
situations, and that research should use primarily interpretative methods to note people’s 
experiences, meanings, and communications (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2008, p. 
59). In social constructionism people’s interpretations affect their actions and social 
interactions with others (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2003, p. 86). However the 
interpretive research tradition is more consistent with the ontological view of organisational 
entities expressed earlier, that the actors are things. The interpretive perspective assumes a 
relativism position of realities composed of subjective and objective meanings which 
influence the behaviour of social actors, and using the unit of analysis of verbal and non-
verbal actions, its goal is to describe actors’ meanings and their implications for social 
interaction (Gephart, 2004, p. 457). Indeed, at the core of social constructionism is the sense 
that social reality is constructed through both language and social interactions (Price, 2012a, 
p. 19). This philosophical stance has applications to the economic and the psychological 
contract situations. For example, in written contract situations the agent acts in response to 
his interpretation of the principal’s intentions codified in the written contract (Hodgson, 2004, 
p. 407). In the psychological contract, the mental models cue people as to how to interpret 
events, and these models continue until interrupted by a noticeable signal (Rousseau, 1995, p. 
30). Managers involved in change need to undergo an alteration of their assumptions, 
orientation, and cognitive structure to facilitate and maintain that change process (Isabella, 
1990, p. 8). Therefore the management responses to situations and changes arising from the 
economic and psychological contracts entail human language and interactions, 
interpretations, reinterpretations in response to signals, and actions based on these.   The 
interpretivist paradigm, then, is an apt research strategy for the study of how and why 
managers endeavour to secure optimum outcomes during the ex post contract.   
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3.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The inductive research approach implies certain methodological directions including a 
concern with the context in which events take place, a small sample of subjects, and working 
with qualitative data collected by a variety of methods (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 
2003, p. 86). While a majority of organisational researchers have traditionally been advocates 
of an objectivist, general, quantitative, outsider or etic approach, more recent recognition has 
been given to subjectivist, individual, qualitative, insider or emic approach concerned with 
defining human actions within settings, the historical context of the situation, and the 
insider’s own definitions, motives, and purpose (Morey and Luthans, 1984, pp. 28 - 29). An 
emic approach using qualitative methodologies on a single organisation or study of a few 
persons is useful in understanding psychological contracts (Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998, p. 
682). Within these qualitative methodologies, content analysis has been used as a 
methodology in management research to access deep individual and collective structures such 
as values, intentions, attitudes, and cognitions (Duriau, Reger, and Pfarrer, 2007, p. 6). All of 
these methodological directions appear useful and supportive in the practical situation of 
conducting a problem-driven doctoral research study. The study’s theory building approach 
provides opportunity for a theoretical contribution and normative approach as to how 
contracts should be managed.  In addition, the use of small samples with a concern for 
context is more feasible way for a management practitioner acting as researcher to collect 
qualitative data than the classical scientific method (see Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 
2008, p. 69). In summary, the research questions towards real world contract problems and a 
more encompassing theoretical explanation justify an inductive theory building approach 
supported by empirical data obtained through an appropriate qualitative methodology.  
A final consideration of the research methodology is the selection of an appropriate unit of 
analysis for the study of ex post contract management. From an economic contract 
perspective, agency theory takes the unit of analysis as the contract governing the relationship 
between the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58). In the psychological contract 
literature the focus is the individual’s beliefs regarding obligations to the other party 
(Rousseau, 2001, p. 534, and Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998, p. 680). Therefore the agency 
theory and mutual psychological contract perspectives share a common view of a relationship 
based on obligations. On one side, the obligations are explicitly established in the written 
economic contract (save for any incompleteness for the contract), and on the other side the 
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obligations are perceived between the parties. However such situations of explicit and 
perceived obligations arising from formal and more personal relationships are common. 
Indeed, over time in inter-organisational agreements, personal relationships increasingly 
supplement formal role relationships (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994, p. 103). To be consistent 
with the paradigm, this unit of analysis will focus on the social constructions of the contract 
actors. Davis and Marquis (2005, p. 337) suggest that a fruitful unit of analysis for problem-
driven research is a field comprising a system of actors, actions, and relations, whose 
participants take one another into account as they carry out interrelated activities. More 
particularly, Price, Ellison, and MacDonald (2009, p. 9) hold that the socially constructed 
realities of managers involved in public contracts have contractual and commercial 
implications.  Therefore the unit of analysis of this study may be appropriately selected as the 
contract relationship between the principal and the agent. This entails the economic and 
psychological perspectives of the parties’ obligations, their socially constructed realities, and 
the contractual and commercial implications for ex post management of incomplete contracts.   
 
3.4 RESEARCH METHOD 
While methodology is the theory of how the research should be conducted, the methods are 
the tools and techniques to collect and analyse the data (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 
2003, p. 2). Well-developed methods that usefully support qualitative research should be 
preceded by a literature review on the appropriate and related fields, and include the case 
study and the interview (Gephart, 2004, pp. 458 - 460), and this study draws on these 
methods. Recall Bowers’s theory building research strategy for real world problems (Bowers, 
1972, pp. 25 - 26).  This study uses Bowers’s cyclic and inductive approach in stages, each 
stage produces a conceptual model and the succeeding stage uses empirical findings or 
literature to produce an improved model. The development of these conceptual models hinges 
on inadequately explained issues, and draw on both agency theory and the psychological 
contract. This is a recognised approach to theory building. Once articulated, theoretical 
models may be improved by addressing anomalies, where outcomes differ from that 
predicted by the current model, examining the situation through another academic lens 
(Gilbert and Christensen, 2005, pp. 76 - 80).  
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Therefore the research is divided into three main stages, a literature review, an initial study, 
and a main study. The literature review articulates a conceptual model which will then be 
improved by examining the empirical situation and by using another academic lens. With this 
first conceptual model, there is sufficient preparation completed to start the empirical work. 
Hamel (1991, pp. 84 - 85) uses a two-stage theory development approach to an empirical 
study.  He first selects eleven cases with underlying differences in order to highlight universal 
categories. He then selects two cases with anticipated maximum and minimum variances of 
the core model to gain a more detailed understanding of the mechanisms of the emerging 
theory. Drawing on this approach, the empirical work of this thesis is based on an Initial 
Study of five cases followed by two cases studied in depth in the Main Study.  The literature 
review, Initial Study, and Main Study are now described in turn. 
  
3.4.1 Literature Review 
The first stage is the literature survey, describing the forces that affect the contract 
management process, using evidence from existing theory and other studies. In this first 
stage, the study’s central proposition is developed and argues that the management of real 
world incomplete contracts during the ex post implementation stage requires an additional 
conceptual perspective to those individually presented by agency theory and the 
psychological contract. To address this proposition, the main theories in the literature 
underpinning the management of contracts during the ex post stage are first reviewed. Yin 
(1993, p. 10) emphasises the importance of theory development prior to the conduct of the 
study, as the findings pertain to specific theoretical propositions.  In the literature survey the 
main theoretical blocks of ex post contract management are identified as the economic and 
psychological contracts, agency theory, and signals theory from both the economic and 
psychological contract perspectives. Having reviewed the literature, using the Bowers 
approach it is appropriate to initiate the theory building process by forming a first conceptual 
model. This conceptual model is the first articulation which is improved in the Initial Study 
by using the economic lens, and improved further by using the lens of the psychological 
contract in the Main Study. The literature is used during all stages of the study. While the 
study’s general literature review is at the beginning, generally inductive analysis in data-led 
qualitative research should use the interleaving of the literature and the data to support 
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reflection (Leavy, 1994b, p. 115).  Indeed, evolving theory requires that the data and theory 
be constantly contrasted throughout the data collection and analysis process (Isabella, 1990, 
p. 12). Therefore, this study uses the literature during all the stages to achieve analysis of the 
data, and support the development of improved theoretical models. 
 
3.4.2 Initial Study Using the Economic Perspective 
The second stage of the research comprises an initial study which builds on the first 
conceptual model by an exploratory investigation of the use of signals in the unwritten 
contract. The objective of the Initial Study is to describe incomplete written contracts in the 
ex post stage, find empirical evidence of the  use of signals by principals to influence the 
agent through an unwritten contract towards solutions to written contract problems, and 
improve the first conceptual model. To derive such an improved conceptual model from 
existing theory and empirical findings (Bowers, 1972, pp. 25 - 26) the Initial Study is an 
exploratory study which examines five cases of public contracts during the ex post stage with 
the aim of identifying the usage of signals to secure contract outcomes when unforeseen 
events arise. There are three reasons for this approach.  
First, the case study approach offers a logical method to investigate the how and why 
research questions which are explanatory and deal with operational links traced over time 
rather than frequencies or incidence (Yin, 2009, p. 9). Second, because signals without 
categories are identified from the literature as management mechanisms in the initial 
conceptual model, a holistic case study design is chosen. As Yin (2009, p. 50) indicates, a 
holistic design is advantageous when no logical subunits are yet identified. Given that the 
exploratory nature of the study included the possibility of finding certain categories of 
signals, a multiple case approach was chosen. As Yin (2009, p. 54) notes, a study using four 
to six cases is designed for theoretical replication where some contrasting but anticipated 
results are expected. The initial conceptual model based on the literature predicts that signals 
are used as ex post contract management mechanisms.  Since it is likely that conceptual 
categories exist, it is reasonable to assume that these signals may vary in type.  Therefore the 
selection of five cases is an appropriate number to make evident the replication of signals as 
well as potential contrasting types.  The third reason is that the unwritten contract signals may 
be viewed from an economics and a psychological contract perspective. The use of an Initial 
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Study allows investigation of the economics perspective on both the written contract and the 
unwritten contract signals used as ex post contract mechanisms. 
As the author was responsible for managing public contracts in his organisation, these 
presented an opportunity for access to sufficient number of cases for a holistic study. 
Although the case contracts were managed by the researcher’s staff and were at a distance, 
this approach also presented the potential problems associated with insider research. Brannick 
and Coughlin (2007, pp. 62 - 70) warn that insider research may be influenced by pre-
understanding, role duality, and organisational politics, with the respective associated dangers 
of being too close to the data, role confusion, and political limitations on reporting data. 
Therefore, in the Initial Study there was an existing pre-understanding of good contracts 
management, the role duality of being both a manager and a researcher of the same contracts, 
and the awareness that his staff or senior management may not like any negative reports on 
the contract performances. These potential problems were acknowledged and addressed by 
focussing on the theory building rather than performance findings from the cases, and 
explaining this to both the participants and the senior management members. To successfully 
manage insider researcher issues, Brannick and Coughlin (2007, pp. 62 – 63) recommend 
remaining honest to the researcher’s personal perspectives and open to disconfirming 
evidence through seeking it out through interviews and journaling to reflect on personal 
perspectives.   
During the Initial Study data was collected from archival material taken primarily from the 
principal’s organisation’s contract files, including the tender documentation, legal contract 
agreements, formal written correspondence between the principal and agent, invoice payment 
records, contract insurance certificates, formally recorded minutes of meetings between the 
principal and agent. In addition, a search on the principal’s organisation IT system was done 
to collect historical sent emails which recorded conversations and decisions in relation to the 
managements of these contracts. Photocopies of the relevant documents were made, resulting 
in a research data file of over a thousand A4 pages for the five cases.  Memos were written 
summarising the information relating to the written contracts and documented events that 
appeared to show incompleteness and decisions in relation to changes in the contract. In such 
memos and other descriptions, actual names were removed and replaced with labels to 
preserve confidentiality. Also, a brief interview of ten to fifteen minutes was held with each 
of the principals to encourage unexpected or contrary data to that already documented. 
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Interview responses were recorded by taking notes and writing out memos on the main 
themes afterwards.  In addition, journaling was used in the form of a learning diary which 
was maintained through the doctoral learning experience, and documented reflections were 
discussed with the thesis supervisor and areas for further literature reading identified to 
support understanding and maintain a sound theoretical perspective. In summary, while the 
author is researching public contracts within his own organisation, and for which his staff 
were acting as principals, through these means, potential insider researcher issues were 
managed during the Initial Study.  
Using the data collection, and the analysis based on comparisons with the literatures, the 
Initial Study develops a number of propositions leading to a second conceptual model. 
 
3.4.3 Main Study Considering the Psychological Contract 
The third stage of the research comprises the Main Study which investigates two cases of 
public contracts, and considers the psychological contract perspective. The objective here is 
to add to the insights of the Initial Study which uses an economic perspective only. To grasp 
the nature of the psychological contracts in place it is necessary to drill down into the beliefs 
held by the parties as well as the information sources they use to interpret the work 
environment (Rousseau, 2004, p. 123).  An emic approach using qualitative methodologies 
on a single organisation or study of a few persons is useful in understanding psychological 
contracts (Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998, p. 682). While large samples may produce results 
significant only in a statistical sense, simpler and more direct methodologies using a sample 
of one, observing activities and tracing the flow of decisions, may prove more valid 
(Mintzberg, 1979, p. 583). Indeed, Yin (2009, p. 47) argues that when a theory has specified 
a clear set of propositions a single case study can be used to confirm, challenge, or extend the 
theory, or determine whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant. 
While a single case study does not strive for statistical generalisation, close examination of a 
single case gives an in-depth description of the actions involved in certain processes, together 


























To ensure that data collection allows the comparing and contrasting of findings, the Main 
Study comprises two cases with the data collection comprising separate interviews with 
principal and agent of a contract in its ex post management stage. The reason for this 
approach was that interviews are the logical method to gather data since the research 
objective is to understand the social constructions that inform behaviours in ex post contract 
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research support this qualitative approach. For example, Piore (1979, p. 566) explains that 
while economic theory attributes to participants prior knowledge of the relative prices of 
substitute resources, interviews and participant observation are ways of discovering how 
economic participants think about the world, of identifying the economic participant’s model 
of the socioeconomic world used in their decision-making (Piore, 1979, p. 566). Also 
Rousseau (1995, p. 5) suggests that interviews with individuals are important as a means of 
capturing the dynamics of contractual thinking.  
Interviews were conducted with both the principal and agent in each of the two cases. The 
interview questionnaire was logically derived from the Initial Study’s propositions. The first 
and second conceptual models are used to develop the Main Study’s interview questionnaire 
which is given in Appendix I. If data is collected primarily through interviews, open 
questions may be used first and then followed by targeted questions about the predetermined 
categories determined from the existing theory and research (Hseih and Shannon, 2005, p. 
1281). Therefore to facilitate a logical development of the discussion by the interviewed 
manager, the questionnaire first addresses general questions in relation to the contracted 
service and the completeness of the contract. Next questions are aimed at issues to do with 
the formal contract management mechanisms of information systems and incentives as 
understood by the managers. Questions then address the informal contract relationship based 
on relational obligations and trust. The questionnaire then moves to the additional and more 
subtle mechanisms of perceived signals issued by the client manager, or principal, and 
observed by the contractor, or agent. Finally, a general question is proposed to surface any 
general management mechanisms used and not discussed during the interview. While the 
same questions were posed to each interviewee, no attempt was made to guide the 
interviewee or curtail the answer. These interviews took between sixty and ninety minutes 
and were recorded with the permission of the participants. The success or failure of the 
interview process to reveal the process of business management depends less on interview 
questions and more on the stories told at the interviews (Piore, 1979, p. 561). To avoid the 
problem of interviewees taking cues to answer in a certain way (Hseih and Shannon, 2005, p. 
1283), the questions were worded to ensure the interviewer did not mention key theoretical 
terms, and the interviewees were allowed to continue freely, or even change the subject, 
during their responses. Any suggestions of the theoretical assumption that written contracts 
are usually incomplete and the management of unforeseen circumstances requires recourse to 
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the psychological contract were avoided. The interviewees were not asked about contract 
changes but generally to describe situations during the workings of the ex post contract.  
To analyse the collected data, the initial step was to make written interview transcripts for 
analysis. The transcripts were edited to remove any identifying names and substituting labels 
to preserve confidentiality. Following this, the transcripts were read and re-read to identify 
and tabulate the agency theory ex post contract mechanisms together with any identifiable 
contract change events. Central to content analysis as a research methodology is the 
assumptions that language is important in human cognition and that analysis of the texts lets 
the researcher understand other people’s cognitive schemas (Duriau, Reger, and Pfarrer, 
2007, p. 6). Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 58 – 63) suggest that starting codes may come 
from the conceptual framework, have clear operational definitions for consistent application, 
and will require to be revised as the study continues.  Following the tabulation of the contract 
mechanisms and events, initial coding categories were formed from agency theory, 
psychological contract, and signals theories. Hseih and Shannon (2005, pp. 1281 - 1283) 
recommend that when the research goal is to validate or extend a conceptual framework or 
theory, a directed approach to content analysis should be used, using existing theory about the 
variables of interest to determine the initial coding categories. Then operational definitions 
are determined from theory. Finally using newly identified categories are used to further 
refine, extend, and enrich the theory. In addition to categories from the existing theories, 
there were newly identified categories. Since anecdotes collected by the researcher close to 
the situation that provides the rich description to build the theory explaining interesting 
relationships (Mintzberg, 1979, p. 587), notes were made using the progression and the newly 
identified categories (Pentland, 1999, pp. 712 - 713). The empirical work and discussion 
concludes with the presentation of the third conceptual model. This final conceptual model 
completes the thesis’ approach to filling the theoretic gap. 
 
Finally, the research concludes with a discussion of its validity, limitations, and contributions. 
Validity of the study depends on how clearly it gained access to the actors’ experiences, the 
reliability on the transparency about how sense was made from the raw data, and 
generalizability on the relevance of the derived constructs to other settings (Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe and Jackson, 2008, p. 109). Both the validity and limitations of the study are 
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discussed in the concluding chapter, together with the study’s theoretical contributions and 
management implications.  
In summary, this chapter sets out the problem-driven and theory building research strategy to 
address the research objectives. These include investigating how and why managers use ex 
post contract management mechanisms to manage incomplete contracts, and developing a 
conceptual model to fill the theoretic gap between the economic and psychological contract 
models. As the principal and agent are managing change in the economic and social contract 
relationship, the unit of analysis is this relationship and a social constructionist approach with 
interpretative methods is used. To develop an improved conceptual model, the empirical 
research is conducted in two phases. First an Initial Study using five cases and archival data 
is carried out based on the economics perspective of contracts and signals. Then a Main 
Study, using two in-depth cases and interviews, is completed based on the economics and 
















CHAPTER 4 - INITIAL STUDY 
The research questions seek to understand how and why managers of public contracts 
endeavour to secure successful outcomes, and develop a conceptual model of ex post contract 
management. The Literature Review concludes with a first conceptual model highlighting the 
principal’s use of both written and unwritten ex post contract management mechanisms to 
influence the agent’s response. This Initial Study takes an economics perspective on these 
written and unwritten contract management mechanisms. 
When events proceed as envisaged by the terms of the ex-ante contract, the incentives and 
information systems (Domberger & Jensen, 1997, Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987, and 
Eisenhardt, 1985) are sufficient as ex post contract management mechanisms to enable the 
contract outcomes to be achieved. However, due to the incompleteness of contracts 
(Williamson, 1999), the objectives are likely to become challenged by unforeseen 
environmental events, and the written contract incentives and information systems no longer 
suffice. Both the principal and the agent are motivated to find solutions to enable the contract 
to continue. They will develop approaches based on the informal relational governance 
(Coase, 2006) to address the unforeseen contingencies (Walls, 2005).  These approaches 
include the principal’s signals of time spent (Spence, 1973), their resources (Lawrence et al, 
2005), or their seniority of position in the relationship (Spence, 1973). The signals observed 
by the agent influence him through additional information on the required performance 
(Nikander & Eloranta, 2001), incentives (Bénabou & Tirole, 2003), and mutual interest 
(Spence, 1973). 
The exploratory study is described as follows. Five cases of public contracts between a higher 
educational institution and a private firm are described. A number of propositions are then 
proposed and a conceptual model put forward. Finally, some suggestions for further research 
are made. 
  
4.1 INITIAL STUDY ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
EdCo is a government funded higher education institution with some 2,000 staff and 10,000 
full-time students based in a number of buildings. EdCo’s arrangements for the provision of 
facilities management services are by contracts with private firms. These contracts include 
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the five cases: the property rental, the waste removal, the canteen catering, the insurance 
brokerage, and the cleaning services. These contracts are subject to public procurement 
regulations which require periodic public tenders to be held. Following the tender award, the 
contracts are signed for a period of three years with two further one-year extensions possible 
subject to a satisfactory review of the contractor’s performance.  The only exception is the 
property rental contracts, which is directly approved by the Department of Education 
resulting in contract duration of fifteen years. The contracts are managed on behalf of EdCo 
by individual principals, who report to the author.   Each EdCo principal has operational 
control over the contract budget resources, technical knowledge of the contracted services, 
and broad social skills to deal with end-user complaints and motivate agents. Principals 
usually only involves their EdCo senior manager in serious contract issues such as risk of 
overspending the total annual budget, contract breaches in relation to quality or Health and 
Safety, or serious complaints from the EdCo stakeholders.  
The five cases are now discussed in turn. 
 
4.1.1 Case 1 - Property Rental Contract 
The property rental contract comprises lease on a 2,000 square metre Victorian premises 
which is used as an art school by EdCo. The provider and owner of the premises is PropCo, 
which provides the contract agent to manage the property. The contract terms include a 
fifteen year lease with an annual rent of €390,000 subject to upward-only rent reviews every 
five years, and an internal maintenance obligation on the tenant. While the contract is not the 
subject of frequent tenders, there are tenant break options every five years where EdCo may 
choose to terminate the rental contract. This break option introduces some degree of 
contestability into the contract. The desired contract outcomes for the EdCo principal are the 
use of a safe property suitable for staff offices and student classrooms, workshops, and 
studios to develop artistic knowledge and skills, at a market rental cost that can be 
demonstrated to be value for money. The contract incentives for the agent are EdCo’s rent 
payments, paid quarterly, and avoidance of exercising a break option to exit the lease. In 
practice, these incentives are fixed, as rent reviews are subject to arbitration and exercising 
the break option would require finding alternative accommodation which would be a 
significant project for EdCo. The contract information system comprises site meetings every 
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three months between the principal and agent to review matters and agree actions to resolve 
any issues.  
 
Table 4.1 - Case 1 - Property Contract – Written Contract ex post Situation 





Incentives Information Systems 
Prompt payment of 
€390,000 annual rent 
Non-exercise of lease 
break options 
Action: Principal threatens 
to withhold rent payment 
3-monthly site meetings No definition of structural 
repairs 
Repairs to 
be done at 






Table 4.2 - Case 1 - Property Contract – Principal’s Signals and Influence on Agent 
Principal’s Signals Influence of Signals on Agent Agent 
Response 














a change of 
communication 





















A matter of contract incompleteness became apparent in relation to significant internal 
repairs. In the written contract the EdCo principal is required to repair the interiors while the 
agent is required to perform any required structural works. Over a period of winter months, 
ingress of damp lead to paint peeling off the internal walls, leading to complaints from staff 
and students regarding the deterioration and the difficulty in fixing the programme artwork to 
the walls. The agent did concede that the fault was structural in origin, but not accept the 
EdCo principal’s view that the consequential requirement for internal works were his 
responsibility, or that they were urgently required. The principal stated her intention to 
withhold payment of the rent. The agent then emailed proposing that works would be carried 
out at the end of the academic year, and that this would be regarded in court of law as a 
reasonable response time. Despite a number of conversations, no improved proposal was 
received from the agent. At this point the EdCo principal emailed the agent, copying her 
senior manager, summarising the problem and requesting action from the agent. She then 
asked her senior manager to intervene. The EdCo senior manager telephoned from his 
personal mobile telephone directly to the agent’s personal mobile. During the discussion the 
EdCo senior manager suggested that while the issue was not clear in the written contract, 
many end-users were adversely affected, and it was in both their long-term reputational 
interests for the matter to be resolved.  The agent apologised and agreed that he would carry 
the required structural repairs. The following month, all the agreed works were completed.  
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 display the case’s written contract mechanisms and incompleteness and 
the arising signals and responses by the agent.  This case supports the proposition that both 
written and unwritten contract mechanisms are used to address ex post management 
challenges. In response to a contract performance issue, the principal used the agreed 
information system, the monthly meeting, to seek a remedy. The agent responded first by 
noting that the contract did not require him to provide a remedy. The principal then 
endeavoured to further apply the written contract mechanism by threatening to withhold the 
rent payment as a penalty. This resulted in the agent offering to provide the remedy, but only 
within a reasonable time. Having exhausted the written contract mechanisms, the principal 
changed to written communication by sending an email, and contacted a senior organisational 
figure in EdCo, who in turn contacted the agent and appealed to the mutual interests of 
PropCo and EdCo in requesting a remedy. The agent being aware that the principal had ready 
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access to EdCo senior organisation figures, responded to reference of mutual interests, and 
remedied the situation with the required works. 
  
4.1.2 Case 2 - Waste Removal Contract 
The EdCo waste removal contract is performed by a private licensed waste contractor firm 
called WasteCo. The contract services comprise the removal and disposal of recyclable, 
catering, electrical equipment, construction, and laboratory wastes from EdCo’s buildings at 
an annual cost of €300,000. The contract is for a maximum of a five year period, with the last 
two years subject to a satisfactory review. The contract benefits to EdCo include the 
collection of waste to conform to statutory legislation, holding costs within the annual EdCo 
waste budget, generation of more accurate data and records of the waste streams, and 
reducing costs through provision of improved waste bins and education programmes for 
greater segregation and recycling by individual end users. The contract incentives to 
WasteCo are the contract payments by the principal, and the establishment of a contract 
reputation to cite as a reference in future tender bids. The contract information system 
comprises monthly waste stream reports and an accompanying monthly management meeting 
between the principal and agent.  
Historically the contract had been managed by a number of EdCo administrators, each based 
in a different EdCo building. The contract incompleteness became apparent following the 
centralisation of the EdCo waste contract budget, and the appointment of a single EdCo 
principal in 2010.  Despite the EdCo decision and announcement, the WasteCo agent 
continued to meet with, and report to, the former de-centralised EdCo budget holders who 
were still EdCo managers in their own right, and did not readily engage with the new EdCo 
principal. This resulted in separate information  reporting of the waste streams, difficulties in 
monitoring EdCo’s cost, and a delay of the roll-out of the recycling and education 
programme to end-users in the EdCo buildings. When the EdCo principal emailed the 
WasteCo agent to request assistance with the changes, the agent replied that she was 





Table 4.3 - Case 2 – Waste Removal Contract – Written Contract ex post Situation 





Incentives Information Systems 
Prompt monthly payments 
of €300,000 annual waste 
charges (based on the 
weight and type of the 
materials collected) 
Action: Principal new 
central reporting 
arrangements, and roll-out 
of waste reduction 
programme 
Monthly waste reports and 
site meetings 
Written contract did not 
specify a single principal 













Table 4.4 - Case 2 – Waste Removal Contract – Principal’s Signals and Influence on 
Agent 
Principal’s Signals Influence of Signals on Agent Agent 
Response 
































told that the 
















The newly appointed EdCo principal then met informally with the WasteCo agent over coffee 
to discuss their understandings of the contract and the developing waste issues. At the 
meeting, the EdCo principal re-explained that local EdCo waste budgets were terminated and 
that she was the authorised central contract budget holder. As she alone was now responsible 
for improving the total EdCo waste cost, she was prepared to work on a one-to-one basis with 
the agent. She highlighted that the new approach would improve regulatory compliance and 
EdCo’s costs. The achievement of the new objectives would add to the WasteCo agent’s 
regulatory recycling targets, and indeed WasteCo’s prospects for tenders with other 
organisations by the achievement of an important change management project. Over a 
number of informal meetings, both principal and agent agreed a new waste information report 
format, a programme to roll out the recycling building-by-building, and a joint survey of all 
laboratories and workshops to better segregate waste streams.  The following month, the 
WasteCo agent implemented these new steps. 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 display the case’s written contract mechanisms and incompleteness and 
the arising signals and responses by the agent. This case supports the proposition that both 
written and unwritten contract mechanisms can be used to address ex post management 
challenges. Despite the information regarding the centralisation of the waste budget, the agent 
continued to operate according to her interpretation of the written contract. Indeed, the 
written contract was incomplete, and did not specify whether EdCo held local or central 
budget. The principal’s personal time together with social skills, technical knowledge, and 
budget ownership appeared to be influences on the agent as incentive and mutual interest 
signals. The positive response from the contract agent and the follow up actions appear to 
confirm recognition of these signals, and induced the implementation of changes and 
improvements beyond the scope of the written contract. 
 
4.1.3 Case 3 - Canteen Catering Contract 
The EdCo canteen catering contract is performed by a private firm called CaterCo with 
experience in providing catering services to higher education and corporate clients. The 
contract service comprises the provision of prepared hot meals, snacks, and hot and cold 
beverages for EdCo students and staff in eight EdCo buildings. The contract period is for a 
maximum of five years, with the last two years subject to a satisfactory review. There are a 
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number of contract benefits to EdCo. These include the provision of a safe food service at 
agreed prices for its students and staff, and the management of compliance with current food 
hygiene legislation. In addition, CaterCo provides a contribution from the financial turnover 
comprising a number of elements: the canteen and equipment refurbishment costing some 
€500,000, annual maintenance on production equipment costing €20,000 performed on all 
production equipment, and a €20,000 annual financial contribution to EdCo. The contract 
incentives for the CaterCo include retaining canteen cash turnover in the EdCo buildings, 
retaining market share against potential competitors (a stated company policy), and 
enhancing the company reputation for future tenders. The information system comprises 
monthly sales turnover reports from the CaterCo, monthly meetings between the principal 
and the agent, and passing on to the agent any customer comments received by the principal.  
 
 
Table 4.5 - Case 3 – Canteen Catering Contract – Written Contract ex post Situation 





Incentives Information Systems 
Retention of canteen  
financial turnover 
CaterCo retain market 
share  & reputation  
building for future tenders 
 
Monthly sales turnover 
reports 
Monthly meetings of 
principal and agent 
Principal passes customer 
comments to agent 
No provision to remedy 











Table 4.6 - Case 3 – Canteen Catering Contract – Principal’s Signals and Influence on 
Agent 
Principal’s Signals Influence of Signals on Agent Agent 
Response 


























changes tone of 
communications 


































The contract incompleteness emerged when it was discovered that there was no contract 
clause to address the poor performance by a member of CaterCo staff. The EdCo principal 
received repeated EdCo customer reports of poor service in one CaterCo canteen location, 
including apparent rudeness to customers. The EdCo principal also noticed that this canteen 
location had a lower than expected financial turnover.  The EdCo principal raised both 
matters at the monthly contract meeting and the agent admitted there was a difficulty with 
one key team member. A further month passed with additional complaints received by the 
principal, and no response by the agent.   
The EdCo contract manager changed the tone of the communications to the agent by posting 
a formal letter to the agent highlighting concerns about the staff complaints and the lower 
than expected financial turnover. She included a written technical review of the financial 
contributions in other canteen locations, the physical areas, the customer numbers, and the 
annual opening hours, supporting the proposition that poor financial performance is linked to 
poor customer care. Separately, she issued an invitation to the agent and his senior 
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management to attend a fundraising event hosted by EdCo. This subsequently provided an 
opportunity for her to comment positively on the agent’s performance in front of both 
CaterCo and EdCo senior managers, highlighting the benefits of the contract to both parties. 
Some weeks later the agent wrote a formal response to the principal confirming that a review 
of the CaterCo canteens would be carried out. Later, the agent telephoned the EdCo principal 
to say that he appreciated her efforts and that the individual delivering the poor performance 
would be reassigned away from customer-facing duties and offered additional customer 
relationship training. Some months later the agent reported at the monthly meeting that the 
financial turnover figures had shown improvement. 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 display the case’s written contract mechanisms and incompleteness and 
the arising signals and responses by the agent. This case supports the proposition that both 
written and unwritten contract mechanisms can be used to address ex post management 
challenges. Initially, the principal’s use of the contract information system, the monthly 
meeting, did not elicit a response from the agent to address the poor staff behaviour. Indeed, 
the written contract had no clause whereby the principal could request the removal of a 
member of the agent’s staff. The agent then changed communications from oral means to a 
written letter, wrote a technical report on the catering performance matters, and was 
successful in getting senior EdCo and CaterCo figures to attend the same fund-raising event, 
providing opportunity to publically praise the agent’s efforts, and highlight the mutual 
benefits of the contract. These actions fit the description of time, resource, and position 
signals from the principal resulting in information, incentive, and mutual interest influences 
on the agent and his senior management. Together with the written contract mechanisms, 
these signals led to a positive response by the agent who moved the staff member to a more 
appropriate area of work. 
 
4.1.4 Case 4 - Insurance Brokerage Contract 
The EdCo insurance brokerage contract is provided by InsureCo, which negotiates EdCo’s 
required insurance cover including public and employer’s liability, professional indemnity, 
product, engineering, and travel insurances, and provides technical support to manage these 
insurances. InsureCo’s services also include advice to control EdCo’s insurance costs, 
technical support on queries in relation to unusual teaching or research projects, and liaison 
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with the insurance providers during any legal processes arising from claims. The contract is 
tendered every five years and InsureCo has won the last two tenders.  The contract incentive 
to InsureCo is an annual fee of €50,000, and increased experience to credibly tender for other 
similar contracts. The contract information systems comprise monthly meetings and a written 
report on the status of insurance claims and their legal processes.   
Contract incompleteness was identified during a disagreement on the extent of the InsureCo’s 
technical support role to EdCo. Typically an EdCo lecturer or College administrator would 
contact the principal prior to a field trip for confirmation that appropriate insurance cover was 
in place. Over time, the principal formed a view that these tasks could be more rapidly 
handled if dealt with directly by the InsureCo agent. During a regular monthly meeting this 
was agreed by the principal and the agent that a certain number of named EdCo staff could 
contact InsureCo directly with queries. However, it was noted at a subsequent monthly 
meeting that the agent’s team responded slowly to queries, effectively leaving the principal to 
discover outstanding issues and handle the work. The written contract specified 
communications between the principal and the agent, but did not refer to potential 
communications from EdCo end users. 
Following a number of telephone conversations, the principal emailed the agent to confirm a 
change in the information system. The principal indicated that she wanted to increase the 
frequency of the contract information meetings from monthly to weekly, record all meetings 
with formal minutes, and change their location from the agent’s office to that of the principal.  
The agent agreed to this. At the first meeting, the principal proposed an addition to the 
information system. This would be an issues log which would be updated weekly by the 
agent and forwarded to the principal in advance of the weekly meeting. The principal notes in 
the minutes that auditors independently review information systems on EdCo contracts, and 
report back to senior management. Therefore it is in both their interests to record 
performance data using the proposed log. The agent objected but later agreed at the following 
meeting to use the template on a trial basis.    
After a number of months, the agent continued to use the weekly log and take calls directly 
from the listed EdCo lecturers and College administrators, resulting in more satisfactory 
response times.  The minutes of a meeting noted that response times had improved. In 
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addition, it was also noted that the agent had used this type of weekly log in his dealings on 
another contract and with another client, and found that that it was effective.   
 
Table 4.7 - Case 4 – Insurance Brokerage Contract – Written Contract ex post Situation 





Incentives Information Systems 
Annual fee of €50,000 
Increased experience to 
credibly tender for other 
similar contracts 
Monthly meetings and 
written summary of legal 
claims 
Extent of technical 
support unclear from 
contract – no reference to 
any direct communication 





Table 4.8 - Case 4 – Insurance Brokerage Contract – Principal’s Signals and Influence 
on Agent 
Principal’s Signals Influence of Signals on Agent Agent 
Response 



















































Tables 4.7 and 4.8 display the case’s written contract mechanisms and incompleteness and 
the arising signals and responses by the agent. This case supports the proposition that both 
written and unwritten contract mechanisms can be used to address ex post management 
challenges. The EdCo principal initially tried to broaden the interpretation of the written 
contract by proposing end users should communicate directly with the agent. This resulted in 
a slow response time from the agent. The principal then increases the frequency of the 
meetings, holds the meetings on her own territory, and proposes a weekly log to be 
completed by the agent. The weekly log signals her knowledge as a resource, since the log 
proves to be a useful management tool for the agent. Also, the increased frequency is a time 
signal, the formal minutes an information signal, while the holding of meetings in the 
principal’s office displays a signal of her senior position in her organisation and in the 
contract relationship. These signals influenced the agent as information, incentive, and 
highlighting the mutual interest of the agent and the principal being better served by 
collaboration. Therefore, by using signals the principal influences the agent to widen the 
interpretation of the written contract terms and improve response times for the contract 
performance. 
 
4.1.5 Case 5 - Cleaning Contract 
The EdCo cleaning contract is performed by a private firm called CleanCo. This company 
provides routine and emergency cleaning, janitorial, and office bin emptying services to over 
thirty EdCo buildings. The cleaning services are tendered every five years by EdCo to a 
private cleaning company, and the current contract was in its fourth year with CleanCo. The 
contract benefits to EdCo are a physical environment sufficiently clean, free from litter and 
trip hazards, and supplied with toilet consumables to function as an educational institution. 
The contract incentives for CleanCo are the monthly payments amounting to some €2m 
annually, and the building of a reputation to support future tender bids. The contract 
information system comprises monthly audits, a complaints log, a labour hours report, and a 






Table 4.9 - Case 5 – Cleaning Contract – Written Contract ex post Situation 





Incentives Information Systems 
Annual fee of €2m paid in 
response to monthly 
invoices 
Increased experience to 
credibly tender for other 
similar contracts 
Monthly audits and reports, 
a complaints log, and 
monthly review meetings 
No contract clause to 
allow changes to hours or 





Table 4.10 - Case 5 – Cleaning Contract – Principal’s Signals and Influence on Agent 
Principal’s Signals Influence of Signals on Agent Agent 
Response 

























































An issue of contract incompleteness arose when the EdCo annual cleaning budget was cut 
from €2m to €1.7m. The EdCo principal broke the news to the CleanCo agent at a monthly 
meeting. The principal noted that EdCo had demonstrably lost funding revenues, and had to 
cut budgets. The agent noted that since the contract had specified fixed tasks at agreed rates, 
there was no written contract mechanism to accommodate the budget reduction while 
meeting the required quality levels. Therefore, she was unable to commit CleanCo to such a 
significant change in the contract. The agent proposed that the contract continued to be 
implemented as originally agreed. However, the meeting noted that EdCo could not afford 
the budget to do so and that the written contract offered a clause to terminate the contract. 
The principal proposed that it was in both their interests to discuss ways of continuing the 
contract on a reduced budget. She committed to be available to the CleanCo manager over the 
next few weeks to discuss matters in confidence and without commitments until a solution 
that would work for both parties could be found. If a solution could be identified, the 
principal would negotiate a reduced level of cleaning with EdCo. The principal and agent 
then agreed to meet informally on a weekly basis, and explore without any prior conditions 
how a solution might be found. Over a two month period a new set of tasks were specified to 
achieve a minimum quality cleaning with the lower budget. These were based on changing 
from out-of-hours working times to office hours cleaning times, and a focus towards the more 
heavily used areas of the buildings. In addition, an emergency response cleaning team was set 
up to handle incidents or address important areas overlooked by the new arrangements. 
Following this mutual informal agreement, both the principal and agent then approached and 
secured approval from their respective organisations, EdCo and CleanCo, to implement the 
new approach at the reduced annual contract budget of €1.7m per annum. Some months later, 
the monthly meeting noted the revised contract agreement and some positive indications for 
the service quality from the customer complaints log.   
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 display the case’s written contract mechanisms and incompleteness and 
the arising signals and responses by the agent. This case supports the proposition that both 
written and unwritten contract mechanisms can be used to address ex post management 
challenges. The EdCo principal and the CleanCo agent could not address the unforeseen 
problem of the budget reduction with the written contract. By highlighting her commitment to 
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be available for discussions, her readiness and seniority to re-negotiate the service levels with 
EdCo, and the principal sent time, resource, and position signals to the agent. The agent, 
observing these signals, appeared to be influenced by the change in tone of communication as 
an information signal that a solution could be found, and the incentive and mutual interest 
that such a solution would be beneficial for her, CleanCo, and EdCo. 
 
4.2 INITIAL STUDY PROPOSITIONS 
The analysis and findings of the five cases are summarised in Tables 4.11 and 4.12. Table 
4.11 shows that in all five cases, the mechanisms of incentives and information systems exist 
in the written contract. However it also shows that all the cases considered had issues of 
incompleteness where the written contract specification did not provide a remedy for some 
service problem. Finally, Table 4.11 shows that when such service problems were raised by 
the principal, the agent had no written contract obligation to respond and usually did not 
respond. In each of these cases, having exhausted the written contract mechanisms, the 
principal issued signals to the agent. In most cases shown in Table 4.12, these signals were 
based on the principal’s time, resources, and position. For example, the principal spent 
personal time, or showed a willingness to commit personal time to finding a solution. The 
principal displayed resources such as budget control, technical knowledge, social or 
negotiation skills. Based on changes in behaviour by the agents towards a positive response, 
in most cases it appears that the agents were influenced by the information, incentives, or 
mutual interest communicated in these signals. From these five cases it is possible to make a 
number of propositions which are show in Table 4.13. 
In public contracts, the payment terms are usually fixed for the duration of the contract, and 
withholding a payment is a serious step potentially leading to an intolerable service 
disruption (Farneti and Young, 2008, p. 95) or a possible legal dispute (Bahli and Rivard, 
2003, p.213). While it is possible for the principal to threaten to withhold payment as in Case 
1, where the principal indicated that she would not pay the rent, this is difficult to implement 
in practice. For example in Case 5 where the EdCo cleaning contract budget was reduced, the 
agent was entitled to the original terms of the contract, and indeed there was a risk that the 
dispute would lead to the termination of the contract. Agents, then, do not have to respond to 
any actual changes in the incentives. However, in both cases the written contract incentives 
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were used as an opportunity to initiate a response from the agent towards providing a remedy. 
Summarising these findings into an initial proposition gives the following statement:   
Proposition P0: A principal uses the written contract incentive as an opportunity to promote 
a response from the agent. 
From this initial proposition, it is clear that principals require other means to induce 
responses. As the written contract incentives provide only opportunities, principals rely less 
on the contract incentives or payments and more on the contract specified information 
systems to manage ex post responses by the agent. For example, in Case 2 the principal relies 
on the information reports to make service improvements, in Case 3 the principal uses 
financial turnover figures to support the argument for improved staff behaviour, and in Cases 
4 and 5 the contract logs were noted as reliable indicators of the contract effectiveness. In 
Cases 2, 3, 4 and 5 the agents note and respond to some positive degree to the information 
system. 
 
Table 4.11 – Summary of Written Contract ex post Situations 

































Table 4.12 – Summary of Principal’s Signals and Influence on Agent 











































Collecting these findings into a formal statement gives the following proposition: 
Proposition P1: A principal relies on the written contract information system to promote a 
response from the agent. 
As complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete (Williamson, 1999, p. 1089), unforeseen 
situations arise during the ex post implementation stage to which the designed contract fails 
to provide an agreed management mechanism, and some non-contractual agreement must be 
struck to allow the benefits of the contract to continue to the agent and the principal. As 
successful projects contribute to a manager’s track record in the organisation and affect 
promotion prospects (Bowers, 1970, p. 303), the principal has opportunity to demand 
additional responses from the agent to remedy the contract incompleteness and implement a 
more optimal solution. This is evident in all the cases. Case 1 shows that absent a written 
contract definition of structural repairs, the principal persuades the agent of the obligation to 
immediately attend to internal redecorations. In Case 2, although the written contract does not 
specify a single client representative, the principal convinces the agent to implement a new 
contract reports system. Despite no written contract clause to remedy poor staff behaviour, 
the principal in Case 3 succeeds in getting the agent to agree to dealing with a difficult 
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situation and improve customer service. In Case 4, despite initial disagreement regarding the 
required level of technical support, the principal obtains from the agent improved response 
times and a new complaints and issues log report. Finally, in Case 5, without a written 
contract mechanism, the principal succeeds in agreeing with the agent the provision of a new 
arrangement with reduced budget and reduced cleaning hours. 
Putting these findings as a formal proposition gives the following: 
Proposition P2: A principal uses the incompleteness of the written contract as an opportunity 
to promote a response from the agent. 
Having formed these propositions in relation to the written contract, additional propositions 
may be made in relation to the unwritten contract. 
Spence (1973, p. 654) proposes that spending interpersonal time and demonstrating 
willingness to spend interpersonal time with the other party functions as a signal 
communicating commitment, and greatly assists resolving disputes. In all the cases discussed 
above, there are examples of signals comprising the expenditure of the principal’s time which 
influence the agent. For example, in Case 1 the principal’s senior manager takes time to 
personally call the agent. In Case 2, the principal meets the agent informally over coffee to 
discuss the contract issues. In Case 3, the principal devotes additional and personal time to 
writing a report that could have been provided by the agent. In Case 4, that principal 
increases the frequency of the contract meetings at a personal time cost to herself. Finally, in 
Case 5, the principal declares her personal availability for informal discussions with the agent 
without demanding any commitments from the agent. These time expenditures are not strictly 
functional, as the communication could have been made briefly through a less personal 
method such as an email or letter. However, the time cost and the conveyed willingness to 
spend time gives the signal its power to influence and promote a response. As there were 
alternative communication means available for the message, these time costs would have 
been evident to the agent.  
Summarising these findings into a proposition gives the following: 
Proposition P3: A principal uses visible non-functional expenditures of time as a signal to 
promote a response from the agent.  
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In addition to the expenditure of time, the principal may use the demonstration of some costly 
attribute as a signal such as his control of the contract budget, technical or contract 
management expertise, or social and negotiation skills appropriate to the contract 
environment (Banker and Hwang, 2008, pp. 310, Lawrence et al, 2005, pp. 185). The 
demonstration of the possession by the sender of some relevant costly resource gives 
influence to their signal. For example, in Case 2, the principal highlighted her control of the 
central waste contract budget as well as her technical knowledge of recent waste management 
regulations. In Case 3, the principal demonstrated her business and management knowledge 
in writing the canteen management proposal. In Case 4, the principal introduces the agent to a 
weekly log as a management tool for monitoring operations. Finally, in Case 5, the principal 
displayed confidence in her ability to negotiate the acceptance by her organisation of reduced 
levels of service, which subsequently proved successful.  
From these findings a proposition may be formed: 
Proposition P4: A principal uses his resources such as budgets, expertise, or negotiation 
skills as a signal to promote a response from by the agent. 
The principal may use their access to figures in a senior management position as a signal.  
For example, the attendance at events by a leadership figures is a strong signal of support for 
that event (Spence, 1973, pp. 653 - 654). This is evident in Case 1 where the principal asks 
her senior manager to telephone the agent. Also in Case 3, the principal successfully invites 
her senior management and the agent’s senior management to attend the same fund-raising 
event. In Case 4, the principal indicates that she represents the position of senior management 
by requiring the agent to attend her office for the contract meetings. Finally, in Case 5 the 
principal, by displaying confidence in her ability to agree a change in the contract service 
level, highlighted that she had a relationship of influence with senior management positions 
in her organisation. 
Summarising these findings into a proposition gives the following: 
Proposition P5: A principal uses his relationship with positions of organizational leadership 
as a signal to promote a response from the agent. 
The above propositions deal with signals by principals based on some costly expenditure or 
attribute of the sender. Rational informed receivers respond positively if the signal 
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expenditures are observable, even if not perfectly so (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986, p. 797). 
Therefore, in observing the principal’s actions or attributes, the agent is influenced to respond 
positively. Some propositions may be now formed in relation to the agent’s observations of 
such signals and their influence on the agent’s response. 
A change from the usual means of contract communications to more formal means of 
communications, such as writing letters, can be a signal of dissatisfaction with performance 
(Nikander and Eloranta, 2001, pp. 387 - 388). Therefore agents will likely view any changes 
in communication methods by the principal as signals conveying information or 
dissatisfaction about the agent’s performance. As continued unsatisfactory performance will 
lead to dispute, it is in the agent’s interest to respond in some measure to such information. 
For example, in Case 1, the agent observes the principal stopping discussion and sending him 
an email. In Case 3 the agent observes a change towards more formal communication on the 
receipt of a letter from the principal. This is viewed as a signal and is instrumental in 
influencing the agent to respond by addressing the poor staff behaviour. In Case 4 the agent 
notices that the relatively informal contract meetings are changed to meetings with formal 
written minutes. In each example, the agent is conscious of unsatisfactory performance and is 
influenced in part by the signal to respond.  
These findings lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition P6: An agent views a change to formal communication as an information signal 
requiring a response.  
The persistence of spending time is a signal of interest that is widely recognised due to the 
shadow value of time (Spence, 2001, p. 432). Activities, such as lobbying or demonstrations, 
which impose intensity of interest and time costs on decision makers, are signals which act as 
incentives to focus the receiver’s attention (Spence, 1973, p. 660).  Therefore, requiring a 
party to repeatedly meet and discuss an issue both imposes a time penalty and signals an 
incentive to resolve the matter. Such repeated discussions may also have a positive intention. 
A principal sends signals to incentivise the agent’s performance by reinforcing their self-
confidence in their ability to complete the task, and highlighting how a good performance 
will improve the agent’s future prospects (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003, p. 491). Therefore 
additional or repeated meetings may be observed as an incentive or a penalty signal 
depending on the context. For example in Case 2 the additional informal meetings drew the 
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agent’s attention to the importance of the proposed waste reduction project and the resulting 
benefits to her company’s regulatory targets. In Case 3 the additional meeting at a fund-
raising event allowed the principal make positive comments to the agent’s senior 
management which gave him an incentive to deal with the difficult issue of poor staff 
behaviour. In Case 4, the additional meetings imposed a time penalty on the agent and 
incentivised improved response times. Finally, in Case 5 the additional meetings alerted the 
agent to the benefits to saving the contract, and provided an incentive to re-design the 
contract services levels to fit the reduced budget. In each case, the agent’s attention is 
focussed on an issue by the additional meetings, and draws from these an incentive to 
respond. 
These findings may be stated as a proposition: 
Proposition P7: An agent views an additional meeting as an incentive signal requiring a 
response. 
A shared sense of non-legal, social obligations support contract outcomes (Macneil, 1974, pp. 
785 - 788) and demonstrations of willingness to work through difficulties signals mutual 
interest which greatly assist resolving disputes (Spence, 1973, p. 654). Parties to a contract 
are motivated to find solutions to difficulties by actions which evidence a sense of mutual 
interest. In Case 1 the agent received a telephone call unusually from the principal’s manager, 
who highlighted concern that the difficulties would affect both their reputations. In Case 2 the 
agent heard during informal meetings how the proposed contract changes would improve 
outcomes for both their organisations. In Case 3 the agent observed the principal highlight to 
his senior managers the expected benefits of the contract. In Case 4 the agent got an 
explanation of the benefits of the proposed weekly log to both their standing. Finally, in Case 
5 the agent heard how avoiding termination of the contract was in both their interests. In all 
these cases the agent observed the principal’s willingness to work through the contract 
difficulties and responded positively to these signals of mutual interest.  
These findings may be summarised as the following proposition:   
Proposition P8: An agent views a demonstration of willingness as a mutual interest signal 
requiring a response. 
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Based on the above findings and propositions an improved second conceptual model may be 
constructed. 
 
Table 4.13 – Initial Study Propositions 
No. Proposition 
P0 A principal uses the written contract incentive as an opportunity to promote a response 
from the agent. 
P1 A principal relies on the written contract information system to promote a response 
from the agent. 
P2 A principal uses the incompleteness of the written contract as an opportunity to promote 
a response from the agent. 
P3 A principal uses visible non-functional expenditures of time as a signal to promote a 
response from the agent. 
P4 A principal uses his resources such as budgets, expertise, or negotiation skills as a 
signal to promote a response from by the agent. 
P5 A principal uses his relationship with positions of organizational leadership as a signal 
to promote a response from the agent. 
P6 An agent views a change to formal communication as an information signal requiring a 
response.  
P7 An agent views an additional meeting as an incentive signal requiring a response. 







 4.3 SECOND CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Bowers views a theory building research strategy for real world problems as describing the 
forces that affect the process, seeking patterns from the data and theory, to derive other 
findings and an improved model of the process (Bowers, 1972, pp. 25 - 26). The first 
conceptual model of ex post contract management (see Figure 2.4) was based on the 
literatures of the written and unwritten contracts and proposed that public contracts to private 
firms comprise two forms, the written contract and the unwritten contract. The written 
contract offers the agency theory management mechanisms of incentives and information 
systems. The unwritten contract emerges due to the contract and offers signals as the 
management mechanisms. These signals may be viewed from the perspectives of the 
psychological contract or information economics. This Initial Study set out to investigate ex 
post mechanisms from the economics perspective to address the research questions and 
improve the conceptual model.      
Based on an economics perspective of the written contract and of signals, five cases of public 
contracts were investigated. From the findings and the resulting propositions, a more detailed 
framework of ex post contract management mechanisms can now formed, and this is shown 
in Figure 4.1. In this model the written contract mechanisms influencing agent towards the 
contract goals comprise the incentives, such as payment or penalties, and the information 
systems, such as site meetings. As the incentives are relatively fixed, the principal relies 
primarily on the information systems to induce a response from the agent towards improved 
performance. As the written contract is inevitably incomplete, unforeseen contingencies arise 
such as a lack of remedies, poor performance due to contract interpretation, or a reduction in 
the contract budget. The principal appeals to the agent to respond by contributing to a 
solution, endeavouring to use the contract incompleteness as an opportunity to induce a 
response from the agent. In parallel with these mechanisms, the principal also makes use the 
unwritten contract through demonstrations or signals. These are based on his non-functional 
expenditure of personal time with the agent, his control of resources such as the contract 
budget, his expertise, or his social and negotiation skills, and his access to positions of 
organisational leadership. The agent observes any or all of these behaviours by the principal, 
and will interpret them as information signals, incentive signals, or mutual interest signals. 
Based on his interpretation he is influenced to some degree towards a response to provide a 
solution to the written contract incompleteness.  
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4.4 TOWARDS THE NEXT PHASE IN THE RESEARCH 
There are a number of limitations of the Initial Study. It is an exploratory study based on a 
limited sample of empirical cases using an inductive theory building approach aimed at 
developing a more detailed conceptual model. It also uses an information economics 
definition of signals as the expenditure of human time in non-functional activities to convey 
information (Spence, 1973, p. 654).  
However, the Initial Study contributes an understanding of the dual aspect of the incomplete 
written contract. While incompleteness presents challenges to both the principal and agent, 
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and indeed may actually threaten the continuance of the contract, incompleteness is shown to 
also be an opportunity for the principal to seek additional responses from the agent thereby 
potentially optimising outcomes.  The Initial Study also identifies categories of signals sent 
by the principal, and categories of influences on the agent based on his observation of such 
signals. Finally, the Initial Study suggests that outcomes from contracts may, due to 
incompleteness and the arising management mechanisms, not entirely conform to those 
originally specified in the contract. 
Recall the research questions (see Table 1.2) which ask how and why managers use ex post 
contract management mechanisms, and lead to a research objective of whether a conceptual 
model of such mechanisms can be developed. The contributions of the Initial Study allow 
some answers to be made. How managers use mechanisms is through a combination of those 
offered by the written contract, negotiated responses arising from the contract 
incompleteness, and signals based on non-functional behaviours, resources, and access to 
organisational position. Why managers use this approach is due in part to unforeseen 
contingencies not covered by the written contract, or perhaps because incompleteness may 
offer the principal potential opportunities to elicit additional responses from the agent. 
Finally, it is possible to develop a conceptual model of these ex post mechanisms. 
This goes some way to explaining the research problems (see Table 1.1) which were that 
public contracts do not sufficiently address contingencies, have outcomes which differ from 
those specified in the contract, and do not promote working relationships which encourage 
collaborative solutions. This Initial Study finds that public contracts may not sufficiently 
address ex post contingencies since incompleteness in the written contract may allow 
principals to create additional responses from agents and more flexible contract outcomes. 
Such a situation would also explain why public contract outcomes differ from those specified. 
This may be because the final outcomes are those which address unexpected contingencies 
rather than those specified in the contract. Finally, the third research problem proposes that 
public contract relationships do not foster collaborative solutions. The cases examined 
suggest that collaborative solutions were in fact usually achieved contrary to the problem 
statement.  
However, the Initial Study shows that further research is required to better understand how 
these collaborative solutions are reached. While perfunctory performance to the letter of the 
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contract is enforceable, consummate performance is not, and optimum outcomes depend on 
the parties being happy to perform to the spirit of the contract (Hart and Moore, 2008, p. 3). 
How do parties become happy to perform to the spirit of the contract? The data in the Initial 
Study was collected from archival materials held by the principals of the contracts, and may 
not sufficiently highlight the perspectives of the agents. At the heart of collaboration is the 
notion of willing voluntary effort. As discussed earlier in the literature review, this can be 
better understood in the context of the psychological contract applied to the principal agent 
relationship.  Having established in the Initial Study through the economics perspective that 
both agency theory and signals are used in ex post contract management to achieve optimum 
outcomes beyond that of the written contact, the psychological contract perspective may now 
be used to more fully understand how parties are willing to perform to the spirit of the 
contract, and improve the conceptual model of what constitutes desirable performance. This 
















CHAPTER 5 - MAIN STUDY 
 This chapter describes how the Main Study was conducted, the analysis, the findings, and a 
review of the Initial Study propositions.  
  
5.1 MAIN STUDY OVERVIEW 
The study comprises an investigation of two public contracts between a public sector client 
and a private contractor in the ex post stage. Two cases were selected using three selection 
criteria. The first was that the case contract was a publically tendered contract between a 
public body and a private supplier firm, and in its post tender stage. The second criterion was 
that the cases collectively provided a basis of theoretic sampling to develop a conceptual 
model through their similarities and differences. The final criterion was that the actors to be 
interviewed, that is the principal and agent, represented their organisations with final 
responsibility for the cost and service outcomes of the contract. 
Using web sites of third level institutions, a number of potential cases were identified to 
provide theoretical sampling, leading to two cases being selected and named Case A and 
Case B. Both these cases were contracts that had followed a public procurement tender 
process, were in now in their ex post implementation stage, and concerned service contracts 
likely to require continuous monitoring and adjustment by the principal and the agent. Case A 
was a cleaning service and primarily a function of manual tasks by a relatively large number 
of operatives. Case B was a sophisticated information technology system, developed and 
maintained by a relatively low number of knowledge workers. It was felt that these 
similarities and differences would provide richer data and better support the development of 
the conceptual model. 
To negotiate access, telephone calls were made first to the contract principals outlining in 
general terms the requirement of the research. Without detailing the research objectives, it 
was explained that the intention was to conduct two interviews, one with the contract 
principal and the other with the contract agent. It was explained that the research was being 
conducted under academic supervision as part of a Dublin City University Business School 
doctorate, and that all results would be confidential. Having got agreement from the principal, 
I then made a similar approach to the agent explaining that the principal had already given 
88 
 
agreement. Following agreement on the telephone, a letter with the current revision of the 
DCU Certificate of Consent to Participate in the Research Study were sent with a copy of the 
questionnaire to encourage considered replies during the interviews. The success or failure of 
interviews to reveal the process of business management depends less on interview questions 
but more on the stories told at the interviews (Piore, 1979, p. 561). Therefore while the 
interviews followed a prepared questionnaire, the interviewees were not interrupted during 
their replies and allowed to follow their own train of thought.  The interviews were recorded 
on a Philips LFH0617 device, which allowed slow speed playback to facilitate re-listening 
and accuracy in transcribing. Case A interviews took place during August 2011. Due to 
postponements by the principal, Case B interviews did not take place until 2013. 
 
5.2 ANALYSIS 
Appendix I shows the interview questionnaire and selected excerpts from the interview 
transcripts describing the case written contracts. The first step, to preserve confidentiality, 
was to remove all person and place names and substitute capital letters for these, for example 
all references to the principal’s and agent’s names were removed and replaced by P for 
principal, A for agent, MP for principal’s contract manager, and MA for agent’s contract 
manager. The analysis comprised an initial analysis of the transcripts, the development of 
codes for a detailed analysis, and a final analysis based on these codes. These are discussed in 
turn. 
 
5.2.1 Initial Transcript Analysis 
The analysis began by arraying the interview transcripts in rows showing the questions posed 
adjacent to the responses of the principal and agent. Each case had the individual responses of 
the principal and agent shown side by side against the text of the relevant interview question. 
To allow clear reference the Case A transcript was given page numbers A-1 to A-33, and the 
Case B page number B-1 to B-22. When referring to quotations, it was decided to highlight 
these as PA for the principal in Case A, AA for the agent in Case A, PB for the principal in 
Case B, and AB for the agent in Case B. The transcripts highlighted the different perspectives 
of the parties to the same questions. Next the transcripts were read through several times and 
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memos written against data items as they stood out for consideration. This initial analysis to 
establish a general understanding of the principal and agent perspectives resulted in two 
initial documents comprising of over 11,000 words for Case A and some 6,000 words for 
Case B. Based on this initial transcript analysis, an overview of each case was formed. Both 
Case A and Case B transcripts had excerpts which allowed basic information to be placed 
under the headings of the written contract incentives and information systems, the contract 
incompleteness, and a potential unwritten contract.   
For example in Case A the agent identifies the written contract incentive stating that the 
annual contract value ‘was €140,000’ (AA, p. A-4) while the principal identifies the 
information system saying ‘they meet formally on a monthly basis’ (PA, p. A-12).  The 
contract appears incomplete as the principal notes that ‘the contract has grown’ (PA, A-4). 
Finally, there appears to be an unwritten contract relationship based on mutual obligations 
since the agent says that ‘if there is an additional requirement for anything extra, we have to 
try and do that’ (AA, p. A-19).     
Similarly in Case B the written contract incentive is noted by the agent as ‘€56,000’ (AB, p. 
B-2), and the information system is described by the principal as a ‘once a year … review’ 
(PB, p. B-12). The principal is aware the contract is incomplete due to ‘things we hadn’t 
thought of in the original contract’ (PB, p. B-5), and the relationship makes up this deficit 
since the agent notes that ‘because we have this on-going relationship we are willing’ (AB, p. 
B-18).  
As the initial analysis indicated that both cases show evidence to support written contract 
incentives, written contract information systems, contract incompleteness, some form of 
psychological contract based on reciprocal obligations, a more detailed analysis could begin 
using coding. This is now described. 
   
5.2.2  Coding and Final Transcript Analysis 
Following the initial transcript analysis, the texts were coded. Hseih and Shannon (2005, pp. 
1281 - 1283) recommend that when the research goal is to extend a conceptual framework or 
theory, the researcher should use existing theory to determine the initial coding categories, 
then determining operational definitions from the theory to further refine, extend, and enrich 
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the theory. Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 58 – 63) suggest that starting codes may come 
from the conceptual framework and this approach was taken using the main terms as labels 
and adding an additional ‘other’ label to capture data not defined by the existing codes. The 
initial codes were drawn from labels of the first and second conceptual models (see Figures 
2.4 and 4.1) together with the psychological contract signals communication model (see 
Figure 2.3). In all, nineteen initial codes were used to analyse the transcriptions, five from the 
first conceptual model of the written and unwritten contracts, six from the second conceptual 
model of signals, and eight from the formation of the psychological contract. Starting with 
these initial codes, the texts were coded and re-coded for several iterations following a 
development shown schematically in Figure 5.1, to arrive at the final codes tabulated in Table 
5.1. Over these iterations, codes began to settle into clear categories, until some codes were 
merged into others, and no new codes emerged and final codes were established. The process 
required re-reading of the literatures to clarify the nature of the individual codes in the light 
of interviews themselves. In summary, the codes are a product of literature concepts and the 
interpreted meanings of the principal and agent interviewed in the context of their 
management of contracts. This process took several months before clarity in the themes and 
the codes were finalised. These final codes and themes were then used to analyse the 
transcripts, picking out quotations of relevance, and interpreting these using memos inserted 
into a page column adjacent to the excerpt. From this the analysis was completed and the 












Table 5.1 – Themes and Final Codes 






























Written contract WC Minimum standards of the contract service 
for the agreed payments 
Contract incentives IBP Incentives or penalties such as contract 
payments for work done 



















WCI Contingencies requiring extension of the 
original contract 
















































CP The principal communicating the required 
performance standards through additional 
meetings or more formal communications  
Message Reinforcement MR The principal reinforcing the message 
through the compensation system such as 
reviewing invoices in light of work done 
Authority Display A The principal demonstrating power, 
capacity, and support of the organisation to 













Individual Disposition ID Agent’s cognitive bias and focus on 
information relevant to interests or 
prospects such as attention to the 
principal’s mood or likely positive  
consideration of future tenders 
Obligations BJ Agent’s decision on his required actions to 
fulfil his perceived obligations under the 
contract, for example    decisions to 
perform additional unpaid works 
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Based on the analysis using the developed codes and themes of the written contract and the 
psychological contract, the findings are now discussed. From the development of the codes, a 
number of themes emerged which may be used to order the discussion. These are the written 
contract mechanisms, the written contract incompleteness andthe contract relationship, and 
the unwritten contract mechanisms. The findings are now discussed taking these headings in 
turn. 
 
5.3.1 Written Contract Management Mechanisms 
Appendix II shows selected interview transcript examples from Case A and Case B 
concerning the written contract mechanisms coded as the contract incentives and the contract 
information systems.  The findings in relation to the written contract management 
mechanisms are discussed under the headings of incentives and information systems, and 
these mechanisms are identified as important resources to enable the contract response by the 
agent. 
 
5.3.1.1 Written Contract Incentives 
The contract incentives are the payments to the agent for the contracted service. The written 
contract offers three incentives, the payments, the security of those payments, and the 
contract client or location. In Case A the agent states that the annual contract value ‘was 
€140,000’ (AA, p. A-4). The agent stresses that ‘having…a three year contract with an option 
for a further year….it’s nice to know…you are going to get paid at the end of every month’ 
(AA, p. A-10). As the principal summarises, ‘they are dealing with a public body…it’s a 
regular payment, it’s not something that going to go to the wall tomorrow’ (PA, p. A-10).  
The agent confirms this saying ‘it’s very nice to know that you’re undertaking a job that you 
know you are going to get paid for at the end of every month… with private sector work you 
don’t have that guarantee’ (AA, p. A-10). Also, the contract brings his company towards the 
aspiration of having a larger campus contract. He says ‘we don’t have a large third level 
institution, what we would see in a large campus type contract’ (AA, p. A-5). In addition, the 
location is convenient, as the agent puts it, ‘the great benefit of it is that it’s the centre of the 
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city…I have a large management team in centre of the city’ (AA, p. A-5). Finally, he notes 
that ‘It’s great to have government work and you can use some contracts as a reference, 
whether it be for an educational institution, or the public authorities which often have very 
sensitive areas, that you can show that you’ve got good security in place for your staff, and 
vetting for your staff’ (AA, p. A-11).  
In Case B the agent puts the contract value as ‘€56,000 … cost of providing and developing 
the software and the annual support … about €12,000 to €14,000 (AB, p. B-2). A significant 
benefit is the development opportunity through the contract. The agent says ‘apart from the 
fact that they are flagship, we would learn things from the fact that it’s a veterinary hospital 
using the system while in practice the needs are somewhat different’ (AB, p. B-8).  
In both cases the written contracts incentives are evident as those specified. However, there 
are additional incentives present to the agents. For example a public contract offers security 
of contract payments, a potential reference in seeking other contracts, and an opportunity to 
acquire knowledge. 
 
5.3.1.2 Written Contract Information Systems 
The information systems are the ways the principal monitors the contract for the appropriate 
performance. In Case A the written contract information systems comprise monthly site 
meetings where an inspection or audit of the cleaning service outcomes is done, followed by 
a discussion and a written audit report. The principal highlights that ‘though they meet 
formally on a monthly basis, they would be in contact via email around issues’ (PA, p. A-12). 
The agent explains that ‘the monthly information meeting between the managers is the 
information system’ (AA, p. A-9) as well as ‘our fortnightly walk arounds on our audits’ 
(AA, p. A-26). 
In Case B the written contract information system appears limited to an annual review, about 
which the principal notes ‘I think we said that periodically once a year we would review it 
and we are to have one of those meetings quite soon’ (PB, p. B-12). However, an informal 
information system based on discussing incidents is important as the principal says ‘another 
incident where we need communicate … our concerns over this issue’ (PB, p. B-13). This 
enables remedies and development of the system as explained by the agent ‘we are all 
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interested in progressing the system’s ability and to meet as many people’s requirements’ 
(AB, B-5).  
While both Case A and Case B show defined monthly or annual meetings as the contract 
information system, there is some ambivalence by both the principal and the agent towards 
the extent of the information system usefulness. In parallel with the formal information 
system there are informal information systems which are significant in moving the agent 
towards a useful response. 
 
5.3.1.3 Written Contract Mechanisms as a Resource 
While the incentives or payments provide the necessary funding to enable the agent’s 
provision of the contract service, the information systems are also a useful resource enabling 
the agent to allocate effort towards issues of importance and use resources more efficiently. 
Therefore the principal’s incentives and information systems are the primary contract 
resources provided to the agent in exchange for the agent’s specialised services. In Case A, 
the agent highlights that the contract budget determines the payroll for the cleaning service 
saying ‘it’s the payroll … the manager has a certain number of hours per week, per building’ 
(AA, p. A-18). In return for the principal’s contract resources of the information and the 
budget, the agent exchanges his specialised services and human resources. He notes that ‘our 
contract managers … can provide that service, that knowledge, to do the job’ (AA, p. A-20).   
The contract resources provided by the principal are also an important factor in Case B. Here 
the agent refers to the principal’s information saying that ‘what we have provided meets their 
needs pretty well, but certainly from time to time they might say we would like be able to do 
x, y, and z’ (AB, p. B-26). In return for the principal’s contract payment and information on 
special requirements, the agent is enabled to provide solutions. He states that ‘we obviously 
had the knowledge, the workings of the operation there, which an operation of that size, tends 
to be somewhat unique’ (AB, p. B-4).   
Therefore the written contact ex post mechanisms serve primarily as a contract resource 
provided by the principal to enable the agent have the necessary budget and information to 
provide a service in an efficient way. How the agent provides the service is intended to suit 
the needs of the principal. The resulting remedy may differ from that specified in the written 
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contract, or indeed may be missing from the contract specification due to incompleteness. 
The concept of ex post written contract mechanisms as a resource is a useful finding in 
understanding why public contract outcomes may differ from those specified.  
From the statements of the principals and the agents it is clear that the written contracts are 
incomplete and require informal communications to ensure the required outcomes. The next 
section examines data in relation to this written contract incompleteness and the resulting 
relationship from the perspective of the psychological contract. 
  
5.3.2 Written Contract Incompleteness and Relationship 
Complex written contracts are inevitably incomplete and some form of relation governance is 
used to manage such contracts. In both Case A and Case B, the principals and agents speak of 
a contract relationship which fills the gaps arising from an incomplete written contract and 
develops the quality of the service. Appendix III shows selected interview transcript 
examples in relation to the written contract incompleteness and the psychological contract. 
The findings in relation to the contract incompleteness and the relationship are now discussed 
before summarising the all the findings of the written contract themes. 
  
5.3.2.1 Contract Incompleteness 
There are examples of incompleteness of the written contract in both cases. In Case A, the 
principal specifies the cleaning services in terms of the outcomes to be achieved rather than 
the tasks or inputs, highlighting ‘the minimum frequency in cleaning…based on an outcome 
basis that everywhere has to be to our standard with absolute minimum frequency’ (PA, p. A-
6). She adds that ‘if there were areas which may need levels of service or specific events 
happening … our contract supervisor would liaise with the manager of the cleaning 
company’ (PA, p. A-6). She also indicates that the contract is designed to be incomplete 
saying ‘‘I think a too-detailed document can become a bit of a weapon between the two 
parties’ (PA, p. A-8). This has led to additional requirements being agreed after the original 
contract. The principal notes these changes saying that ‘but the contract has grown over that 
period as buildings came on stream’ (PA, A-4) and that ‘we’re actually working on devising a 
whole measurement of KPI’s’ (PA, A-30). The agent notes this contract incompleteness 
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saying ‘bits of it came on in different parts’ (AA, A-3). The requested additions are 
acknowledged by the agent as a burden saying ‘if there is an additional requirement for 
anything extra, we have to try and do that within those hours … there is no additional 
resources, financial resources, to carry out the job’ (AA, p. A-19). However, like the 
principal, he sees the incompleteness as supporting efficiency and a positive example over 
other public contracts. He says ‘if it was run like some other government contracts … it 
wouldn’t happen’ (AA, A-10). While the contract is obviously incomplete, the ex post 
flexibility, despite its burden, seems to offer flexibility and benefits to both parties. 
In Case B, both the principal and agent initially state that the contract as complete, with 
sufficient clauses to address contingencies. For example the agent states that ‘there hasn’t 
been a whole lot that needed to be done other than changes within the contract’ (AB, B-15). 
The principal also notes that ‘it wasn’t because of lack of completeness; it was only because 
of things we hadn’t thought of in the original contract’ (PB, p. B-6). However, both the 
principal and agent comment that much of the contract working is without reference to the 
written contract. The principal says ‘I think there is a little bit in the contract about 
communications, but a lot of it is informal’ (PB, p. B-7) and ‘to be honest, I think people 
don’t really look back at the contract’ (PB, p. B-8). She appears conscious of the difficulty in 
having a complete contract for such a system saying ‘sometimes it was our fault … we didn’t 
understand quite how it works’ (AB, p. B-7). Incompleteness is apparent in changes and 
additions to the contract that is required ex post. The principal gives examples where ‘the 
anaesthetists wanted it in a different form for anaesthesia requests’ (PB, p. B-6) and ‘when 
we developed a new laboratory test which we have quite recently, then there needs to be an 
action to ensure that the link between the lab system and the VetServ happens’ (PB, p. B-13). 
Also the principal expresses concern over the security of the IT servers saying ‘this made us a 
little bit worried for the VetServ servers … we need communicate to AB in VetServ our 
concerns over this issue (PB, p. B-13). The agent explains that in some cases additional 
charges are discussed saying ‘they would ask how feasible that would be …we would let 
them know that there would be a cost involved’ (AB, p. B-15). He also notes his commitment 
to perfect the incompleteness saying ‘we are all interested in progressing the system’s ability 
and to meet as many people’s requirements’ (AB, p. B-6). This case offers findings that the 
contract is incomplete, and that this offers the principal means to address issues with 
flexibility, and allows the agent to develop the system’s capability.  
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5.3.2.2 Contract Relationship 
Both cases indicate that there are links between the written contract incompleteness and the 
development of a contract relationship which promotes service performance and offers 
potential safeguards from dispute to both the principal and the agent. Striving for a complete 
contract is held to be something to be avoided.   
In Case A the principal favours the development of a relationship above writing a more 
complete contract. She says ‘you build the relationship, because if you are solely relying on 
what’s printed, the one thing you miss will be the one thing you need … it won’t be written 
down’ (PA, p. A-7). The principal maintains that it is the relationship that ensures the 
contract quality saying ‘I think it’s absolutely essential to have a relationship between the 
client manager and the contract manger….if you don’t have that …the service will fall down’ 
(PA, p. A-12). The agent takes a similar view saying ‘the most important thing as far as I’m 
concerned is the relationship’ (AA, p. A-12). He works to maintain this relationship saying ‘I 
am available at any time to come in and see them’ (AA, p. A-22). He maintains that his staff 
feel a close relationship with the client organisation saying ‘the people who work for me on 
all the sites, very very quickly, they forget they work for CleanServ … they feel that they 
work for the building’ (AA, p. A-22). Case A supports the view that the contract relationship 
is felt to be a substitute for a complete written contract and a support for the service quality 
during the ex post stage. 
In Case B the agent explains that the relationship with the principal is of importance to 
service delivery saying ‘if there’s a difficulty either side, having a point of contact like that is 
really useful … I’d like to think that’s an excellent relationship’ (AB, p. B-10). The principal 
confirms this saying ‘we do enjoy a very good cordial relationship … that has been really 
instrumental in ensuring the success of the contract’ (PB, p. B-11). She notes that there is a 
warm relationship between the agent and her staff saying he has a ‘good friendly relationship 
with many staff on the ground, and he would go out of his way … to help an individual with 
problems’ (PB, p. B-11). She sees the relationship as helping the communication of the 
contract requirements saying ‘if you lose that personal contact, that closeness, the 
relationship, then I think things just get put up with and we don’t communicate our needs 
clearly’ (PB, p. B-13). Finally, the principal associates the building of the relationship with 
the development of a successful contract service saying ‘only when we went and investigated 
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and built up that relationship again, and spent a little bit of money in ensuring that our 
contract was such that we would be able to upgrade every year and would upgrade annually 
that that developed’ (PB, p. B-14). The agent sees the written contract as insufficient, and 
may be valuably substituted by the relationship. He says ‘I would like to think we have 
moved beyond the contract … we have a very, very good working relationship with the 
College and its entire staff’ (AB, B-6). Therefore this case also supports the finding that the 
contract relationship is felt to be a substitute for a complete written contract and a support for 
the service quality during the ex post stage.  
Since parties to the above relationships exhibit perceived obligations linked to 
communications of future intentions (Morrison and Robinson, 1997, p. 228) and a concern 
for potential loses of the other party supported by behaviours (Rousseau, 1995, pp. 24 – 26) 
the findings support that the contract relationships are psychological contracts. While 
dependent on the written contract for its existence, its development is supported by the 
written contract incompleteness, and it may, in part, become a substitute for the written 
contract in defining how the parties behave. Finally, the emergence of this psychological 
contract offers security against potential disputes, and improves the quality of the agent’s 
response. It is now possible to review the main elements of the written and psychological 
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Table 5.3 – Overview of Case B 
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5.3.2.3 Summary of the Written Contract Themes 
From the above discussion, it is now possible to summarise the findings for Case A and Case 
B under the written contract themes, including the contract incompleteness, and the 
psychological contract, and these as shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. In both cases 
the contracts are clearly in the ex post phase and of importance to both the principal and 
agent. While the written contract incentives and information systems are easily identified, 
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there is significant contract incompleteness which is not regarded as undesirable, and indeed 
appears welcome to some extent by both parties. This written contract incompleteness gives 
rise to an unwritten or psychological contract where additional obligations are provided by 
the agent.  
To more adequately analyse the mechanisms leading to the obligations and responses of the 
agent, it is now necessary to examine the contract relationship from the perspective of the 
psychological contract signals. The next section discusses the findings in relation to these. 
 
5.3.3  Psychological Contract Management Mechanisms 
Selected interview transcript excerpts are shown in Appendix IV which provides data of the 
psychological contract management mechanisms comprising the principal’s signals of 
performance communication, message reinforcement, authority displays, and also the agent’s 
individual dispositions. The agent’s observation of the principal’s signals together with the 
agent’s individual disposition create the agent’s psychological contract concerning his 
required obligations to the contract, and lead to behaviour judgements including additional 
unpaid work. These are grouped for discussion under the headings of principal’s signals and 
agent’s obligations. 
 
5.3.3.1  Principal’s Signals 
A principal sends such signals to the agent to shape the psychological contract by behaving as 
the contract maker, communicating the required performance standards, reinforcing standards 
through the contract incentives, and displaying authority in relation to contract by showing he 
is supported by his organisation. These signals of performance communication, message 
reinforcement, and authority are now taken in turn. 
 
5.3.3.1.1 Performance Communication Signals 
Performance communication signals comprise time spent by the principal communicating 
performance in addition to the contract information systems.  In Case A, the principal  signals 
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performance issues to the agent by noting events in, what she terms, a formal manner. For 
example, she says ‘if there is a problem that can’t be dealt with at a supervisory level, then 
we would set up a formal meeting’ (PA, p. A-27). She adds ‘I would formally take the report 
from Security and send it to CleanServ so that it’s actually documented’ (PA, p. A-13). She 
creates formality by accompanying the verbal communication with a written record of the 
unsatisfactory event, and it is this written evidence which marks it as a signal. Verbal 
communication concerns routine operational matters, for example ‘if it’s a small issue it 
might be dealt with a phone call’ (PA, p. A-13). However, she notes that problems are 
communicated using written communication saying that ‘we try to deal with any actual 
complaint or anything that we think may be a problem via email at least so that there is some 
record’ (PA, p. A-13). Additional formality to strengthen the signal is achieved by having a 
further meeting in a location owned by the principal and referring to the written contract. She 
explains ‘I would believe in bringing them in for a formal meeting…on our territory rather … 
and sitting down formally across the desk with the documents in front of me and deal with it 
in that manner’ (PA, p. A-23). The agent is alert to the principal’s performance signalling. All 
meetings with the principal are a performance signal to some extent. He notes that ‘if I was 
meeting P to look at something new … there would always be a conversation about how 
things are going’ (AA, p. A-27). If the matter concerns a problem, the performance signal is 
clear. He says ‘if there was a requirement or a problem, P would come straight on to me’ 
(AA, p. A-13), adding that ‘if P wasn’t happy with services being delivered, or services being 
delivered were related back to P, and P came on the phone, she wouldn’t put any gloss on it’ 
(AA, p. A-23).  He is aware that written communications from the principal signal a problem 
saying ‘…if they had a difficulty where their office wasn’t being cleaned, they might send an 
electronic email to P, who would, in turn then, forward it on to our own office here’ (AA, p. 
A-16). Such issues are met with prompt responses by the agent who says ‘if something is 
highlighted it’s addressed there and then, and it will be finished before the next meeting’ 
(AA, p. A-7). Also, some written communications are positive signals. The principal 
highlights that ‘any comment that would come back, positive comments, we would pass it on 
to them’ (PA, p. A-27). This is important to the agent who says ‘it’s a lovely gesture … very 
seldom does the cleaning staff get thanked for the job … it’s nice to get something positive’ 
(AA, p. A-26). Therefore while performance signals frequently indicate dissatisfaction, the 
principal views more positive expressions as being important to maintaining the relationship. 
She says ‘if you are too business-orientated and you don’t build any relationship… if you are 
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too social …that’s not good business practice either’ (AA, p. A-23). Such signals are also 
evident in Case B. 
Performance communication signals in Case B comprise meetings that are additional to the 
regular contract information systems. The agent notes that ‘the meetings are informal…. 
weren’t part of the contract as such’ (AB, p. B-6). He is alert to such meetings being 
performance signals saying ‘if the client is there wanting something else, and we can’t 
discuss it or aren’t willing to discuss it … then the client isn’t going to be too happy’ (AB, B-
15). He views any reference to the formal written contract as a negative performance signal 
saying ‘I would feel very worried if anyone started quoting the contract’ (AB, B-8). The 
principal states that some performance issues are serious and require a formal meeting to be 
set up saying ‘some of the cases weren’t being counted correctly; we would certainly set that 
up’ (PB, p. B-12). However she highlights that the informal performance communication is 
also important saying ‘if you lose that personal contact …we don’t communicate our needs’ 
(PB, B-13). She also sees effective performance communication as a balance between the 
formal and the informal saying ‘I think a balance between the very friendly and the more 
formal written communication is an influence’ (PB, p. B-18).  
Therefore, the principal’s performance signals comprise the principal devoting time to more 
formal communication, such as a meeting or written communication, to the agent, concerning 
a required response from the agent. The agent perceives some sense of obligation to respond 
positively to such signals. 
  
5.3.3.1.2 Message Reinforcement Signals 
Message reinforcement signals comprise actions by the principal consistent with reinforcing 
the contract requirements through the compensation system (Rousseau, 1995). In Case A the 
principal reinforces the unwritten contract through signals highlighting linkages between the 
contract and the payments. As the contract payment is fixed, the linkage is highlighted by 
audits of the work done and the additional comments appended to the audit reports. She 
explains that ‘our supervisor would conduct a joint audit … she would report back the results 
of that audit to me’ (PA, p. A-8).  The agent notes that ‘the invoice goes to the Housekeeping; 
I presume P may sign it off’ (AA, p. A-19).  The agent links comments added to audits with 
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possibility of not getting paid. He says that ‘if the building isn’t up to standard, she’s going to 
say it because she’s not signing off on her fortnightly audit if … it wasn’t right.’ (AA, p. A-
28). However, he also welcomes the audit comments as a way of recognising his contract 
performance saying that ‘by getting it signed and getting the comment onto the audit forms, 
both MP and … P get to see us and the service we’re providing’ (AA, p.A-31).  The principal 
plans to link more firmly the audit result with the contract payments saying ‘so that we’re 
auditing the whole operation and the value of the contract….so that no invoices will be paid 
until the product is correct’ (PA, p. A-30). Therefore the principal’s message reinforcement 
signals are intended by her to grow in influence. 
In Case B the principal views the compensation system as reinforcing her message of the 
required level of service. She says ‘I think the fact they know the budget is under the control 
of the Vet School rather than a contracts manager from some other part of the university 
means that they know … we are looking at their service …calibrates their service’ (PB, p. B-
15). She adds that the tender process is another message reinforcement saying ‘I think that 
they know that they were nearly not awarded this contract … there’s that level of awareness’ 
(PB, p. B-15). As in the previous case, the agent in Case B welcomes message reinforcement 
as recognition of his performance, and has implemented his own tracking system for the 
principal to review. He says ‘we have implemented an IT system for tracking technical issues 
… we can jointly review it’ (p. B-21). 
 Therefore message reinforcement signals are found to be actions or systems, used by the 
principal, which link the agent’s performance to the receipt of payments. These may be 
reminders of the tender process and carrying out audits to highlight that continued payment is 
conditional on satisfactory performance. Interestingly, in both Cases A and B, the agent 
values such message reinforcements as guaranteeing recognition by the principal, and 
perhaps securing further payments. 
 
5.3.3.1.3 Authority Signals 
Authority signals are actions by the principal which influence the agent’s perceptions of the 
principal as having power, authority, or capacity to make the contract commitments. In Case 
A, the principal is conscious of her authority as contract maker. She sees operational matters 
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as issues to be delegated, noting ‘some things are better left sorted out at a supervisory level 
(PA, p. A-20).  Her authority supersedes that of her supervisor as she explains ‘if …  it seems 
they’re not listening sometimes to the supervisor, then if myself …  would step in … and 
everything’s right the next day…. that’s the hierarchy isn’t it, that’s where the power is. It’s 
the balance of power’ (PA, p. A-18).  She only deals with the agent as the other contract 
maker saying ‘the set-up of the contract is normally done by myself and the owner of the 
company’ (PA, p. A-2). She adds ‘I wouldn’t see many of the contractors that often’ (PA, p. 
A-13).  When she does meet the agent’s staff it causes them concern due to their perception 
of her as an authority figure. She explains ‘I went over and met with all the contract staff, and 
you could see they may have thought they were about to get the sack’ (p. PA, A-28). The 
agent is conscious of the principal’s authority as the contract maker. He only meets her in 
relation to contract matters saying ‘never socially…. normally there’s not a huge amount of 
interaction between myself and P … it would be more so if there was a requirement or a 
problem, P would come straight on to me’ (AA, p. A-13). He prefers issues to be resolved 
between the contract supervisors saying that ‘because there is no escalation to P’ (AA, p. A-
18). Avoidance of escalation to P, the principal, he says is ‘the most important thing… 
because after that it goes to the next stage and then there’s a problem’ (AA, p. A-19). His 
concern is that the principal, as contract maker, has the authority to start a new contract. He 
says ‘… the client would very soon say “this is not working and you could lose the business 
or we’ll put it to tender”…’ (AA, p. A-12). These findings show that the principal’s authority 
signals are important influencers of the agent’s responses. 
In Case B the principal is aware that the winning of the contract budget and the approval to 
proceed with the tender process is a demonstration of her authority within her organisation 
and as the contract maker. She explains ‘I think our ability to issue the tender and get that 
contract passed, where there had been no investment in this region, where the service 
provider had been told there was no money for upgrades for the last ten years, was seen as 
very influential and a demonstration by the university to the service provider’ (PB, p. B-17). 
She is clear that her authority influences the agent saying ‘I do have access to the Bursar, the 
President and the Registrar… I think the knowledge that that influence and access is present 
certainly has been an influence’ (PB, p. B-17). She exercises this authority as the contract 
principal saying ‘certainly there is a level of awareness of things that we know what we want 
and that we are going to be quite active in ensuring that we get it’ (PB, p. B-16). As in the 
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other case, she reserves social interaction around contract matters to dealing with the agent. 
She notes ‘I haven’t been directly in contact with anybody really from the service provider’s 
team except one member’ (PB, p. B-21). The agent is conscious of the principal having 
significant authority saying  ‘I would go so far as to say that the person we are dealing with 
and others I suppose, has enough of, I hate using the word power, but power and respect 
within the organisation that they can get things done’ (AB, p. B-10). He also regards her as 
the contract maker who influences his prospects in her organisation and potentially others, 
and needs to be kept happy. He says ‘obviously you would want to keep someone happy if 
you know that they might influence a future contract … the person we are dealing, I am sure 
has significant influence on the contract’ (AB, p. B-16).  
Therefore in both Case A and B, the principals give authority signals by having the budgetary 
support of their organisation, by limiting their social interaction to the agent rather than the 
agent’s team, and by communicating their requirements of the contract. The agent is 
conscious of the principal’s authority which is based on their control of the contract budget 
and their influence on the agent’s prospects. Based on these perceptions, the agent is sensitive 
to any requirements of the principal and feels obliged to respond to these. 
The above sections have discussed the findings in relation to the principal’s signals as part of 
the psychological contract ex post contract management mechanisms. These signals influence 
the agent’s response to make behaviour judgements based on his perceived obligations.  
 
5.3.3.2 Agent’s Obligations 
The agent interprets the principal’s signals based on his individual dispositions such as 
cognitive biases, including focusing on information directly relevant to one’s own interest, 
and motives, such as how the job affects their long-term career. Having interpreted the 
signals as credible future intentions or promises, the agent will then make behaviour 
judgements regarding the standards of behaviour to fulfil his obligations to the principal 
under the psychological contract. The next sections discuss the individual dispositions and 





5.3.3.2.1 Agent’s Individual Dispositions 
The agent’s individual dispositions comprise cognitive biases and the focus on all 
information relevant to his prospects and interests, and these influence how he interprets the 
principal’s signals.  
In Case A, the agent indicates a predisposition towards providing high standards of service 
sometimes at his own expense, being focussed on keeping the principal happy and, in a sense, 
competing against other potential providers to retain the contract.  He says ‘there are no 
additional hours carried out … subject to some charge…we have are our standards for a 
cleaning service’ (AA, p. A-16). He is conscious of potential competition for the contract 
saying that ‘if any customer ever needs me … I am available at any time ….  I am sure it’s 
the same in other organisations as well’ (AA, p. A-22).  Keeping the principal happy 
influences retention of the contract and his prospects for future tenders. He says that ‘the 
important thing is for … the client to be completely happy that the service we’re giving is the 
best that it possibly can be because they’re going to relay that to the people in the 
organization that are making the decision’ (AA, p. A-31). He wants to preserve his prospects 
for other public contracts noting that ‘we are always very conscious that we don’t want to 
have any confrontation because we have a number of public contract buildings’ (AA, p. A-
27). However he feels critical towards the public tender process saying ‘the drawback is that 
it’s exceptionally price competitive’ (AA, p. A-10), and ‘it’s very hard to know if people are 
actually measuring like for like … I think that there are major drawbacks in public 
procurement’ (AA, A-11). He is also critical towards some management of public contracts 
saying ‘once the contract is awarded, there doesn’t seem to be much follow-through from the 
awarding authority. Where are the quality meetings? Or where are the reports?’ (AA, p. A-8). 
Despite criticisms, the agent shows a disposition towards finding and retaining public 
contract work for his firm. He notes that despite ‘the great thing about any work from any 
government contract is you never have to worry about getting paid. … they pay on time’ 
(AA, p. A-6), and  ‘with private sector work you don’t have that guarantee’ (AA, p. A-10).  
He adds that there is an additional incentive for winning public contracts saying ‘the other 
benefit … is the actual reference … has government work and you can use some contracts as 
a reference’ (AA, p. A-10). While the agent finds publically procured contracts competitive 
and offering low financial rates, he is disposed towards the benefits of the predictable 
payments and using the contract as a reference to seek other work. These individual 
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dispositions focus the agent’s attention on keeping the principal happy by responding to her 
requests. 
In Case B, the agent’s disposition also includes the awareness of other potential competitors 
for his contract. He says ‘obviously we were in competition with other providers as well. But 
I suppose our on-going relationship helped somewhat and the fact we knew exactly what it 
was we were looking for’ (AB, p. B-4). He has a sense that his previous performance helped 
win the tender for the current contract saying ‘we obviously had the knowledge, the workings 
of the operation there, which an operation of that size, tends to be somewhat unique’ (AB, p. 
B-4). He has his own professional standards to maintain, particularly that of being 
approachable to the principal’s team. He says ‘we would like to feel that we have quite an 
easy manner ourselves and it reflects in all our conversations with all our clients’ (AB, p. B-
16). The agent also is conscious of the value of the contract as a reference saying ‘the UniVet 
college is the qualifying college for all veterinary surgeons throughout Ireland and most of 
our customers have gone through there, and it is a flagship site for our business’ (AB, p. B-4). 
He notes other benefits of the contract saying ‘we find that there are other things outside of 
the relationship to do with the contract that are useful or beneficial to both parties’ (AB, p. B-
10). He adds ‘we have discussions about other things that influence both our organisations … 
I might ring up and ask, you know, what’s the best organisation to phone in relation to this? 
Or, do you have any contacts in this organisation?’ (AB, p. B-20).  He seems confident that 
the current contract performance is satisfactory to the client saying ‘I would like to think we 
have moved beyond the contract’ (AB, p. B-4).  He maintains if the principal’s team continue 
to be happy with the service, his future tender prospect is good saying ‘it’s in their benefit 
rather than changing everything that they could continue with the relationship in operation 
assuming that they are quite happy with it’ (AB, p. B-19). He feels that the principal or her 
team will make helpful suggestions to him in relation to the next tender. He says ‘I would be 
hopeful that, come that time, we would be given a few hints here and there’ (AB, p. B-18). 
Therefore, the findings from both cases support individual dispositions of the agents 
comprising a desire to retain public contracts against competition, leading to a focus on 
keeping the principals happy with responses to signals for contract changes or additional 
work. The next section examines examples of behaviour judgements made by the agent to 
fulfil their perceived obligations. 
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5.3.3.2.2 Agent’s Behaviour Judgements 
The agent’s behaviour judgements comprise his decisions on the actions required to fulfil his 
perceived obligations under the contract. Therefore, based on the psychological contract 
formed from the principal’s signals and his individual dispositions, the agent decides what 
standards of performance are required beyond what is specified in the written contract to 
fulfil his perceived obligations, including additional unpaid work.  
In Case A the agent notes that additional work requests are normal saying ‘additional 
requirements and additional needs pertain to cleaning’ (AA, p. A-7). However, some of his 
additional work is not requested by the principal, but undertaken voluntarily from some sense 
of perceived obligation. He voluntarily decides to perform extra tasks, initially during periods 
of low activity saying that ‘things would be a little bit quiet during the breaks and we would 
do extra things like carpet cleaning and floor machine scrubbing that wouldn’t necessarily be 
perceived as being part of a contract’ (AA, p. A-6). He does not invoice the principal for 
these additional services saying ‘we might say clean computers or shampoo the carpets, 
which some people would see as an extra or additional chargeable job, we would have seen 
that as, certainly in the case of UniCampus, as just a part of the job’ (AA, p. A-7). He 
emphasises that ‘there are no additional hours carried out, or subject to some charge’ (AA, p. 
A-16) and that ‘my point is we don’t raise additional invoices for additional requirements’ 
(AA, p. A-19). He has arranged that his staff teach the UniCampus staff certain cleaning 
methods, saying ‘how to do the job on the floor with the new pads that we have done in 
UniCampus using diamond pads that restore floors, stone floors. ..  when they in turn 
demonstrate it to UniCampus representatives, they in turn roll it out to their own direct 
employees on the campus’ (AA, p. A-20). The principal is appreciative of this, saying ‘where 
in fact they’ve actually shown us some initiatives that we have been able to use inside, and 
actually trained our supervisors in a thing called bonnet mopping for carpets’ (PA, p. A-24).  
The agent explains the limitations on this additional unpaid work saying that ‘the manager 
has a certain number of hours per week, per building … we have to try and do that within 
those hours’ (AA, p. A-19). Therefore, while the agent performs additional unpaid work to 
fulfil his perceived obligations under the psychological contract, there is a natural limit to his 
resources set by the available contract budget. 
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In Case B, the agent says that ‘because we have this on-going relationship we are willing, 
well I like to think we are quite helpful to them in making some small changes here and there 
that we don’t charge for’ (AB, p. B-18). He notes that ‘only recently we were recommending 
someone for them to use in an accounting role that would have familiarity with our software’ 
(AB, p. B-11). The principal recognises these additional services saying ‘anytime he is in … 
he would go out of his way, from time to time, to help an individual with problems with our 
system’ (PB, p. B-10). Therefore, while he performs additional unpaid services to fulfil his 
perceived obligations, this is subject to the natural limitation of his availability during his 
visit to the contract location. The principal has also made other requests for additional work 
or support without charge. She gives examples where ‘they might just sponsor continuing 
education events, and they have been generally very happy to do so’ (PB, p. B-19), ‘the 
service provider to be invited to come in and talk to the students, and they are happy to do so’ 
(PB, p. B-21), and ‘there might be an opportunity in continuing education where the software 
provider could be asked to contribute’ (PB, p. B-22).  
In summary, both cases support the view that the agent performs additional unpaid work to 
fulfil his perceived obligations under the psychological contract subject to a natural limit of 
resources within the available contract budget. Therefore the unpaid additional works 
performed by the agents not only add service quality to the ex post contract, but serve to 
maximise the efficiency allocation of the agent’s responses. The agent’s responses are 
enabled by the principal’s resources comprising incentives and information systems. 
Therefore the use of signals by the principal to influence the agent’s perceived obligations 
may be viewed as optimising the efficiency of the agent’s responses. This may explain why 
the principals in Case A and Case B, rather than designing more complete contracts, rely on 
the contract relationship to secure responses from the agent. 
 
5.3.4 Summary of the ex post Contract Management Mechanisms 
The above findings show that during the ex post contract, written and psychological contract 
mechanisms are used by the principal to induce responses from the agent. These are 
summarised in Table 5.4. The written contract provides incentives and information systems to 
ensure the agent delivers a specialised service in return for the contract resources provided by 
the principal. The contract is necessarily, and sometimes intentionally incomplete and 
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insufficient to address all contingencies. This incompleteness necessitates a principal agent 
relationship comprising a psychological contract to provide solutions to unforeseen issues 
and ensure optimum allocation of the principal’s resources and efficient responses from the 
agent within the natural limitations of his resources.  
 Having set out the findings which identify the ex post management mechanisms of the 
written and psychological contract, it is now possible to review the Initial Study propositions 
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5.4 REVIEW OF THE INITIAL STUDY PROPOSITIONS   
The Initial Study developed eight propositions (see Table 4.13) in relation to ex post contract 
management mechanisms viewed from the economics perspective only. These included the 
written contract mechanisms of incentives, information systems, and the unwritten contract 
mechanisms of signals.  The Main Study investigated the ex post contract management 
mechanisms from the perspectives of both the economics written contract and the 
psychological contract. Both approaches support the use of incentives, information systems, 
and signals. However the psychological contract view of signals has some differences to that 
of the economics view. Therefore the Main Study provides useful findings with which to 
examine the Initial Study propositions. 
In the Initial Study the first proposition states: 
Proposition P0: A principal uses the written contract incentive as an opportunity to promote 
a response from the agent. 
In both Case A and Case B the written contract ex post mechanisms are the incentive of fixed 
payments and  an information system consisting of regular audits or reviews supported by 
electronic records, and scheduled meetings between the principal and agent. In Case A the 
agent notes that ‘the work that we have … €140,000’ (AA, p. A-4). Similarly in Case B, the 
agent is conscious of the annual payments saying ‘it was €56,000 … annual support … about 
€12,000 to €14,000’ (AB, p. B-2). There is an additional incentive to the agent by having a 
contract with an established organisation, which may in turn enhance his future prospects 
with other clients. In Case A the agent confirms that ‘the other benefit … is the actual 
reference’ (AA, p. A-11) while in Case B the agent also notes ‘UniVet college is … a 
flagship site for our business’ (AB, p. B-4). While these are not strictly written contract 
incentives, they are direct consequences of the written contract and may be considered as 
such. In contrast, the written contract penalty of terminating and re-tendering the contract is 
not mentioned by either principal. Indeed both emphasise the benefits of the good and 
continuing nature of the relationship. In Case A, the principal observes that the agent having 
‘the UniCampus brand on their portfolio is a selling point’ (PA, p. A-11). In Case B the 
principal notes that ‘they have relied on that … they are associated with UniVet’ (PB, p. B-
8). Both principals are aware that these incentives are significant for the agents. The Case A 
principal observes that ‘when they are seeking future business … it proves that they have 
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been there for a period of time (PA, p. A-11). Similarly, the Case B principal notes that ‘a 
very significant incentive … is being associated with UniVet Veterinary Hospital, a major 
institution, a big third level institution’ (PB, p. B-8). , Since the agents want to preserve the 
relationship with their principals, and the principals are aware of this, the written contract 
incentive offers opportunity to the principals to promote responses from the agents. 
Therefore, the Main Study supports this proposition. 
The nest Initial Study proposition states: 
Proposition P1: A principal relies on the written contract information system to promote a 
response from the agent. 
In contrast, the information systems may be studied in more detail and discussed at greater 
length with the agent by the principal in response to performance issues. For example in Case 
A the principal notes that ‘the information provides a history of how the contract is 
performing over a period of years. And then, if there is a problem, you can genuinely view if 
it’s an isolated incident rather that a continual problem’ (PA, p A-9). He pays close attention 
to the client meetings saying ‘I would find them very useful because, at the end of the day, if 
the client is there wanting something else, and we can’t discuss it or aren’t willing to discuss 
it … then the client isn’t going to be too happy’ (AB, p. B-15).  
Therefore the Main Study findings support the proposition P1 statement that a principal relies 
on the use of the written information system to promote a response from the agent. 
The following proposition of the Initial Study is: 
Proposition P2: A principal uses the incompleteness of the written contract as an opportunity 
to promote a response from the agent. 
The findings support this proposition. In Case A the principal observes ‘a too detailed 
document can become a bit of a weapon between the parties’ (PA, p. A-8) and ‘if you are 
solely relying on what’s printed, the one thing you miss will be the one thing you need’ (PA, 
p. A-7). Using this incompleteness she has added additional obligations such as new 
performance measurements saying ‘we’re actually working on devising a whole measurement 
of KPI’s’ (PA, p. A-30).  The agent accepts such additional obligations within the agreed 
contracted cleaning hours saying ‘if there is an additional requirement for anything extra, we 
have to try and do that’ (AA, p. A-19). In Case B the principal has also added additional 
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obligations saying ‘a lot of issues only arose subsequent to the contract being 
issued…because of things we hadn’t thought of in the original contract’ (PB, p. B-6). The 
agent accepts these obligations of an incomplete contract saying ‘we are all interested in 
progressing the system’s ability and to meet as many people’s requirements…and that would 
be normal’ (AB, p. B-6). 
Therefore the written contract incompleteness is used by a principal as an opportunity to 
promote a response from the agent, and the Main Study findings support the proposition P2. 
The next proposition is  
Proposition P3: A principal uses visible non-functional expenditures of time as a signal to 
promote a response from the agent. 
The findings show that in both cases the principal spends time in behaviours that are not 
functionally required by the written contract, but communicate requirements to the agent who 
then performs actions towards meeting these requirements. For example, in Case A while 
there is a site supervisor who manages the contract, the principal still spends personal time as 
a means to highlight the importance of certain matters to the agent. She gives examples 
saying ‘the set-up of the contract is normally done by myself’ (PA, p. A-2) and ‘I would 
believe in bringing them in for a formal meeting … on our territory rather than meeting in the 
building … and sitting down formally across the desk with the documents in front of me and 
deal with it in that manner’ (PA, p. A-23). Although she is not essential to setting up the 
contract which could be done by her supervisor, she chooses to do so herself. Similarly, 
having the meeting in her office, across a Table, with documents takes more time than 
meeting in the building under the contract. As this personal time is not strictly functional, it 
sends a signal. The agent responds to these signals promptly saying ‘If something is 
highlighted it’s addressed there and then, and it will be finished before the next meeting.’ 
(AA, p. A-7).  
The principal in Case B spends time in additional personal communication saying ‘if you lose 
that personal contact, that closeness, the relationship, then I think things just get put up with 
and we don’t communicate our needs’ (PB, B-13) and  ‘I think a balance between the very 
friendly and the more formal written communication is an influence’ (PB, B-18). In these 
examples the principal devotes personal time that goes beyond that which is strictly 
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functionally required in maintaining closeness and in written communication. The agent 
responds positively to these signals saying ‘I think that if there was something going wrong it 
would just be said. I don’t think the tone would be necessary’ (AB, p. B-18), ‘I would like to 
think we have moved beyond the contract’ (AB, B-6), and ‘we are quite helpful to them in 
making some small changes here and there that we don’t charge for’ (AB, B-18).  
Therefore, the Main Study findings generally support the proposition P3 that a principal uses 
visible non-functional expenditures of time as a signal to promote a response from the agent. 
The following proposition from the Initial Study sates:  
Proposition P4:  A principal uses his resources such as budgets, expertise, or negotiation 
skills as a signal to promote a response from by the agent. 
The findings show that the principal’s contract resources comprise the budget, the 
information systems, their contract management expertise, and their social skills of 
developing and maintaining an appropriate contract relationship. The principal’s access to 
these resources is a signal influencing the agent to improve the contract outcomes.  
In case A the principal has access to these contract resources. For example, the principal 
demonstrates her control of the budget and her management expertise in revising the 
information system in line with her responsibility for the contract. She says ‘we’re auditing 
the whole operation and the value of the contract … no invoices will be paid until the product 
is correct’ (AA, p. A-30). She maintains her expertise is not related to the purely technical 
aspects of the contract saying ‘you could go in and not know what we are talking about … 
some things are better left sorted out at a supervisory level’ (AA, p. A-20). However, this 
demonstrates that she is clear about where her management expertise lies. She says ‘you just 
really need to indicate that there are issues that have to be sorted out, how to do them, and 
what’s going to happen’ (AA, p. A-15). She says the required social skills are a balance 
between fault finding and being over-friendly. She says ‘only picking out faults … I don’t 
think that serves to build any relationship and you won’t build for good service … if you are 
too social … then you won’t be able to deal with things when they become difficult’ (AA, p. 
A-21). The agent views the principal as responsible for all the contract resources 
demonstrated by extending the contract and approving payments. He says ‘that if and when 
there was a new building coming on or there was a new area that might require cleaning, the 
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head of the housekeeping in UniCampus, P, would contact myself directly and I would go in 
and see P’ (AA, p. A-12). He adds ‘the invoice goes to the Housekeeping; I presume P may 
sign it off’ (AA, p. A-19). His views the principal’s resources as signals and these influence 
his behaviour as he says ‘if she has an issue she’ll tell you … and you’d already have to have 
it addressed (AA, p. A-23). 
Similarly in Case B, the principal sees her access to contract resources as an important 
influence. She says ‘I think our ability to issue the tender and get that contract passed, where 
there had been no investment in this region, where the service provider had been told there 
was no money for upgrades for the last ten years, was seen as very influential and a 
demonstration by the university to the service provider’ (PB, p. B-17). She sees a significant 
contract resource in the annual budget saying ‘money in ensuring that our contract was such 
that we would be able to upgrade every year’ (PB, p. B-16). She says the required expertise is 
less about the technical aspects. She says ‘we have a lot better level of service now than when 
we did have someone who was knowledgeable about technical things’ (PB, p. B-16). Rather 
she says it is more important that ‘things that we know what we want and that we are going to 
be quite active in ensuring that we get it’ (PB, p. B-16). Also she says that while social skills 
‘are important in maintaining that relationship’ (PB, p. B-17), there has to be ‘a balance 
between the very friendly and the more formal written communication’ (PB, p.B-18) and that 
this balance ‘is an influence’ (PB, p. B-18) on the agent. The agent is conscious of the 
principal’s access to contract resources saying ‘I would go so far as to say that the person we 
are dealing with and others I suppose, has enough of, I hate using the word power, but power 
and respect within the organisation that they can get things done’ (PB, B-10). He 
acknowledges that the principal’s ‘other general expertise is extremely good … somebody 
with good management expertise is important because it means it’s likely that things get 
done’ (PB, p. B-16). These signals influence his behaviour, as he says ‘obviously you would 
want to keep someone happy if you know that they might influence a future contract’ (PB, B-
16). 
Therefore, the Main Study findings generally support the proposition P4 that a principal uses 
his resources such as budgets, expertise, or negotiation skills as a signal to promote a 
response from by the agent. 
The next proposition from the Initial Study is: 
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Proposition P5: A principal uses his relationship with positions of organizational leadership 
as a signal to promote a response from the agent. 
The findings only partly support proposition P5 as stated above. For example, in Case A the 
principal does not refer to her access to more senior figures in her organisation. She is clear 
that she is the organisational leadership figure saying ‘from the service provider’s point of 
view, in this case I think they would know that the supervisor would be reporting back to me 
on a regular basis’ (PA, p. A-22).  Similarly in Case B the principal says ‘certainly I do have 
access to the Bursar, the President and the Registrar … I think the knowledge that that 
influence and access is present certainly has been an influence’ (PB, p. B-17). However she 
does not involve them in contract meetings saying ‘I think it would have to be serious for that 
level of discussion to occur’ (PB, p. B-17). The agent understands the authority of the 
principal saying ‘it would be essential in a contract this size, that it would have a point of 
contact that would be at a senior level’ (AB, p. B-10), and ‘the person we are dealing with … 
has enough … power and respect within the organisation that they can get things done’ (AB, 
p. B-10). Therefore the organisational leadership figure in relation to the contract from the 
agent’s perspective is the principal herself. The study finds that the only organisational 
leadership figure influencing the agent is the principal. While the Main Study’s findings do 
not directly support this proposition as it is stated, it does highlight that the authority of the 
principal as contract maker is a signal influencing the agent’s psychological contract. This is 
discussed further in the next chapter. 
The following proposition of the Initial Study states: 
Proposition P6: An agent views a change to formal communication as an information signal 
requiring a response. 
In Case A the principal says ‘if it’s a small issue, it might be dealt with a phone call’ (PA, p. 
A-13), but ‘we try to deal with any actual complaint or anything that we think may be a 
problem via email at least so that there is some record’ (PA, p. A-13). Therefore the principal 
changes from verbal to written communication to signal that there is an issue requiring a 
response. In Case B the principal generally uses informal communication saying ‘To be 
honest it happens much more informally now where somebody will email or ring up’ (PB, p. 
B-8).  However, during a critical period of concern for performance written communication 
was used. She says ‘I know that we did have some formal written communication around the 
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time of the deadline for going live on the system … and we were worried about some levels 
of progress’ (PA, p. B-18). The agents in both Case A and B associate any increased 
formality in communications from the principal as a signal of poor performance. In Case A 
the agent notes that ‘saying where there might be a fall-off in the level of service … they 
might send an electronic email’ (AA, p. A-16). In Case B, the agent states concern for any 
reference to written statements saying that that ‘I would feel very worried if anyone started 
quoting the contract’ (AB, p. B-8).  
Therefore the Main Study findings support the Proposition P6 which states that an agent 
views a change to formal communication as an information signal requiring a response.   
The next proposition is: 
Proposition P7: An agent views an additional meeting as an incentive signal requiring a 
response. 
The Main Study findings only partly support the proposition that additional meetings are used 
by the principal to influence the agent towards improved contract outcomes. For example, in 
Case A the principal indicates that when a problem has not been resolved by the contract 
supervisors, she would call an additional meeting saying ‘I would believe in bringing them in 
for a formal meeting’ (PA, p. A-23). However, the agent reports that ‘something needing 
additional attention is brought up at the regular meetings’ (AA, p.A-7). In Case B the agent 
observes that the only meetings are about ‘progressing the system’s ability and to meet as 
many people’s requirements’ (AB, p. B-6). Therefore, while additional meetings may be 
called by principals, other signal mechanisms are more frequently used. While the findings 
partly support this proposition, re-stating it in terms the psychological contract is more useful 
and this is explored in the next chapter.  
The last proposition from the Initial Study is: 
Proposition P8: An agent views a demonstration of willingness as a mutual interest signal 
requiring a response. 
The findings from the Main Study only partly support this proposition. In Case A the 
principal gives an example of resolving a difficulty where the agent’s team had activated the 
fire alarm saying ‘it was … quite informal … I said “look, I’m not here to beat anyone up, 
but I just want to know where did this happen, what did you do then” … because I realised 
121 
 
we hadn’t given the girl enough information’ (PA, p. A-28).  She also notes that ‘if you are 
too business-orientated … you don’t build any relationship’ (PA, p. A-21).  She concludes 
that there is mutual interest in the development of skills saying the agent’s staff has ‘actually 
trained our supervisors in a thing called bonnet mopping for carpets’ (PA, p. A-24). The 
agent agrees saying ‘we would do extra things … but it’s that extra bit and the bit that gets 
noticed … we’ve probably shown MP a few ways of cleaning carpets and using different 
pads.’ (AA, p. A-6). While the principal is demonstrating a willingness to solve a problem, it 
appears to be more of a demonstration of her authority within the contract than of mutual 
interest. 
Similarly in Case B the principal notes ‘to be honest it happens much more informally now’ 
(PB, p. B-8). She also notes that ‘and it seems to work that way’ (PB, p. B-8) and ‘we do 
enjoy a very good cordial relationship’ (PB, p. B-11) which allows her team to ‘communicate 
our needs clearly to VetServ’ (PB, p. B-13). The agent notes the social and informal aspect of 
the contract relationship saying ‘we would … have social conversation … we find that there 
are other things outside of the relationship to do with the contract that are useful or beneficial 
to both parties’ (PB, p. B-10). Because of this relationship the agent responds positively says 
‘we have this on-going relationship we are willing, well I like to think we are quite helpful to 
them’ (AB, p. B-18). Again, this willingness to be helpful to the principal appears to 
acknowledge her position of authority within the contract relationship which allows her to 
conduct business in an informal manner. 
Therefore the Main Study findings partly support the proposition P8 which states that an 
agent views a demonstration of willingness as a mutual interest signal requiring a response. It 
may be that the principal’s demonstration of willingness is more about the authority to define 
the required goals of the contract than mutual interest. 
In summary, this chapter has analysed the data to find the ex post contract management 
mechanisms. These comprise the incentives and information systems of the written contract, 
as well as principal’s signals of performance communication, message reinforcement, and 
authority which contribute to forming the agent’s psychological contract. The psychological 
contract perspective also adds the importance of the individual dispositions of the agent such 
as his motivations towards extending the contract and potentially influencing the next tender 
outcome, and his awareness of his human and contract resources. Based on the principal’s 
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signals and his individual dispositions, the agent decides to perform works to satisfy his 
perceived obligations under his psychological contract, including additional unpaid works to 
satisfy the principal. The agent’s work under the terms of the written contract and his 
psychological contract is performed within the limitations of the available contract resources. 
By adopting both agency theory and the psychological contract as lenses with which to view 
the ex post contract management mechanisms, a fuller explanation of how and why managers 
deal with contracts is achieved. The next chapter discusses the wider applications and 




















CHAPTER 6 - DISCUSSION 
The three research problems and the arising two research questions are shown in Tables 1.1 
and 1.2 respectively. These concern issues with public contracts that arise ex post, how and 
why managers manage such contracts, and lead to a research objective of whether an 
appropriate conceptual model can be developed. This chapter first discusses the research 
problems, questions, and the research objective in the light of the Main Study findings. From 
these findings revised propositions are developed, and an improved conceptual model based 
on an economic written contract and the psychological contract perspectives is proposed. It 
then examines the validity, the limitations, and the contributions and suggests opportunities 
for future research. 
 
6.1 REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS 
Three research problems are set out in Table 1.1 and these are now discussed in relation to 
the findings. 
The first problem is that public contracts do not sufficiently address ex post contingencies. 
The context set out in the literature is that public contracts lack flexible incentives and not 
address all contingencies (Walls, 2005, pp. 217 - 218). Despite the formal ex-ante public 
procurement process, poor contract design may result from extending existing contracts into 
longer arrangements (Kim and Brown, 2012, p. 688), and principals frequently rely on 
building trust with agents to overcome contract incompleteness (Merkert and O’ Fee, 2013, p. 
125). Examples of such behaviours are evident. The Case A contract has been extended using 
informal arrangements noted by the principal saying ‘the contract has grown’ (PA, A-4). 
Also, in Case A the principal avoids drafting a complete contract, preferring to rely on 
building trust with the agent. She notes ‘you build the relationship, because if you are solely 
relying on what’s printed … the one thing you need … it won’t be written down’ (PA, p. A-
7). Similarly in Case B there is an incomplete contract, extended informally, and relying on 
the relationship for performance. In Case B the principal highlights the difficulty in 
forecasting eventualities in the contract saying ‘it wasn’t because of lack of completeness; it 
was only because of things we hadn’t thought of in the original contract …  our lab services 
had since expanded and so had to think anew’ (PB, p. B-6). She adds ‘people don’t really 
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look back at the contract … it happens much more informally … and it seems to work’ (PB, 
p. B-8). Therefore the findings support the statement of the first research problem. However, 
the data of this study suggests that principals of public contracts are less concerned about 
designing complete contracts, and more about achieving service performance outcomes that 
are useful for their organisations. For example in Case A the principal states that ‘a good 
contract service is vitally important’ (PA, p. A-4), while in Case B the principal says ‘it’s 
very, very important … we can’t operate our hospital efficiently without it’ (PB, p. B-4).  
In summary, the evidence suggests that public contracts do not sufficiently address ex post 
contingencies for two reasons. First, as stated in the literature, because complete contracts are 
difficult to design. Second, from the findings, because principals are more concerned about 
providing service outcomes that are useful to their organisations, rather than having complete 
contracts. 
The second research problem states that public contract ex post outcomes differ from those 
specified ex-ante. The reasons mentioned in the literature for this is because principals do not 
secure the required performance from agents (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001, pp. 401 – 41) 
due to the unwillingness or inability to enforce the contract terms (Domberger and Jensen, 
1997, p. 71). From the findings discussed earlier, the original written contracts are extended 
to produce new outcomes. For example, the principal in Case A notes the service includes ‘a 
new building that came on stream last year’ (PA, p. A-2) and a new audit process ‘so that 
we’re auditing the whole operation’ (AA, p. A-30). Similarly, in Case B the principal says 
she intends to add a new ‘link between the lab system and the VetServ’ (PB, B-13). Therefore 
the evidence support the research problem statement that public contract ex post outcomes 
differ from those specified ex-ante. While the literature states that these different outcomes 
are due to lack of ability or willingness to secure performance from the agent, the findings 
show that principals appear competent in doing so. For example, in Case A the principal 
affirms that ‘you just really need to indicate that there are issues that have to be sorted out, 
how to do them, and what’s going to happen’ (PA, p. A-15). Also in Case B the principal 
says ‘we know what we want and that we are going to be quite active in ensuring that we get 
it’ (PB, p. B-16). These approaches by the principal appear effective in securing performance 
from the agent. For example, in Case A the agent notes of the principal that ‘if she has an 
issue she’ll tell you and you’d already have to have it addressed’ (AA, p. A-23). In Case B 
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the agent observes ‘if there was something going wrong it would just be said … because we 
have this on-going relationship we are willing’ (AB, p. B-18). 
To summarise, the evidence supports the second research problem statement that public 
contract outcomes may differ that those specified ex-ante. The results imply that these 
different outcomes are due to extensions and changes in the service agreed by the principal 
with agent. Finally, the evidence supports that, in contrast to the literature, principals have the 
ability and the willingness to secure ex post contract performance from agents.  
The third research problem states that public contract relationships do not sufficiently foster 
ex post collaborative solutions. The literature indicates that once the public contract is 
awarded, close co-operative working relationships, while optimal for outcomes, do not result 
(Loader, 2010, p. 42). Indeed, a formal adversarial contract relationship may be maintained to 
demonstrate transparency (Darwin, Duberley and Johnson, 2000, p. 53), with the relationship 
viewed as the monitoring and review of the contract (Murray, 2009, p. 200).  The data 
indicate some tensions in the relationship. In Case A, the agent is aware that he is always in 
competition with other potential suppliers saying ‘if any customer ever needs me … I am 
available at any time … but I am sure it’s the same in other organisations as well’ (AA, p. A-
22). In Case B the agent similarly notes that ' obviously we were in competition with other 
providers … seeing whether they were going to make a radical change here, or should they 
stick with VetServ’ (AB, p. B-4). However, both agents declare that there is a positive 
working relationship with their principal. In Case A the agent says that ‘we have a very good 
working relationship’ (AA, p. A-3), while in Case B the agent notes ‘we have moved beyond 
the contract … we have a very, very good working relationship’ (AB, p. B-6). The principals 
view the positive contract relationship as providing collaborative solutions. In Case A the 
principal notes that ‘the relationship … has been very good … they’ve actually shown us 
some initiatives’ (PA, A-24), and ‘in this relationship … we can learn from each other’ (PA, 
p. A-25).  Also, in Case B the principal confirms that ‘a very good cordial relationship … has 
been really instrumental in ensuring the success of the contract’ (PB, p. B-11).  Interestingly 
she adds that ‘relationship … was one of the factors in the awarding of the contract to this 
particular service provider’ (PB, p. B-11). This suggests that a positive working relationship 
not only provides an exchange of knowledge towards collaborative solutions, but also 
supports the agent’s prospects for a future tender.  
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Therefore, the evidence does not support the third problem statement that public contract 
relationships do not sufficiently foster ex post collaborative solutions.  The evidence supports 
that despite the tensions of performance monitoring and the prospect of re-tendering, the ex 
post contract relationship can result in collaborative solutions. This result does not contradict 
the literature. Indeed, the principal in Case A notes that ex post relationships may lack 
collaboration saying that  ‘in one of our other contracts which would be a very big 
organisation, you don’t get as good service because they don’t really value the contract’ (PA, 
P. A-22). The data suggests that lack of collaboration may stem from a lack of regard for the 
benefits offered by the contract to the organisation. It is worth noting that in Cases A and B 
all the parties regard their contract as important to their organisation. The evidence may 
suggest that a lack of collaborative solutions stems from lower than expected benefits to the 
parties from the contract. This suggests that great management attention to the ex-ante tender 
process and the contract design would provide more clarity on the expected contract benefits, 
and support collaborative solutions in public contracts.  
Having reviewed the research problems, the research questions are now discussed. 
  
6.2 REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Two research questions are set out in Table 1.2 and these are now discussed in relation to the 
findings. The research questions asks how and why are ex post management mechanisms 
used by managers to secure optimum contract outcomes? These were posed at the outset 
based on the understanding of the ex post management challenges noted in the literature and 
the research problems identified from these. In this section, the question of ‘how’ is discussed 
first followed by the question of ‘why’. 
 
6.2.1 How are ex post Mechanisms used by Managers 
The evidence suggests show that how ex post mechanisms are used by managers is by jointly 
using the economic written contract mechanisms of agency theory and psychological contract 





The ex post mechanisms of the written contract comprise the principal’s incentives and 
performance information systems (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58). In both cases, the incentives 
provided by the principals comprise the contract payments and the reputational benefit to the 
agents. In Case A the agent gives the annual value of ‘€140,000’ (AA, p. A-4). He says ‘it’s 
nice to know…you are going to get paid at the end of every month’ (AA, p. A-10) and ‘it’s 
great to have government work and you can use some contracts as a reference, whether it be 
for an educational institution, or the public authorities’ (AA, p. A-11). Similarly in Case B, 
the agent notes the contract payments as ‘€56,000 … and the annual support cost, I think it is 
about €12,000 to €14,000’ (AB, p. B-2). He adds that ‘UniVet College is the qualifying 
college for all veterinary surgeons throughout Ireland and most of our customers have gone 
through there, and it is a flagship site for our business’ (AB, p. B-4). 
Therefore the evidence suggests that the written contract incentives comprise the contract 
payments and the reputation enhancement to the agent. From the principal’s perspective in 
Case A and Case B, the ex post management mechanism does not entail changing the 
incentives in relation to the agent’s performance, and incentives are an ex-ante mechanism. 
However, the evidence also suggests that the contract incentives are in the agent’s attention in 
both these cases. This implies that while a principal’s ex post management primarily relies on 
the information system, careful ex-ante design of the contract incentives would support ex 
post management. Both Cases A and B support the use of contract incentives as a mechanism 
that is used to induce an ex post response from the agent. 
 
6.2.1.2 Information Systems 
Information systems in both cases rely primarily on meetings arranged by the principals. In 
Case A the agent indicates that ‘The monthly information meeting between the managers is 
the information system’ (AA, p. A-9) as well as ‘our fortnightly walk arounds on our audits’ 
(p. A-26). In Case B, the principal highlights that the contract information system is an 
annual review meeting saying ‘once a year we would review it’ (PB, p. B-12).  
As discussed, the information system is the ex post mechanism that is primarily relied on by 
the principals in these cases. It is interesting to note that these are relatively informal and 
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qualitative mechanisms. While both Case A and Case B contracts appear to be successful 
with positive working relationships, it may be that some quantitative measurements would 
strengthen this ex post management mechanism, particularly in the event of a dispute or 
difficulty in the contract relationship. Indeed, in Case A it appears that the principal has 
identified this area for improvement saying she will be ‘auditing the whole operation’ (PA, p. 
A-30). It may be that some form of numerical performance measurements are intended here.  
However, the evidence from both Cases A and B suggest that the information system is an ex 
post contract management mechanism used by managers. 
 
6.2.1.3 Psychological Contract Signals 
Psychological contract signals are interpreted as credible promises if the contract maker is (i) 
operating in a context appropriate to promise making such as communicating required 
performance standards, (ii) behaving in ways consistent with the commitment made, such as 
reinforcing the message through the compensation system, and (iii) having power, authority, 
or capacity to make the commitment (Rousseau, 1995, pp. 40 – 43). These may be termed 
performance communication, message reinforcement, and authority signals respectively. 
Examples of these signals by the principal to the agent are found in Case A and Case B. 
Performance communication signals include changes from informal to formal or verbal to 
written communication (Nikander and Eloranta, 2001, pp. 387 - 388) by the principal. In 
Case A the principal notes that ‘if there is a problem that can’t be dealt with at a supervisory 
level, then we would set up a formal meeting’ (PA, p. A-27), and ‘if it’s a small issue, it 
might be dealt with a phone call … any actual complaint or anything that we think may be a 
problem via email at least so that there is some record…. a formal record of it….’ (PA, p. A-
13). Similarly in Case B the principal states ‘we did have some formal written 
communication around the time of the deadline for going live on the system … I think a 
balance between the very friendly and the more formal written communication’ (PB, p. B-
18). Therefore the evidence from both Case A and Case B support the use of performance 
communication signals as an ex post management mechanism. 
Message reinforcement signals are links by the principal established between the contract 
message and the payments (Rousseau, 1995, pp. 41) such as payments being made on 
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satisfactory performance. For example in Case A the principal says ‘we’re auditing the whole 
operation and the value of the contract….so that no invoices will be paid until the product is 
correct’ (PA, p. A-30). In Case B the principal notes that ‘the fact they know the budget is 
under the control of the Vet School rather than a contracts manager from some other part of 
the university means that they know and we know that we are looking at their service, I think, 
calibrates their service’ (PB, p. B-15). Interestingly, and perhaps due to the linkage between 
performance and payments, the agents in both cases reciprocate by adding to their own 
review systems. In Case A the agent says ‘we would do our own reports that are electronic 
audits that we would do, setting the sort of standard that we do for all buildings … which is 
signed by the customer, or the customer’s representative, and is emailed to the customer and 
to our own office here’ (AA, p. A-8). In Case B, the agent explains ‘we have implemented an 
IT system for tracking technical issues  …  a little information system of its own that’s 
separate from the system and which is available to them … we can jointly review it’ (AB, p. 
B-21). Therefore, both Cases A and B support that message reinforcement signals are used. 
Authority signals are demonstrations of the principal’s authority as the contract maker 
(Rousseau, 1995, pp. 42) such as setting up the contact and maintain formal social 
relationships with the agent. In Case A the principal says ‘the set-up of the contract is 
normally done by myself and the owner of the company’ (PA, p. A-2), and adds ‘the only 
time I would meet the managing director of the business … would be if I was asking him to 
quote for a new building that was coming on stream, or to tell them that we are going into the 
tender process’ (PA, p. A-24). She is aware that her authority comes from her organisational 
position saying ‘that’s the hierarchy isn’t it, that’s where the power is’ (PA, p. A-18). The 
agent is conscious of these authority signals and prefers to avoid matters being escalated to 
the principal’s attention saying ‘because there is no escalation to P. I think that’s the most 
important thing’ (AA, p. A-18). Similarly in Case B the principal is clear on her authority as 
contract maker saying ‘we know what we want and that we are going to be quite active in 
ensuring that we get it’ (AB, p. B-16). She is also aware that her position in her organisation 
and access to other senior figures is a signal to the agent saying ‘the knowledge that that 
influence and access is present certainly has been an influence’ (PB p. B-17). The agent is 
conscious of the principal’s ‘power and respect within the organisation’ (AB, p. B-10) and 
that ‘you would want to keep someone happy if you know that they might influence a future 
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contract’ (AB, p. B-16). Therefore, the evidence from Case A and Case B support the use of 
authority signals an ex post management mechanisms 
In summary, the evidence supports that how ex post mechanisms are used by managers is 
through recognising that contracts are incomplete, and by jointly using both the written 
contract and psychological contract mechanisms to induce a response to the contract 
requirements. These are the agency theory mechanisms of incentives and information 
systems, and the psychological contract signals of performance communication, message 
reinforcement, and authority. The reasons why this approach is used is now discussed. 
  
6.2.2 Why are these ex post Mechanisms used by Managers? 
The reason why managers use the ex post mechanisms available from both the written and 
psychological contracts is to overcome a number of management challenges. These are the 
difficulty of contract design and the problem of balancing cost and quality. These are 
discussed in turn. 
 
6.2.2.1 Contract Design 
Complex contracts are unavoidably incomplete (Williamson, 1999, p. 1089) and some 
unforeseen situations arise during the ex post implementation The evidence suggests that 
while the principals in Case A and Case B are recognised by the agents as being senior 
managers, both principals indicate that they are managing contracts which are incomplete. In 
Case A, the principal says that she prefers to have a minimal written contract and rely on the 
relationship. In Case B, the principal did not intend the contract to be incomplete, but certain 
requirements were initially forgotten and had to be remedied ex post. Therefore, despite the 
knowledge and experience of the managers, a complete contract design is very difficult to 
achieve. By using the signals mechanisms of the psychological contact, solutions may be 
found for the inescapable contingencies of incomplete contracts. This is one reason why 





6.2.2.2 Cost and Quality 
The evidence supports the view that public tenders produce competitively-priced contracts 
resulting in tight contract budgets being provided by public organisations. As the contract 
budget is unlikely to be increased ex post, the only way to achieve quality is by the efficient 
allocation of the agent’s knowledge and human resources. The written contract terms alone 
do not guarantee the efficient allocation of the agent’s resources. While perfunctory 
performance to the letter of the contract is enforceable, consummate performance is not (Hart 
and Moore, 2008, p. 3).   With the incompleteness, the relatively fixed incentives, and the 
simple information systems evident in the written contracts of Cases A and B, the written 
contract outcomes are unlikely to achieve such efficiency. By using the psychological 
contract signals to create obligations for the agent, the agent will most efficiently use his 
resources to remedy contingencies. This is why managers use the ex post mechanisms 
available from both the written and psychological contracts. 
   
6.3 REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The Initial Study shows that further research is required to better understand how ex post 
collaborative solutions are reached, how parties are willing to perform to the spirit of the 
contract, and improve the conceptual model of what constitutes desirable performance using 
the perspective of the psychological contract in addition to that of the economics view. In 
particular, the second research objective asks can a conceptual model be developed that 
would better support understanding of ex post contract management? The Main Study  has 
improved on the understanding of the ex post contract management mechanisms of the Initial 
Study by adding the theoretical lens of the psychological contract to the signals mechanisms 
of the unwritten contract, and by linking the written and psychological contracts through the 
influence of the contract resources. To answer this research objective it is necessary to draw 
on the evidence of the Main Study to restate the Initial Study Propositions, and using these, 
endeavour to develop an improved conceptual model.   The next two subsections address 





6.4 RESTATEMENT OF THE INITIAL STUDY PROPOSITIONS 
The Initial Study Propositions (see Table 4.13) were reviewed in the last chapter. While the 
propositions are largely supported, it was concluded the Main Study also offers additional 
insights to allow these propositions to be improved. Bowers’s theory building research 
strategy for real world problems (Bowers, 1972, pp. 25 - 26) advises that from the empirical 
findings, more general propositions should be developed leading to an improved model of the 
process indicated. Therefore the Initial Study propositions are now reviewed in the light the 
evidence of the Main Study, and re-stated to develop an improved conceptual model. 
The first proposition P0 stated that a principal uses the written contract incentive as an 
opportunity to promote a response from the agent. The next proposition P1 proposed that a 
principal relies on the written contract information system to promote a response from the 
agent. While the   Main Study support these propositions, in both Cases A and B the data also 
identified the main elements of the contracts as the contract budget, the specialised 
knowledge of the agent in performing the contract tasks, and the agent’s allocation of the 
contract budget to the required tasks. Therefore it is possible to usefully join P0 with P1 to 
propose:  
Proposition A: A principal designs a written contract to create resources to exchange for 
agent’s response. 
The next proposition P2 proposed that a principal uses the incompleteness of the written 
contract as an opportunity to promote a response from the agent. From the Main Study   it is 
possible to more fully articulate this in terms of the psychological contract obligations and the 
limitations of the available contract resources. In Case A and B, neither principal reports 
concerns regarding their incomplete written contracts. They report that they have gone 
beyond the contract. They say that a positive working relationship, not limited by the written 
contract, is the more important factor to facilitate communication of their requirements. The 
principals engaged in a variety of communications, formal and informal, to highlight their 
desired contract outcomes.  The principals leave the agents to allocate contract resources to 
those tasks that will most benefit the contract outcomes highlighted by the principal. This 
results in a mutual psychological contract where the agent commits to additional work to the 
extent of his perceived obligations and the available contract resources. Because of the 
agent’s specialised knowledge, the psychological contract has the effect of optimising the 
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allocation of contract resources. The proposition P1 may be re-stated to include these points 
as a new Proposition B: 
Proposition B: A principal designs an incomplete written contract to create a psychological 
contract with the agent. 
The following proposition P3 proposes that principals use visible, non-functional, and non-
enjoyable expenditures of time as signals to promote a response by the agent. The Main 
Study supports this proposition and adds clarity to the signal activity. The evidence on the 
psychological contract mechanisms identify performance communication signals as time 
spent by the principal communicating performance in addition to the contract information 
systems and usually in a more formal manner. Therefore P3 may be usefully re-stated as: 
Proposition C: A principal spends additional time in formal communication to send a 
performance communication signal to the agent. 
The next proposition P4 states that principals use their access to contract resources such as 
budgets, expertise, or social skills as signals to promote behaviours by the agent towards the 
desired contract outcomes. The Main Study suggests that the psychological contract signal 
explaining the potential influence of this is the creation of a link between these principal’s 
resources and the agent’s performance. Making the identification of satisfactory performance 
a requirement for the receipt of the contract payment is a message reinforcement signal. 
Therefore, P4 may be re-stated as:  
Proposition D: A principal creates links between the information system and the incentive to 
send a message reinforcement signal to the agent 
The next Initial Study proposition P5 holds that a principal uses his relationship with 
positions of organizational leadership as a signal to promote a response from the agent. The 
Main Study suggests that the principals have the support of their organisations, and that they 
are the authority figure representing their organisation in relation to the contract. This 
authority is signalled by the principals in the Main Study by limiting their social interactions 
with the agent to occasions of concerning the contract. To more fully capture the ex post 
signal mechanism, P5 may be usefully re-stated as: 
Proposition E: A principal regulates his social time to send a signal of authority to the agent. 
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The Initial Study propositions P6, P7, and P8 propose that the agent’s interpretations of the 
principal’s formal communication, additional meeting time, and demonstration of willingness 
are information, incentive, and mutual interest signals requiring a response. The   Main Study 
supports the principal’s time and formal communication as performance communication and 
message reinforcement signals respectively. The evidence supports   demonstrations of 
willingness more as potential authority signals. These signals create perceived obligations 
under the agent’s psychological contract. These perceived obligations direct the agent to 
respond to the principal’s signals. Using the evidence of the Main Study, P6, P7, and P8 may 
be usefully re-stated as:  
Proposition F: An agent observes a signal which creates an obligation requiring a response. 
The Main Study findings allow an additional proposition to be made. The agent is conscious 
of the available contract resources from the principal’s incentives and information systems. 
He also recognises the incompleteness of the written contract which needs a response to 
ensure the contract continues satisfactorily. Finally, he is aware of his perceived obligations 
under the psychological contract arising from the principal’s signals which also require a 
response. In deciding his response, the agent takes into consideration the extent and 
limitations of the resources, and his perceived obligations from the principal’s signals. This 
allows a final proposition to be made: 
Proposition G: An agent considers the resources, the contract incompleteness, and his 
obligations in deciding a response. 
Table 6.1 shows a summary of the Initial Study propositions together with their associated re-
stated propositions based on the Main Study findings using the perspective of the 
psychological contract. 







Table 6.1 – Restatement of ex post Management Mechanisms Propositions 
Initial Study Propositions Main Study Restated Propositions 
P0 A principal uses the written 
contract incentive as an opportunity 
to promote a response from the 
agent. 
PA A principal designs a written contract to create 
resources to exchange for agent’s response. 
P1 A principal relies on the written 
contract information system to 
promote a response from the agent. 
P2 A principal uses the incompleteness 
of the written contract as an 
opportunity to promote a response 
from the agent. 
PB A principal designs an incomplete written 
contract to create a psychological contract with 
the agent. 
P3 A principal uses visible non-
functional expenditures of time as a 
signal to promote a response from 
the agent. 
PC A principal spends additional time in formal 
communication to send a performance 
communication signal to the agent. 
P4 An agent views a formal 
communication as an information 
signal requiring a response.  
PD A principal creates links between the information 
system and the incentive to send a message 
reinforcement signal to the agent 
P5 A principal uses his relationship 
with positions of organizational 
leadership as a signal to promote a 
response from the agent. 
PE A principal regulates his social time to send a 
signal of authority to the agent. 
P6 An agent views a change to formal 
communication as an information 
signal requiring a response.  
PF An agent observes a signal which creates an 
obligation requiring a response. 
 
P7 An agent views an additional 
meeting as an incentive signal 




Table 6.1 (continued) – Restatement of ex post Management Mechanisms Propositions 
Initial Study Propositions Main Study Restated Propositions 
P8 An agent views a demonstration of 
willingness as a mutual interest 
signal requiring a response. 
  
  PG An agent considers the resources, the contract 




6.5 THIRD CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
Bowers views a theory building research strategy for real world problems as describing the 
forces that affect the process, seeking patterns from the data and theory, to derive other 
findings and an improved model of the process (Bowers, 1972, pp. 25 - 26). The first 
conceptual model of ex post contract management (see Figure 2.4) was based on the 
literatures of the written and unwritten contracts and proposed that public contracts to private 
firms comprise two forms, the written contract and the unwritten or psychological contract, 
and both these forms are used to secure the contract outcomes.  Based on five case studies, an 
improved second conceptual model was developed (see Figure 4.1) based on the use of 
signals in addition to the written contract means. The written contract mechanisms comprise 
incentives such as the payments and information systems, such as site meetings, to direct the 
agent towards the contract objectives. As the written contract is inevitably incomplete, the 
principal appeals to the agent using signals comprising expenditures of non-functional 
personal time to create obligations address problems and provide solutions. Given the 
limitations of the information economics definition of a signal, further theory is required to 
more fully understand the mechanisms of ex post contract management. Using the 
psychological contract in the above study, the evidence suggests an improved third 
conceptual model may be developed. 
From the Main Study, during the post tender contract period, the principal and agent work 
towards achieving the contract outcomes following mechanisms of the written and 
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psychological contracts. The written contract systems are those information systems and 
incentives specified in the contract, typically the contract payments and joint audits of the 
service outcomes. The written contract specification, incentives, and information systems 
serve primarily to form the contract resource provided by the principal to enable the agent 
have the necessary payroll and focus of attention to use the payroll in an efficient way.  
However, the written contract is largely incomplete due to both the difficulty of designing a 
complete contract and the principal’s preference for addressing issues through the unwritten 
or psychological contract. Managing through the psychological contract requires signalling 
by the principal and a positive agent’s disposition towards opportunities to extend the 
contract, and potentially influence future decisions on tender awards. Performance 
requirements are signalled by the principal in order to change the agent’s psychological 
contract, and induce decisions to implement preferred contract outcomes. The signals 
comprise actions by the principal such as changing to written communication, usually emails 
(performance communication), highlighting the link between payment and performance 
through the audits (message reinforcement), and displaying authority as the contract maker 
through setting up the contracts and maintaining a formal relationship with the agent and 
staff. The agent interprets these signals influenced by his dispositions towards extending the 
contract and potentially influencing the next tender outcome. Based on these he decides to 
perform works to satisfy his obligations to the psychological contract, for example to keep 
the principal happy, within the limitations of the available contract resources. In this way the 
cost quality conflict is optimised, enabling the highest performance within the limitations of 
the contract budget. This may explain why principals in public contracts are less inclined to 
withhold payments as a penalty under the written contract, and prefer to address performance 
by building the relationship with the agent. It also explains why public contract outcomes 
may differ from that of the original written contract. The conceptual model in fulfilment of 
the research objective is shown in Figure 6.1. 
Returning to the earlier ex post contract management conceptual models, this third model 
holds the dual approach of the written and unwritten contracts in the first (Figure 2.4) and 
second (Figure 4.1) conceptual models. By comparison with the second model, the signals of 
time, resource, and position correspond with the third conceptual model’s signals of 
performance communication, message reinforcement, and authority respectively. Similarly 
the second model’s information, incentive, and mutual interest interpretations by the agent 
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are identified as the agent’s obligations in the third model. However, it improves on the 
signals approach identified in the second conceptual model by more precisely separating 
sending of signals by the principal and the observation and decision making by the agent. It 
identifies the agent’s consideration of the resources, incompleteness, and obligations as 
relevant influencing factors in the agent’s decisions. Finally, it links the written contract and 
the psychological contract by identifying the written contract resources as the limitation on 
the scope of the agent’s decisions under psychological contract. To complete the discussion, 
the implications for theory, management, and policy are now reviewed in the light of this 























6.6 CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The implications of the Main Study findings and the improved conceptual model are 
discussed in relation to the economic theory of the contract, agency theory, the psychological 
contract, signalling, management practice, and public procurement policy. 
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6.6.1 Validity and Limitations 
Qualitative research with a truth-seeking purpose is concerned with extracting causality in the 
data by employing a conceptual-analytic framework that guides data collection and analysis, 
and is a progressive induction through which the data is collected, analysed, interpreted, and 
represented in a credible, corresponding account (Cho and Trent, 2006, p. 328). The Initial 
Study data collection and analysis is guided by the first conceptual model, highlighting 
agency theory and signal mechanisms, and the credibility of its account is supported by email 
correspondence and contract documentation. The Main Study further exposes the 
mechanisms of the written and unwritten contracts, and approaches signals through the 
psychological contract. 
By selecting the Main Study cases on a theoretic sampling basis where it is hoped to find 
both maximum and minimum variance along the dimensions of the core model (Hamel, 1991, 
p. 85), validity is supported in the research. To further ensure validity, the responses by agent 
and principal in Case A and Case B were compared for consistency. To grasp the nature of 
the psychological contracts in place it is necessary to drill down into the beliefs held by the 
parties as well as the information sources they use to interpret the work environment 
(Rousseau, 2004, p. 123), and an emic approach in a study of a few persons is useful 
(Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998, p. 682). Therefore a “thick description” approach is used in 
the Main Study, explicating perspectives constructed by individuals who act in a context, 
with the emphasis on constructing texts with salient descriptions and interpreting locally 
constructed meanings from the emic worldview (Cho and Trent, 2006, p. 329). Charmaz 
(2004, p. 982) argues that people often cannot tell the researcher what most concerns them, 
and that the fundamental processes in the setting may be tacit. Therefore, participants were 
not offered the opportunity to review transcripts in order to avoid withdrawal of potentially 
context-rich statements by participants. In retrospect the researcher feels that this was an 
appropriate approach because useful data, which may have been withdrawn, were left for 
consideration. For example, the principal in Case A states ‘it’s the balance of power’ (PA, p. 
A-18) when referring to her demonstration of authority in contract matters. Similarly, in Case 
B the principal does not readily admit to designing an incomplete contract saying ‘it wasn’t 
because of lack of completeness; it was only because of things we hadn’t thought of in the 
original contract’ (PB, p. B-6). While these statements do not portray the principals in in an 
entirely positive light, they offer insights to the power balance within the principal agent 
141 
 
relationship, and the difficulties in designing a complete contract. Finally, the narrative voice 
of the researcher is one of a facilities management practitioner with experience of managing 
contracts as a principal and agent in the public and private sectors. The narrative voice in this 
study is sympathetic to the purposeful social construction of the principal and agent as they 
explain their endeavours to address the management challenges during the ex post 
construction.  Since the narrative voice assists explanatory constructs (Pentland, 1999, p. 
715), this researcher’s narrative voice is a further support to the validity of the research. 
The limitations of the research are that it is a theory building study using a social 
constructionist approach to a total of seven individual cases concerning public contracts. In 
addition, the Main Study uses cases with fixed price contracts and not cost-plus. It is possible 
that cost-plus contracts may exhibit a stronger influence from the written contract incentives. 
Despite these limitations, the evidence and the conceptual models have relevance to 
principals and agents in ex post contract management in public contract settings. The 
contributions and implications are now discussed.   
 
6.6.2 Contributions to Theory 
Public procurement policy for public tenders and contracts are based on a classical 
transaction cost model of contract which presumes the availability of market remedies 
(Williamson, 1979, pp. 236 – 238). This transaction cost model brings two assumptions to the 
ex post stage of the contract. The first is that in the market there are potential agents available 
to offers solutions in exchange for payment by principals. Therefore in the event of poor 
performance by an agent a principal may choose to terminate a contract.  The second is that 
since the market is competitive, agents will offer varying solutions in relation to cost and 
quality. In both Case A and Case B the evidence supports  that the principals have worked to 
continue the relationship with the agents through a number of public tender processes. In 
Case A the principal notes that ‘we have been dealing with this contractor for about seven or 
eight years, but the contract has grown over that period as buildings came on stream’ (PA, p. 
A-4). In Case B the principal explains that the contract is ‘about two years’ (PB, p. B-3) but 
that ‘the original software was supplied by the same company … had been there for about ten 
years or so’ (PB, p. B-3). Therefore, both principals did not choose to avail of market 
remedies for poor performance or seek more innovative solutions from other agents in the 
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market despite holding tender competitions. An additional perspective is required to explain 
this. Since all contracts are psychological (Rousseau, 1995, p. 6) this perspective is the 
psychological contract. The psychological contract it is defined as the beliefs based on 
promises expressed or implied regarding an exchange agreement which binds the parties to a 
course of action (Rousseau, 2001, p. 511).  This is evident in Case B where the principal says 
‘when it went out to tender we had another very competitive quote … I think what happened 
was that we were concerned about the level of support … whether it’s directly or indirectly, 
the fact that the personal relationship existed did influence the award of that contract’ (PB, p. 
B11). While the evidence does not discount the transaction cost model of contract, it does 
support the proposal that the additional theoretical perspective of the psychological contract 
is required to explain the perspectives of managers towards contracts.      
Agency theory recommends that the ex-ante contract design includes the management 
mechanisms of incentives and information systems to address risk and contingencies 
(Eisenhardt, 1988, p. 490).  However the evidence suggests that the principal’s incentives and 
information systems are necessary but insufficient mechanisms to address the ex post contract 
risks and contingencies. In Case A and B the principals are conscious of the incentives and 
information systems, but state that the relationship beyond the written contract is what 
addresses risks and contingencies. The principal in Case A notes that the payments are 
‘around €5,000 a month’ (PA, p. A-4) and that ‘our supervisor would conduct a joint audit on 
a monthly basis’ (PA, p. A-8). She also adds that ‘you build the relationship, because if you 
are solely relying on what’s printed, the one thing you miss will be the one thing you need. 
And it won’t be written down’ (PA, p. A-7). Similarly in Case B the principal notes that the 
‘contract value was the first year €54,000 … €19,300 annually’ (PB, p. B-2) and ‘I think we 
said that periodically once a year we would review it’ (PB, p. B-22). She adds that ‘to be 
honest, I think people don’t really look back at the contract … it happens much more 
informally now where somebody will email or ring up and say ‘AB we have a problem and 
can you come and fix it?’ And it seems to work that way’ (PB, p. B-8). Therefore during the 
ex post contract, agency theory’s incentives and information systems are necessary but 
insufficient mechanism to address risk and contingencies. Rather, these mechanisms are 
better identified by the findings as the principal’s contract resources. Both the incentives and 
information systems provided by the principal resource the agent who uses these mechanisms 
to make available specialised knowledge and human resources to the contract. In Case A, the 
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agent notes that his contribution is ‘that service, that knowledge, to do the job’ (AA, p. A-20) 
and ‘without that regular input from the Housekeeping Department in UniCampus, if it was 
run like some other government contracts that possibly should have the same flexibility in the 
manpower, it wouldn’t happen’ (AA, p. A-10).  Also in Case B the agent says ‘the contract 
was to provide a case management cum accounting system for the veterinary hospital, a 
practice management system for the veterinary hospital’ (AB, p. B-3). He adds the client 
information is important saying that ‘meetings are informal … we are all interested in 
progressing the system’s ability and to meet as many people’s requirements’ (AB, p. B-6).  
The theoretic implication of this is that the agency theory ex post mechanisms are less about 
addressing risk and contingencies and more a primary contract resource that drives the scale 
and scope of the contract outcomes.  
The evidence also supports broadening the application of the psychological contract theory 
from the employment contract to inter-firm contracts between individual principals and 
agents acting on behalf of their organisations. While individuals have psychological contracts 
and organizations do not (Rousseau 1989, p. 126), the principal and agent are individuals 
with the authority to represent the interests of their organisations in the contract. As the agent 
in Case A notes about the principal that if ‘client is getting a number of complaints and 
they’re not being addressed … the client would very soon say this is not working and you 
could lose the business’ (AA, p. A-12). Also in Case B the agent similarly says that ‘the 
person we are dealing with … has enough of, I hate using the word power, but power and 
respect within the organisation that they can get things done’ (AB, p. B-10). The evidence 
suggests   links between the psychological contract and the agency theory mechanisms. As 
the agent decides and acts to fulfil his perceived obligations under the psychological contract, 
he allocates his knowledge and human resources to the priority requirements within the limits 
of the contract resources provided by the principal. That is he allocates work to the priorities 
identified by the principal’s information and enabled by the principal’s budget. Therefore the 
psychological contract obligations drive the efficiency of the allocation of the principal’s 
contract resources to optimise outcomes. 
Finally, the evidence supports extending signalling theory in two aspects. The first aspect is 
in relation to the understanding of signals used to convey information as part of the 
psychological contract of the principal agent relationship. Signalling theory is largely based 
on the information economics perspective which defines signals as non-functional time 
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expended in social and economic interaction to convey information (Spence, 1973, pp. 650 - 
651). Using the lens of the psychological contract (Rousseau, 1995, pp. 36 – 44), the 
evidence supports categorising these signals into performance communication, message 
reinforcement, and authority display signals sent by the principal, and further highlight the 
importance of the agent’s observation and consideration of these signals to form perceived 
obligations and responses under the psychological contract. The second aspect is in relation 
to methodology. By adopting a perspective of social constructionism it becomes possible to 
advance knowledge and practice in facilities management to provide real contribution to the 
core business of the organisation (Price, 2012b, pp. 90-91). This thesis uses the categories of 
signals as tools to explore and better understand the social constructions between the 
principal and the agent as they manage outcomes which provide outcomes for their 
organisations beyond the limitations of the written contract. The use of signals as a 
methodological tool facilitates enables this research. 
 
6.6.3 Implications for Management Practice  
The research problems summarised in Table 1.1 identified three research problems of which 
the first two have implications for management practice.  
The first problem states that while public contracts are designed by experienced managers, 
they are inflexible and do sufficiently not address contingencies. The Main Study findings 
support this point. As the principals holds in Case A ‘you build the relationship, because if 
you are solely relying on what’s printed, the one thing you miss will be the one thing you 
need’ (PA, p. A-7). Also in Case B the principal notes that ‘I think a lot of issues only arose 
subsequent to the contract being issued’ (PB, p. B-6) and ‘we do enjoy a very good cordial 
relationship … that has been really instrumental in ensuring the success of the contract’ (PB, 
p. B-11). The evidence suggests that some experienced managers hold that it is impossible to 
rely on a contract being sufficiently complete to address all contingencies, and such 
contingencies are better addressed through developing a positive relationship.  Indeed, while 
the contract is inflexible and incomplete, the positive relationship provides flexible solutions 




The second research problem is that public sector principals are unable or unwilling to secure 
the contract terms from the agents. The Main Study evidence supports this to an extent. For 
example in Case A the principal explains that ‘the contract has grown over that period as 
buildings came on stream’ (PA, p. A-4). The agent adds ‘if the builders were finished in a 
certain area, and we were to take over the next area or the next floor … we’d have the weekly 
meetings and get then the instruction “from next week I want you to do this and to do that”’ 
(AA, p. A-16).  Similarly in Case B the principal notes that ‘to be honest, I think people don’t 
really look back at the contract’ (PB, p. B-8), and the agent concurs saying ‘I would like to 
think we have moved beyond the contract’ (AB, p. B-6) and ‘I would speculate that they are 
thinking let’s see what we can do to develop the system rather than the contract itself’ (p. B-
8). Therefore rather than securing the written contract terms, the principals work with agents 
to secure the broader unwritten contract outcomes in preference to the written contract ones. 
While this ex post management approach by principals works well in a positive relationship, 
the reliance on the relationship can threaten the contract outcomes when parties disagree. For 
example in Case A the principal notes that ‘in a previous and another relationship there have 
been times when lack of clarity caused a lot of problems’ (PA, p. A-7) and ‘I know in one of 
our other contracts which would be a very big organisation, you don’t get as good service 
because they don’t really value the contract’ (PA, p. A-22). The implication for management 
from these findings is to improve ex ante the design of written contracts. This approach could 
include developing templates that address a wider range of contingencies, creating more 
flexible incentives, providing more easily implemented information systems, and identifying 
risks and remedies in relation to over-reliance on the psychological contract. After all, the 
efficiency of ex post renegotiation is influenced by the ex-ante contract that the parties sign 
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, p. 398). To an extent this is borne out by a comment from the 
principal in Case B who says that ‘our ability to issue the tender and get that contract passed 
… was seen as very influential and a demonstration by the university to the service provider’ 
(PB, p. B-17). Therefore efforts to manage exante the tender and the written contract 
development influence the ex post relationship, as well as potentially providing more written 
contract solutions to a wider range of contingencies. The implication for managers is that ex-
ante effort in the design of contracts with more flexible incentives and information systems 




6.6.4 Implications for Policy  
Of the research problems summarised in Table 1.1, the last two have implications for public 
procurement regulation policy. The second research problem states that the ex post contract 
outcomes frequently vary from those outcomes specified in the written contract. 
Public procurement policies emphasise competitive tendering, clear written contracts, and 
fixed price contracts with defined outcomes. The evidence suggests that during the ex post 
stage managers of public contracts rely on the psychological contract between the principal 
and agent to achieve outcomes which are based on optimal resource allocation rather than 
defined outcomes. For example in Case A the principal maintains that ‘a good contract 
service is vitally important’ (PA, p. A-5). It appears that the contract outcome has been a 
success. As the principal says ‘we have been dealing with this contractor for about seven or 
eight years, but the contract has grown over that period as buildings came on stream’ (PA, p. 
A-4). The efficiencies arise from the agent’s allocation decision within the contract budget, 
rather than from the defined contract outcomes. As the agent says, ‘whether that be allocating 
some staff in to do an extra job, there is no additional resources, financial resources … you 
just have to try and manage what we have’ (AA, p. A-19). Also, in Case B the principal notes 
that ‘it’s very, very important  ... we can’t operate our hospital efficiently without it’ (PB, p. 
B-4). She adds ‘I think people don’t really look back at the contract’ (PB, p. B-8), and notes 
‘we do enjoy a very good cordial relationship … that has been really instrumental in ensuring 
the success of the contract’ (PB, p. B-11). Because of the psychological contract, the agent 
notes ‘we have moved beyond the contract’ (AB, p. B-6), and that ‘let’s see what we can do 
to develop the system rather than the contract itself’ (AB, p. B-8). Finally he says ‘we are 
quite helpful to them in making some small changes here and there that we don’t charge for’ 
(AB, p. B-18). In Case B, it is evident that rather than the public procurement objectives 
being the main influence, efficiencies appear due to the psychological contract between the 
principal and agent. In summary, the efficiencies stem from the agent’s allocation decision, 
based on perceived obligations under the psychological contract, and within the contract 
budget.  Contract outcomes are driven less by the written contract specification and more by 
the efficient allocation of the contract resources by means of the psychological contract 
between the principal and agent. A potential policy implication is the development of public 
manager competencies to design public contracts which provide clauses allowing for more 
flexible incentives and information systems to cope with unforeseen contingencies. In this 
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way, audited contract outcomes will report that contingencies were dealt with in accordance 
with the written contract specifications.  
The third research problem arising from public procurement policy is that public contracts do 
not sufficiently encourage principal agent relationships which foster collaborative solutions. 
While recent policies encourage pre-tender consultation between buyer and sellers, in both 
Case A and B the findings indicate that the consultation and relationship between principal 
and agent develops as a result of a management decision rather than from the public tender 
process. For example in Case A the principal deliberately fosters a relationship with the agent 
saying ‘I think the relationship is all-important as well as what’s written down… you build 
the relationship, because if you are solely relying on what’s printed, the one thing you miss 
will be the one thing you need.’ (PA, p. A-7) and ‘if you don’t have that … the service will 
fall down’ (PA, p. A-12). In Case B the principal notes that ‘we do enjoy a very good cordial 
relationship … that has been really instrumental in ensuring the success of the contract’ (PB, 
p. B-11) She adds that ‘. So it’s only when we went and investigated and built up that 
relationship again, and spent a little bit of money in ensuring that our contract was such that 
we would be able to upgrade every year and would upgrade annually that that developed’ 
(PB, p. B-14). The relationship develops with the contract. Or as Luo (2002, p. 903) puts it, 
the contractual arrangement serves as a framework within which cooperation proceeds. 
Therefore the evidence supports public procurement policies as a framework that supports the 
principal agent relationship rather than a means of directly fostering the relationship. While 
much public procurement literature exists on the regulatory requirements, more could 
usefully be done to develop management guidelines in relation to the ex post phase of the 
contract. Public procurement regulatory bodies could publish more detailed examples of how 
appropriate monitoring systems may be designed and implemented in public contracts. There 
are also opportunities for holding discussion between public and private sector management 
practitioners to highlight the regulatory, social, and market objectives of public procurement, 
address mutual solutions to tender criteria and written contract design, and encourage a 






Table 6.2 - Contributions of Thesis (Source: author, based on Farndale, 2004, p. 251) 
 
Domain 
Extent of Contribution 
Supported Developed New 
Theory Both transaction costs 
economics and the 
psychological contract 




contracts.   
Signals by the principal 




and authority signals. 
The agent’s 
consideration of these 
leads to perceived 
obligations and 
responses under the 
psychological contract. 




and incentives create 
contract resources as 
well as address risk and 
contingencies 
  The agent’s perceived 
obligations under the 
psychological contract 
assist the efficient 
allocation of the 
contract resources. 
 
Empirical Evidence Principals hold that it is 
impossible to rely on a 
contract being 
sufficiently complete to 
address all 
contingencies, and 
such contingencies are 
better addressed 
through developing a 
positive relationship 
with the agent. 
 Rather than securing 
the written contract 
terms, the principals 
work with agents to 
secure the broader 
unwritten contract 
outcomes in preference 






Table 6.2 - Contributions of Thesis - continued (Source: author, based on Farndale,          
2004, p. 251) 
 
Domain 
Extent of Contribution 
Supported Developed New 
Methods   
 
Signal categories are a 
methodological tool for 
analysing the social 
constructions between 
the principal and the 
agent as they work to 







 Improvement of the ex-
ante tender process and 
contract design to 
include more flexible 
incentives and 
information systems 
will support ex post 
management outcomes. 
 
 Guidelines by public 
procurement regulatory 
bodies on ex post risk 
analysis, monitoring, 
and management of 
public contracts will 









6.6.5 Opportunities for Future Research  
This research is based on a theory building and social constructionist approach with a small 
number of cases of public contracts. Arising from this, there are two potential future research 
approaches. The first is to test the conceptual model using a survey questionnaire with a 
Likert Scale response options to allow conveyance of personal perspectives. This would test 
and further refine the model. Given that the majority of findings concern the principal agent 
relationship and its workings, the conceptual model has likely application to private sector 
contracts. A similar theory-building study could usefully be carried out on cases where the 
interorganizational principal agent relationships are between private sector firms, and the 
public procurement tender requirements are absent. This would increase generalisation of the 
conceptual model. Finally, since both agency theory and psychological contract signals 
influence the contract outcomes, a process study could be carried out to identify whether 
these mechanisms operate simultaneously or whether the mechanisms swing between agency 
theory and psychological contract depending on the state of the contract relationship or in 















CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION 
This thesis explores ex post contract management mechanisms in seven cases of facilities 
management contracts resulting from public procurement tender processes in three higher 
education organisations. Using a qualitative and interpretative methodology, the study takes 
an inductive theory building approach to how and why managers address such challenges, 
and develops a conceptual model of ex post management mechanisms through the lenses of 
agency theory, the psychological contract, and signals. While it has the limitations of a theory 
building and social constructionist approach, it offers findings of theoretic, management, and 
policy relevance.  
 The evidence suggests that public procurement contracts entail frequent tenders and defined 
contracts, and give rise to expectations of low cost quality services which is reflected in the 
provision of limited budgets by the principal organisations. It also  suggests that challenges 
for the ex post  contract management are present due to the written contract incompleteness 
and the tension within the contract relationship due to frequent tendering required by public 
procurement policies.   
The evidence supports that in public contracts the principal agent relationship is based on 
both written and psychological contracts and the ex post management mechanisms include 
the agency theory mechanisms of incentives and information systems, as well as 
psychological contract signals of performance communication, message reinforcement, and 
authority. The findings indicate why this dual approach is used. It is because principals find 
complete contracts difficult to write and contingencies are viewed as inevitable, some 
reliance on positive responses to the obligations under the agent’s psychological contract is 
inevitable. In addition, the agent’s response under the psychological contract is a more 
efficient way to allocate resources to remedy contract contingencies than by using the written 
contract information system alone. Therefore, while public contracts often prove incomplete 
and inflexible, maintaining a positive principal agent relationship provides solutions to 
contingencies, and secures the continuity of the contract for the benefit of both parties. Rather 
than relying solely on the written contract terms, principals work with agents to achieve 
broader unwritten contract goals in preference to the written objectives. This is why outcomes 
differ from those originally specified in the contract. 
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The evidence suggests that both agency theory and the psychological contract are required to 
better understand how and why managers use the ex post mechanisms of the contract. The 
thesis extends agency theory in public contracts by highlighting the importance of 
information systems used by the principal, and how together with the incentives, forms a 
resource for allocation towards the contract requirements and contingencies by the agent. It 
extends the psychological contract by applying it to the principal agent relationship, and 
identifying how the psychological signals influence the agent’s responses.  Through 
understanding these ex post mechanisms, managers may better address contract challenges 
and more fully understand the risks and opportunities when using ex post mechanisms of the 
written or the psychological contract. The written contract will eventually fail to provide a 
remedy due to its incompleteness, and the psychological contract will be limited to the extent 
of the resources created by information and incentives. The evidence also supports that more 
attention to flexible contract design may address a wider range of contingencies, and that 
innovative solutions to problems may be found by endeavouring to build the relationship and 
maintain a positive psychological contract.  
Finally, the thesis addresses this researcher’s perspectives as a practitioner managing 
contracts in the area of facilities management for some twenty seven years, of which the last 
eighteen have been spent managing public contracts as a principal. There are a number of 
emerging challenges for a public sector principal managing contracts, some of which have 
come into particular focus during this thesis process. These are the growing requirements to 
articulate the value of ex post management activities to auditors, to demonstrate to the 
organisation that ex post outcomes contribute to the strategic plan, and to develop 
organisational staff in the theory and practice of public contract management. The evidence 
of this research goes some significant way towards assisting the researcher to design, 
manage, and explain to stakeholders the value of informed contract management practice to 
the organisation.  This thesis, then, offers a useful theoretic perspective to practitioners who 
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APPENDIX I - MAIN STUDY INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE AND WRITTEN 
CONTRACT 




Proposition P2: Principals 
use written contract 
incompleteness as 
opportunities to create 
additional obligations on the 
agent to improve on the 
written contract outcomes. 
 
1. Please describe a public sector contract managed by 
you that is in its post-tender phase. For example, could 
you describe the specified contract services, the end-
users who benefit, and the managers and operatives 
who facilitate the service? 
2. What was the tender value? 
3. How long has the contract been in operation?  
4. What is the contract duration and are there any 
permitted extensions? 
5. How important is this contract to your organization? 
For example, to what extent does it provide important 
benefits to your organization? 
6. Does the written contract specify all the services 
actually required or provided by your organization? 
7. To what extent does lack of completeness or clarity in 
the written contract generate additional discussions or 
work? For example, would it lead to additional 
meetings, communications, etc.? 
Contract Information 
Systems 
Proposition P1: Principals 
rely primarily on information 
systems of the written 
contract to induce the agent to 
perform towards the contract 
outcomes. 
8. Please describe any contract-specified information 
systems between the client and the contractor to 
monitor and ensure performance? For example, 
contract meetings, reports, KPI’s, committees, etc.? 
9. To what extent do you find these contract information 
systems helpful in monitoring performance and 






I 1.1 – Interview Questionnaire Based on the First Conceptual Model  
(continued) 
Propositions Questions 
Contract Incentives 10. What do understand are there contract-specified 
incentives for the service provider? For example, 
contract payments, possible penalties or bonuses? 
11. Are there any other incentives not specified in the 
contract, for example the potential benefit of the 
experience, possible increase in company’s market 






Contract Relationship 12. To what extent is the client-contractor managers’ 
relationship useful in resolving contract difficulties? 
For example, following up on complaints, performance 
issues, or payment queries?  
13. To develop this relationship, how frequently would you 
engage in purely social conversations or activities with 
the contract manager in the partner organization? 









I 1.2 – Interview Questionnaire Based on the Second Conceptual Model 
Propositions Questions 
Proposition P3: Principals 
use visible, non-functional, 
and non-enjoyable 
expenditures of time as 
signals to promote behaviours 
by the agent towards the 
desired contract outcomes. 
[These questions addressed to 
Principal or Client’s 
Manager] 
14. In addition to the formal contract information systems, 
are there client actions or activities you use to 
indirectly draw attention to service performance issues? 
For example, would you use such visible 
demonstrations as additional client time or energy, 
additional meetings, telephone calls, or client 
inspections?  
15. To what extent do you feel these client actions are 
useful in promoting service performance levels of the 
contract?   
 
 
Proposition P9: Agents use 
imperfectly observed signals 
from principals to better 
understand and perform 
towards the desired contract 
outcomes. [These questions 
addressed to Agent or Service 
Provider Manager] 
 
16. In addition to the formal contract information systems, 
are there other client actions or activities used to draw 
attention to service performance issues or 
requirements? For example, activities such as 
additional visible client time or energy, additional 
client required meetings, client telephone calls, or 
client inspections?  
17. To what extent do you feel these client actions are 
useful in promoting service performance levels of the 









I 1.2 – Interview Questionnaire Based on the Second Conceptual Model 
(continued) 
Propositions Questions 
Proposition P4: Principals 
use their access to contract 
resources such as budgets, 
expertise, or social skills as 
signals to promote behaviours 
by the agent towards the 
desired contract outcome. 
18. To what extent do you think the client manager’s 
authority over the contract budget supports their 
influence in contract matters? For example, would 
people pay more attention to someone because they 
control the contract budget? 
19. To what extent do you think the client manager’s 
technical or contract expertise supports their influence 
in contract matters? For example, would people pay 
more attention to someone because they are technical 
experts on contract matters? 
20. To what extent do you think the client manager’s social 
skills supports their influence in contract matters? For 
example, would people pay more attention to someone 
because they are friendly and socially skilled? 
Proposition P5: Principals 
use the involvement of 
organizational leadership 
figures in contract situations 
or events as signals to 
promote behaviours by the 
agent towards the desired 
contract outcomes. 
21. To what extent do you think the client manager’s 
access to senior management figures supports their 
influence in contract matters? For example, would 
people pay more attention to someone because they 
have frequent contact with senior management, or can 
get these figures to attend contract events? 
Proposition P6: Principals 
use increased formality in 
contract communications as 
information signals of 
dissatisfaction with the 
agent’s performance or the 
contract outcomes. 
22. Do you feel the client manager’s tone of 
communication indicates their satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the contract performance? For 
example, would informal and formal tones indicate 
information regarding the client’s satisfaction? 
23. To what extent does the client manager highlight 
information that may be of use in a future tender 




I 1.2 – Interview Questionnaire Based on the Second Conceptual Model (continued) 
Propositions Questions 
Proposition P7: Principals 
use additional contract 
meeting times or attendances 
as penalty or incentive signals 
to induce the agent towards 
the desired contract 
outcomes. 
24. To what extent does the client manager arrange 
additional events or activities to highlight problems, 
encourage performance, or celebrate improvements? 
For example, additional meetings or agenda items to 
highlight problems or notes of congratulations after 
particular achievements? 
25. To what extent does the client manager arrange for 
senior figures (in either organization) to attend 
meetings in recognition of important contract issues or 
events? Can you give examples? 
Proposition P8: Principals 
use informal time spent 
resolving contract difficulties 
or relationships as a signal to 
generate social obligation by 
the agent towards the desired 
contract outcomes. 
26. Does the client manager arrange informal meetings or 
spend time to work through difficulties in the contract? 
For example, off-line meetings, ‘off the record’ 
conversations? 
27. Does the client manager spend time developing 
relationships or expressing gratitude or trust with 
member of the service provider’s team? For example, 
having informal conversations or meetings? 
 
Other potential ex post 
Mechanisms 
28. Do you use any other means, not yet discussed, of 
ensuring or promoting good service performance? For 
example, staff meetings, IT systems, focus groups, 
consultants, statistics, benchmarking, references to 




I 2.1 - Written Contract Case A Interview Excerpts 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
WC  Written 
Contract 
(A-2) We employ contracted 
services to a number of properties. 
(A-2) The set-up of the contract is 
normally done by myself and the 
owner of the company. 
(A-2) … it’s left to be managed 
on a monthly basis with a 
Supervisor designated in-house 
here, MP, and a dedicated 
Contract Relationship Manager, 
MA from CleanServ… 
(A-4)  At the moment it’s around 
€5,000 a month.  
(A-4)  We have been dealing with 
this contractor for about seven or 
eight years… 
(A-5)  It’s very important to have 
a good service provided to an 
area… A good contract service is 
vitally important if it’s off-
campus… 
 
(A-3) When we started the 
contract, when we originally 
came first to look after building 
C was a brand new building. 
(A-2)  We have been awarded a 
section of the UniCampus 
contract, we’re in a standstill 
period at the moment, we’re just 
waiting for everything to be 
rubber stamped, and giving time 
to the other contractors, who 
weren’t successful, time to 
appeal any decisions. 
(A-2)  Obviously when the 
tender went out we would have 
known beforehand that the 
tender was going to be, in that 
there were people walking 
around the buildings, so we felt 
that we were in a strong position 
because we were obviously the 
present contractors. 
 (A-4)  The portion of the work 
that we have with UniCampus 
prior to going to tender was 
€140,000. 
 (A-4)  We started working in X 
Street, it went to tender and we 
got the contract, I think in 2003 




I 2.1 - Written Contract Case A Interview Excerpts (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
WC Written Contract (A-4)  It’s very important to 
have a good service provided to 
an area, particularly given the 
fact that we’re using 
contractors in off-site and off-
campus properties which are 
more difficult to manage, and 
when we manage most of the 
campus cleaning with in-house 
staff. A good contract service is 
vitally important if it’s off-
campus. 
(A-5) … because of the time 
you can spend managing the 
contract off-site if there are 
problems with it. If it’s next to 
you it’s easy, but if you have to 
go and travel to site, even if it’s 
only across the road, it’s very 
time-consuming if a contract 
isn’t running right, or 
incorrectly, dealing with 
complaints from customers and 
passing them on.  
(A-6) … when we started up 
this agreement with the 
company. We specified the 
minimum frequency in 
cleaning. We based it on an 
outcome basis that everywhere 
has to be to our standard, with 
absolute minimum frequency. 
(A-6) Certainly back when the 
original contract started it 
would have been fairly 
flexible. In that there would 
have been a quotation given in 
for just how many staff we 
were going to provide and the 
number of days a week of the 
service being provided. 
(A-18)  From our manager’s 
point of view, it’s the payroll 
for the building. They know 
exactly the budget for the 
building. We measure that in 
hours. So, the manager has a 
certain number of hours per 
week, per building.  
(A-20)  It’s equipping our 
managers with the knowledge 
of how to clean the carpets 
with the new methods, or how 
to do the job on the floor with 
the new pads that we have 
done in UniCampus using 
diamond pads that restore 





I 2.1 - Written Contract Case A Interview Excerpts (continued) 
Code Description Principal  – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
WC Written Contract (A-7) … if you put in too much 
detail it can become a 
battleground as well. In that if 
you put too much detail in, then 
if you missed one thing out, 
then the answer is “well, you 
didn’t ask me to do that”.  So I 
think the relationship is all-
important as well as what’s 
written down. 
(A-7)  You build the 
relationship, because if you are 
solely relying on what’s 
printed, the one thing you miss 
will be the one thing you need. 
(A-8)  I think a too-detailed 
document can become a bit of a 
weapon between the two 
parties. 
(A-20)  With our contract 
managers, we try to give them 
all the information that we 
can. Whether that be methods 
of cleaning carpets in 
UniCampus, so that they can 
provide that service, that 
knowledge, to do the job 
without having to bring in the 
industrial crew to do extra 
jobs. We also train all our 
managers in communicating 
with our front line people, our 
cleaning staff. So whether we 
are bringing in new products, 
new processes, new methods 
of cleaning floors, we would 
train our managers who in 
turn then will train their own 
staff. 
(A-21) MA, who would be the 
main point of contact in 
UniCampus, would possibly 
have up to sixty or seventy 
staff that she would be 
responsible for. She would 
also have three or four area 






I 2.2 - Written Contract Case B Interview Excerpts 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 
WC  Written 
Contract 
(B-2)  Well we have a contract 
which we have awarded to an 
organisation called VetServ, and 
who have supplied us with a 
clinical and financial management 
system for UniVet Veterinary 
Hospital. 
(B-2)  The annual contract value 
was the first year €54,000, plus 
VAT obviously, and then for each 
following year we would pay 
€19,300 annually and that 
includes a certain amount of 
support, and over above that we 
pay for additional support. We 
pay for additional support if we 
need it, if we call someone out, or 
if we want something new, we 
pay for that separately. But it does 
include annual upgrades or 
periodic upgrades of the software. 
So anything new that’s developed 
for commercial practice, we get 
this as part of the deal. And it 
includes a hundred site licences. 
(B-3)  About two years. The 
original software was supplied by 
the same company, but as I said, 
in its original version it had been 
there for about ten years or so.   
(B-4)  I think it’s a rolling 
contract that would go on year by 
year. 
(B-3) And the contract was to 
provide a case management cum 
accounting system for the 
veterinary hospital, a practice 
management system for the 
veterinary hospital. 
(B-3) We have had this 
relationship since 98, since 
1997, 1998 really. 
(B-3) But there was an ongoing 
support contract so that we could 
cover any issues that might arise 
or future development work. 
(B-3) In the year 2000 we 
implemented an accounts system 
because at the time they needed 
because they were liable for 
VAT, which they hadn’t been up 
to that. So we put an accounts 
module onto the management 




I 2.2 - Written Contract Case B Interview Excerpts (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 
WC Written Contract (B-4)  It’s very, very 
important. Because we can’t 
operate our hospital efficiently 
without it, you see. We can’t 
do things like count the cases 
accurately. We can’t 
communicate between different 
clinical departments 
accurately. We can’t charge the 
clients accurately. We can’t 
communicate with clients 
accurately, with commercial 
vets accurately. And another 
aspect is that we have linked 
up the VetServ system onto our 
clinical labs management 
system. So that test results it 
can be exported directly from 
the laboratories and go back to 
the clinicians on line as it were. 
So it is much better than it was. 
(B-8)  What was specified in 
the contract, though, was 
training. A certain amount of 
training by professionals is 
included in the fee. 
(B-14)  So in our new contract 
now, we have specified that we 
get those regular software 
updates and those versions of 
the software upgrades that are 
applicable to commercial 
veterinary practices as well. 
(B-3) And then, this particular 
contract was where we had 
continued in our business to 
develop a practice management 
software for commercial 
veterinary practice. And it was 
along slightly different lines as to 
what the original system was. 
The college became aware of 
this. We obviously made them 
aware of this, and they had a look 
at it over time. And it was a 
better way of doing things. 
(B-5) There was a written 
contract, yes indeed. I can’t 
remember all the details of it 
now. I probably should have it in 
front of me. There was a written 
contract which specified what we 
would provide. At each stage we 
would have outlined a proposal 
along with our costs which in 
turn developed into a contract. In 
earlier days there wasn’t any 
particular contract coming from 
the other side and it was a case of 
accepting our proposal with 
amendments. It was done by 
agreement. This last round was 
somewhat similar, but probably 
more formalised in that the 
contract wasn’t quite our 
wording as it had been before, 




I 2.2 - Written Contract Case B Interview Excerpts (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 
WC Written Contract (B-17)  A procurement 
manager in the university was 
involved in drawing up the 
original specification. 
(B-6) I don’t think that anyone is 
in anyway worried about the 
contract at this point, them or us 
for that matter. 





APPENDIX II - WRITTEN CONTRACT MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS  
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT EXCERPTS 
  
 
II 1.1 – Contract Incentives Case A 





(A-4) At the moment it’s around 
€5,000 a month. 
(A-10)  They are dealing with a 
public body. It’s a regular 
payment it’s not something 
that’s going to go to the wall 
tomorrow.  
 (A-11) I think to have the 
UniCampus brand on their 
portfolio is a selling point for 
them when they go to get other 
business. When they are seeking 
future business, to say that 
within their current portfolio of 
business they have places like a 
university, it proves that they 
have been there for a period of 
time, and is a comfort to and 
may a selling point to future 
clients they are going to. 
 
(A-4) The portion of the work 
that we have with UniCampus 
prior to going to tender was 
€140,000. 
(A-5) It’s very, very important. 
The one disadvantage CleanServ 
has is that we don’t have a large 
third level institution, what we 
would see in a large campus type 
contract. We have large office 
cleaning contracts, retail 
contracts, but we don’t have and 
still don’t have a large third level 
institution. 
(A-5)  Although we were 
working for UniCampus, they 
were small buildings. But it was 
great to have it as a reference if 
we were going for other 
buildings. 
 (A-5)  The great benefit of it is 
that it’s the centre of the city. I 
have a large management team 




II 1.1 – Contract Incentives Case A (continued) 






(A-6) And the great thing about 
any work from any government 
contract is you never have to 
worry about getting paid. They 
pay on time.  
(A-10)  From an incentive point 
of view, purely the only incentive 
as a contractor is getting the 
contract. Having a contract that 
you know is in place for a 
predetermined time, where that is 
a three year contract with an 
option for a further year. 
Certainly on government 
contracts it’s very nice to know 
that you’re undertaking a job that 
you know you are going to get 
paid for at the end of every 
month. Whereas with private 
sector work you don’t have that 
guarantee. 
(A-10) The drawback is that it’s 
exceptionally price competitive 
at the detriment of the service 
element. If you wanted to be sure 
to give a good job, the public 
procurement seems to be solely 
fixed on price, not on how the 
service is going to be delivered, 
or how damage is going to 






II 1.1 – Contract Incentives Case A (continued) 





 (A-10) If you wanted to be sure 
to give a good job, the public 
procurement seems to be solely 
fixed on price, not on how the 
service is going to be delivered, 
or how damage is going to 
happen to the service. 
(A-11)  The other benefit, we 
use the word more so than 
incentive, is the actual reference. 
It’s great to have government 
work and you can use some 
contracts as a reference, whether 
it be for an educational 
institution, or the public 
authorities which often have 
very sensitive areas, that you can 
show that you’ve got good 
security in place for your staff, 




II 1.2 – Contract Incentives Case B  





(B-2)  The annual contract value 
was the first year €54,000, plus 
VAT obviously, and then for 
each following year we would 
pay €19,300 annually, and that 
includes a certain amount of 
support, and over above that we 
pay for additional support. 
(B-8)  A very significant 
incentive for the service provider 
is being associated with UniVet 
Veterinary Hospital, a major 
institution, a big third level 
institution. Certainly I know 
from looking at their marketing 
data, they have relied on that 
quite heavily, to say that they are 
associated with UniVet. And I 
think that has been useful to 
them. 
(B-20)  They have also been 
asked to come in and 
demonstrate their software to 
students, particularly the 
veterinary nursing students. And 
they see that as a big advantage 
because these veterinary nursing 
students go out and work in 
various commercial veterinary 
practices, obviously saying 
‘well, I know how to work 
VetServ’ and that’s clearly an 
influence on the practice.   
(B-2) It was €56,000. That was 
the cost of providing and 
developing the software, and the 
annual support cost, I think it is 
about €12,000 to €14,000. 
(B-4) It is yes. You know, the 
UniVet college is the qualifying 
college for all veterinary 
surgeons throughout Ireland and 
most of our customers have gone 
through there, and it is a flagship 
site for our business. 
(B-8) Apart from the fact that 
they are flagship, we would 
learn things from the fact that 
it’s a veterinary hospital using 
the system while in practice the 
needs are somewhat different. 
(B-9) But we learn from both as 
to what’s useful in each 
environment. And quite often, 
technically speaking, there are 
systems in one that is useful to 







II 1.2 – Contract Incentives Case B (continued) 





(B-22)  We are very aware of the 
need for our students, for 
example the vet students, to be 
proficient in using the clinical 
software systems, being able to 
use it for research purposes for 
example. Basically to see how 
many cases of a particular 
disease or whatever we have had 
in the past over a period. So I 
think that would be an 
opportunity for the service 
provider to be invited to come in 
and talk to the students, and they 
are happy to do so. 
(B-23)  So in all the reports that 
go out to referring vets and 
clients there would be a degree 
of branding there. That would be 
an advantage to VetServ. 
(B-9) But on top of that, you 
know, they have a programme 
which is about business for 
veterinary practice, and we have 
contributed to that, showing how 
VetServ could be used to 
manage the business, and what 
KPIs and so on they should be 
looking for through something 
like VetServ. 
(B-10) We find that there are 
other things outside of the 
relationship to do with the 
contract that are useful or 
beneficial to both parties. We 
have looked at doing joint 
conferences. We are involved in 
the UniVet conference and so 
on. 
(B-20) But we have discussions 
about other things that influence 
both our organisations. So I 
might ring up and ask, you 
know, what’s the best 
organisation to phone in relation 
to this? Or, do you have any 
contacts in this organisation? 





II 2.1 – Contract Information System Case A 




(A-8) Yes, our supervisor would 
conduct a joint audit on a 
monthly basis.  And she would 
report back the results of that 
audit to me. For any areas that 
are falling down, a timeframe 
would be set for rectification.   
(A-9) the information provides a 
history of how the contract is 
performing over a period of 
years. And then, if there is a 
problem, you can genuinely 
view if it’s an isolated incident 
rather that a continual problem. 
(A-12) … they meet formally on 
a monthly basis 
 
(A-9)  The monthly information 
meeting between the managers is 
the information system. 
(A-10) So, without that regular 
input from the Housekeeping 
Department in UniCampus, if it 
was run like some other 
government contracts that 
possibly should have the same 
flexibility in the manpower, it 
wouldn’t happen. 
(A-15) I suppose with something 
like that would be where you 
might be saying where there 
might be a fall off in the level of 
service. I suppose the way things 
are now it’s very easy for a 
member of UniCampus staff, 
obviously if they had a difficulty 
where their office wasn’t being 
cleaned, they might send an 
electronic email to P, who 
would, in turn then, forward it 
on to our own office here. 
(A-16)  If there as an issue 
raised at the weekly or 
fortnightly walk arounds with 
MP, that would be what they 





II 2.1 – Contract Information System Case A (continued) 




 (A-26) What we have received 
from time to time from our 
fortnightly walk arounds on our 
audits (MP would be the person 
to sign off on them), if there is a 
positive comment to be made, 
MP will put it onto the 
additional comments section 
which is lovely for my own 
managers because they know 
I’m going to see that. Actually 
signed and written by MP. 
(A-28) So I don’t really know 
how much an informal meeting 
could work in what we do 
because you’re measuring the 
standard of cleaning at a given 
point in time. 
(A-28) My impression of MP is 
that she wouldn’t let you away 
with a whole lot either. She had 
a job to do. If the building isn’t 
up to standard, she’s going to 
say it because she’s not signing 
off on her fortnightly audit if it’s 






II 2.1 – Contract Information System Case A (continued) 





(A-26)  Somebody has said 
something, or from time to time, 
people in the college have sent 
an email to Housekeeping 
thanking them for a particular 
job that was done, it’s always 
passed on. It’s sent to ourselves 
first then always passed on. It’s 
a lovely gesture. It doesn’t take a 
whole lot, but very seldom does 
the cleaning staff get thanked for 
the job. It’s usually when there 
is something wrong when they 
are contacting you. But it’s nice 
to get something positive. We all 
like to have our egos stroked a 
bit! 
(A-27) We don’t have review 
meetings, which I do think P is 
going to change this with the 
new contract. 
(A-29) This is an audit done on 
the 14
th
 February in UniCampus 
building C, signed by MP. And 
MP wrote ‘attend to toilet on 
back stairs: toilet rolls – toilet 
rolls not to be left on cistern, 
only small ones’. So MP will 
communicate this way… 
(A-29) ‘Bin liners in A House, I 
have spoken to staff, this is 
never to happen again’. 
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II 2.2 – Contract Information System Case B 




(B-6)  Regular meetings and 
workshops during the 
implementation phase of VetServ. 
(B-7)  We have a snag list which 
one member of our staff compiles 
and relays to AB at intervals. 
(B-7)  I think there is a little bit in 
the contract about 
communications, but a lot of it is 
informal. 
(B-8)  To be honest it happens 
much more informally now where 
somebody will email or ring up 
and say ‘AB we have a problem 
and can you come and fix it?’ And 
it seems to work that way. 
(B-22)  I think we said that 
periodically once a year we would 
review it and we are to have one 
of those meetings quite soon. 
(B-6) The meetings are informal. 
The meetings weren’t part of the 
contract as such. 
(B-6)  We are all interested in 
progressing the system’s ability 
and to meet as many people’s 
requirements. 
(B-10)  We can answer 
questions they may have, and 
similarly they can answer 
questions we may have.  
(B-15) I would find them very 
useful because, at the end of the 
day, if the client is there wanting 
something else, and we can’t 
discuss it or aren’t willing to 
discuss it or considering 
delivering it then the client isn’t 
going to be too happy. 
(B-22) Yes, well I suppose as 
well we have implemented an IT 
system for tracking technical 
issues and so on. We would 
discuss those on a regular basis, 
you know. That’s a little 
information system of its own 
that’s separate from the system 
and which is available to them. 
We can view it as well. We can 
jointly review it. 
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APPENDIX III - CONTRACT INCOMPLETENESS AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
CONTRACT 
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT EXCERPTS 
 
III 1.1 – Written Contract Incompleteness Case A 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
WCI Written contract 
Incompleteness 
(A-2) We employ contracted 
services to a number of 
properties … have the building 
A, building B, and a new 
building that came on stream 
last year, building C, which are 
all supplied services by one 
contractor. 
(A-4)  We have been dealing 
with this contractor for about 
seven or eight years, but the 
contract has grown over that 
period as buildings came on 
stream.  
(A-6)  We based it on an 
outcome basis that everywhere 
has to be to our standard, with 
absolute minimum frequency. 
Sometimes if there were areas 
which may need levels of 
service or specific events 
happening might need extra 
services. Our contract 
supervisor would liaise with 
the manager of the cleaning 
company to arrange those 
special services. 
(A-3) When we started the 
contract, when we originally 
came first to look after 
building C was a brand new 
building…. So, bits of it came 
on in different parts. 
(A-4)  The other buildings 
would have come on 
subsequent to that. There was a 
building down in Z street that 
would have come on a couple 
of years later. And then there 
was obviously the new 
building that would have come 
on in 2010, that is building C. 
(A-12)  What would happen 
regarding UniCampus would 
be that if and when there was a 
new building coming on or 
there was a new area that might 
require cleaning, the head of 
the housekeeping in 
UniCampus, P, would contact 
myself directly and I would go 




III 1.1 – Written Contract Incompleteness Case A (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
WCI Written contract 
Incompleteness 
(A-8)  I think a too-detailed 
document can become a bit of 
a weapon between the two 
parties. 
(A-12)  If you don’t have that, 
you have a very difficult 
relationship and the service 
will fall down. 
(A-30)  In-house we embarked 
on the Q-Mark, and we gained 
the Q-Mark Award two years 
ago. And as part of that process 
our operation is audited on a 
yearly basis. And that has 
highlighted two areas where 
we are falling down, or not so 
much falling down, but not 
demonstrating enough of what 
we do. We’re actually working 
on devising a whole 
measurement of KPI’s. Starting 
with the contract areas, we 
hope to put into place so that 
we’re not just auditing the 
cleaning services, so that we’re 
auditing the whole operation 
and the value of the contract. 
(A-16)  If the builders were 
finished in a certain area, and 
we were to take over the next 
area or the next floor, if the 
UniCampus staff had moved 
into those areas, we’d have the 
weekly meetings and get then 
the instruction “from next 
week I want you to do this and 
to do that”. 
(A-19) And if there is an 
additional requirement for 
anything extra, we have to try 
and do that within those hours. 
So, whether that be allocating 
some staff in to do an extra job, 
there is no additional 
resources, financial resources, 
to carry out the job. You just 






III 1.1 – Written Contract Incompleteness Case A (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
WCI Written contract 
Incompleteness 
(A-31) And also, we would 
make sure it’s part of our audit 
process that all the invoices 
were in on time, or were there 






III 1.2 – Written Contract Incompleteness Case B 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 
WCI Written contract 
Incompleteness 
(B-6)  I think a lot of issues 
only arose subsequent to the 
contract being issued. And it 
wasn’t because of lack of 
completeness; it was only 
because of things we hadn’t 
thought of in the original 
contract. For example, some of 
our clinical departments 
needed particular issues 
tweaked like the anaesthetists 
wanted it in a different form 
for anaesthesia requests. The 
labs wanted other things. And 
our lab services had since 
expanded and so had to think 
anew about how the two 
systems would communicate. 
(B-7)  I would say that we 
were, you know, everyone was 
happy with it. And sometimes 
it was our fault. Sometimes we 
didn’t understand quite how it 
works. Sometimes there was a 
glitch in the software. 
(B-8) To be honest, I think 
people don’t really look back 
at the contract. You know, 
‘you guaranteed you would do 
this, we said we do that’. We 
probably should. 
(B-6) We are all interested in 
progressing the system’s 
ability and to meet as many 
people’s requirements. That’s 
the only meetings that are 
taking place. And that would 
be normal. We are talking 
about 40, 50, or 60 users 
maybe. Invariably they will 
have their own little 
requirements or wanting to 
know how to do things. It’s 
quite a complex little system, 
you know, an elaborate system. 
So any meetings that are taking 
place are to do with that 
element of it. 
(B-15) Thankfully what we 
have provided meets their 
needs pretty well, but certainly 
from time to time they might 
say we would like be able to do 
x, y, and z. They would ask 
how feasible that would be. We 
would let them know that there 
would be a cost involved in 
doing that, and it would go on 





III 1.2 – Written Contract Incompleteness Case B (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 
WCI Written contract 
Incompleteness 
(B-10)  So therefore we had 
another company talking to the 
VetServ Company. And, you 
know, that proved interesting 
in that the communication 
didn’t happen as smoothly as 
we would have liked.  
(B-13)  And also when we 
developed a new laboratory 
test which we have quite 
recently, then there needs to be 
an action to ensure that the link 
between the lab system and the 
VetServ happens. 
(B-13)  Also, we had an 
incident just last week, when 
first one and then the backup 
server running the GI system 
went down. We discovered that 
this was because the 
temperature in the room where 
the servers were went too high, 
and got fried basically.  So this 
made us a little bit worried for 
the VetServ servers, and was 
another incident where we 
need communicate to AB in 
VetServ our concerns over this 
issue. 
(B-15) Thankfully, thus far, 
there hasn’t been a whole lot 
that needed to be done other 
than changes within the 
contract. Which is good from 




III 2.1 – Psychological Contract Case A 




(A-6) Sometimes if there were 
areas which may need levels of 
service or specific events 
happening might need extra 
services. Our contract 
supervisor would liaise with the 
manager of the cleaning 
company to arrange those 
special services. 
(A-7)  In a previous and another 
relationship there have been 
times when lack of clarity 
caused a lot of problems. 
Because it becomes a “you 
didn’t tell me”. 
(A-7)  You build the 
relationship, because if you are 
solely relying on what’s printed, 
the one thing you miss will be 
the one thing you need. And it 
won’t be written down. 
(A-8) Or any areas where it 
might not be the contractor’s 
fault that there is the problem, 
they work together to resolve 
the issue. Maybe periodic 
cleaning needs to be carried out. 
They would work together to 
sort timeframes of what can be 
done and when it can be done.   
 
 (A-3)  We have a very good 
working relationship with P’s 
deputy, a lady called MP, who my 
own contracts manager a lady 
called MA, would meet on a 
weekly basis….We have the same 
staff working in every building. 
So there is continuity of service 
regarding the staff. 
(A-10) …if it was run like some 
other government contracts that 
possibly should have the same 
flexibility in the manpower, it 
wouldn’t happen. 
(A-12) It’s most important as far 
as I’m concerned. There has to be 
a good understanding between the 
contractor’s direct manager and 
the client’s point of contact. 
Because that’s where any issues 
that have come up are resolved 
there and then… 
(A-12)  … if a client is getting a 
number of complaints and they’re 
not being addressed by the client 
services manager, the client 
would very soon say “this is not 
working and you could lose the 
business or we’ll put it to tender”. 
So, the most important thing as 





III 2.1 – Psychological Contract Case A (continued) 




(A-12) I think it’s absolutely 
essential to have a relationship 
between the client manager and 
the contract manager. If you 
don’t have that, you have a very 
difficult relationship and the 
service will fall down. 
(A-20) I think that sometimes if 
myself or the actual Managing 
Director of the contract start 
getting involved that we can 
upset the applecart in some 
ways because things have been 
running smoothly and you could 
go in and not know what we are 
talking about on a daily level. 
Some things are better left 
sorted out at a supervisory level.    
(A-21) If you are dreading this 
monthly meeting, it’s always 
going to be negative, negative, 
negative, and only picking out 
faults. I don’t think that serves 
to build any relationship and 
you won’t build for good 
service. But if you are too social 
as well, and you are going out 
socialising with people, that’s 
not good business practice 
either. Because then you won’t 
be able to deal with things when 
they become difficult. 
(A-13) Never socially…. But 
normally there’s not a huge 
amount of interaction between 
myself and P in this case. It 
would be more so if there was a 
requirement or a problem, P 
would come straight on to me…. 
I also feel that you don’t want to 
be pestering the client all the 
time. 
(A-12) …one of the most 
important things in the 
relationship, between the 
contractor’s representative as in 
his supervisor or manager, and 
the customer’s point of contact. 
(A-22) And again, the people who 
work for me on all the sites, very 
very quickly, they forget they 
work for CleanServ or any other 
cleaning company and they feel 
that they work for the building 





III 2.1 – Psychological Contract Case A (continued) 




 (A-22)  I know in one of our 
other contracts which would be 
a very big organisation, you 
don’t get as good service 
because they don’t really value 
the contract. 
(A-24)  But I would say that the 
relationship between our two 
supervisors has been very good, 
where in fact they’ve actually 
shown us some initiatives that 
we have been able to use inside, 
and actually trained our 
supervisors in a thing called 
bonnet mopping for carpets. 
(A-25)  I think it’s probably in 
this relationship, because in 
addition to employing people to 
provide the service, we are also 
providing the exact same 
service ourselves. In a way we 
are not only competitors, we are 
providing the same service, so 
we understand the operation, 
and we can learn from each 
other. 
 (A-22)  If any customer ever 
needs me to come along, or the 
supervisor, or the client services 
manager, requires me to go along 
and look at the way something is 
being cleaned, or there is an issue 
regarding a stain, or something 
like that, any of the managers will 
ring me and I am available at any 




III 2.1 – Psychological Contract Case A (continued) 




(A-28) I went over to the girl, I 
said “look, I’m not here to beat 
anyone up, but I just want to 
know where did this happen, 
what did you do then”. And I’m 
not saying that this was a 
problem on the part of the 
contactor, because I realised we 
hadn’t given the girl enough 
information. But I wanted to 
find out what information she 





III 2.2 – Psychological Contract Case B 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 
PC Psychological 
Contract 
(B-3) About two years. The 
original software was supplied 
by the same company, but as I 
said, in its original version it 
had been there for about ten 
years or so.   
(B-7) I think there is a little bit 
in the contract about 
communications, but a lot of it 
is informal. 
 (B-8)  To be honest, I think 
people don’t really look back at 
the contract. You know, ‘you 
guaranteed you would do this, 
we said we do that’. We 
probably should. To be honest it 
happens much more informally 
now where somebody will 
email or ring up and say ‘AB 
we have a problem and can you 
come and fix it?’ And it seems 
to work that way. 
(B-11)  And anytime he is in, I 
think he a very good friendly 
relationship with many staff on 
the ground, and he would go out 
of his way, from time to time, to 
help an individual with 
problems with our system. 
(B-6) I would like to think we 
have moved beyond the contract. 
We have a very, very good 
working relationship with the 
College and all its staff, so I am 
very pleased with that, you know. 
(B-8) I think, well I shouldn’t be 
saying what other people think, 
but I would I would speculate that 
they are thinking let’s see what 
we can do to develop the system 
rather than the contract itself. I 
don’t think anyone would want to 
go back and quote the contract. I 
would feel very worried if anyone 
started quoting the contract at any 
stage, you know.  
 (B-9) But on top of that, you 
know, they have a programme 
which is about business for 
veterinary practice, and we have 
contributed to that, showing how 
VetServ could be used to manage 
the business, and what KPIs and 
so on they should be looking for 





III 2.2 – Psychological Contract Case B (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AA) 
PC Psychological 
Contract 
(B-11) So we do enjoy a very 
good cordial relationship. And I 
think that has been really 
instrumental in ensuring the 
success of the contract.  In fact, 
it was one of the factors in the 
awarding of the contract to this 
particular service provider in 
the first instance. 
(B-11)  When it went out to 
tender we had another very 
competitive quote, but it was 
from a UK organisation which 
serves another veterinary 
hospital across the water. It 
went down to the wire and, in 
fact, you know, we were really 
on the point of awarding it to 
the other organisation. And I 
think what happened was that 
we were concerned about the 
level of support, and the fact 
that AB and VetServ were local 
was a factor, and that we knew 
that the support could be 
provided quickly. So all had no 
doubts that, whether it’s directly 
or indirectly, the fact that the 
personal relationship existed did 
influence the award of that 
contract. 
 
(B-10) If there’s a difficulty either 
side, having a point of contact 
like that is really useful. You 
know, I’d like to think that’s an 
excellent relationship, its again a 
two-way street. We can answer 
questions they may have, and 
similarly they can answer 
questions we may have. It would 
be essential in a contract this size, 
that it would have a point of 
contact that would be at a senior 
level. 
(B-10) We would do yes, have 
social conversation, yes. We find 
that there are other things outside 
of the relationship to do with the 
contract that are useful or 
beneficial to both parties. 
(B-11) We are involved in the 
UniVet conference and so on. 
There are many different things 
that we would find useful for each 
other. Only recently we were 
recommending someone for them 
to use in an accounting role that 






III 2.2 –  Psychological Contract Case B (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 
PC Psychological 
Contract 
 (B-13)  Absolutely I do 
because if you lose that personal 
contact, that closeness, the 
relationship, then I think I 
things just get put up with and 
we don’t communicate our 
needs clearly to VetServ.   And 
I think in fact that’s what 
happened during the first phase 
of this contract when we had a 
VetServ system from 2002. 
(B-14)  So it’s only when we 
went and investigated and built 
up that relationship again, and 
spent a little bit of money in 
ensuring that our contract was 
such that we would be able to 
upgrade every year and would 
upgrade annually that that 
developed. So I think the 
personal relationship was 
important and it was something 
we neglected during those ten 
years. 
(B-16)  I think that level, that 
lack of immediate technical 
competence of technical things 
hasn’t affected the relationship. 
In fact, we have a lot better 
level of service now than when 
we did have someone who was 
knowledgeable about technical 
things managing the contract. 
(B-15) Well I suppose the 
working relationship we have 
with staff in there proved to be 
beneficial. Apart from the fact 
that they are flagship, we would 
learn things from the fact that it’s 
a veterinary hospital using the 
system while in practice the needs 
are somewhat different. 
(B-16) Obviously you would 
want to keep someone happy if 
you know that they might 
influence a future contract. But as 
it happens, that situation, the 
person we are dealing, I am sure 
has significant influence on the 
contract. 
(B-16) But their other general 
expertise is extremely good. Yes, 
certainly somebody with good 
management expertise is 
important. Because it means it’s 
likely that things get done. 
(B-17)  Absolutely, yes. I think I 
would find it for our organisation, 
we are a small organisation, that 
dealing with somebody you can 
talk to easily is very useful. And 
we would like to feel that we have 
quite an easy manner ourselves 
and it reflects in all our 




III 2.2 – Psychological Contract Case B (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 
PC Psychological 
Contract 
(B-16)  I think it’s not just a 
single manager’s social skills, I 
think there’s lots of people who 
interact with the contract 
provider, either directly or 
indirectly, and I think  the  
social skills of all of that group 
who report to the client manager 
are important in maintaining 
that relationship. 
(B-20)  We make a point of 
inviting AB to come along to 
any relevant events, like CPE 
events or the Hospital 
Conference events. Normally 
the service provider would pay 
for that level of access. So they 
paid for a stand at the Hospital 
Conference. They might just 
sponsor continuing education 
events, and they have been 
generally very happy to do so. 
(B-21)  So I think that would be 
an opportunity for the service 
provider to be invited to come 
in and talk to the students, and 
they are happy to do so. 
(B-22)  Similarly there might be 
an opportunity in continuing 
education where the software 
provider could be asked to 
contribute. 
(B-18) I don’t think that we have 
that type of relationship. I think 
that if there was something going 
wrong it would just be said. I 
don’t think the tone would be 
necessary. 
(B-18) I think that we are 
probably not at that stage yet. But 
I would be hopeful that we would 
be given that kind of information 
in the future. I suppose in little 
things you would get a bit of that 
alright. 
(B-18) Because we have this on-
going relationship we are willing, 
well I like to think we are quite 
helpful to them in making some 
small changes here and there that 
we don’t charge for, you know. 
(B-20) But we have discussions 
about other things that influence 
both our organisations. So I might 
ring up and ask, you know, 
what’s the best organisation to 
phone in relation to this? Or, do 
you have any contacts in this 
organisation? You know, again 




III 2.2 – Psychological Contract Case B (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 
PC Psychological 
Contract 
 (B-21) Yes. Again we would 
meet at conferences, it wouldn’t 
necessarily be social things, but at 
conferences there’s a social 
aspect to things. We would have 
met the team on one side and the 
client manager on the other side. 
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IV 1.1 - Performance Communication Signals - Case A 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
CP Communicating 
Performance -  
principal 









(A-13)  I think that it depends 
if it’s a small issue, it might be 
dealt with a phone call. We try 
to deal with any actual 
complaint or anything that we 
think may be a problem via 
email at least so that there is 
some record…. If you deal 
much in telephone 
conversations, you don’t have 
a formal record of it…. So, I 
would formally take the report 
from Security and send it to 
CleanServ so that it’s actually 
documented. 
(A-15) You just really need to 
indicate that there are issues 
that have to be sorted out, how 
to do them, and what’s going 
to happen. 
  
(A-7) If something is 
highlighted it’s addressed there 
and then, and it will be finished 
before the next meeting. 
(A-13)  It would be more so if 
there was a requirement or a 
problem, P would come straight 
on to me. I think there was an 
issue a number of years ago with 
keys being lost, or something 
like that, in one of the buildings, 
and P would come straight on to 
me with that. 
(A-16)  I suppose with 
something like that would be 
where you might be saying 
where there might be a fall-off in 
the level of service. I suppose 
the way things are now it’s very 
easy for a member of 
UniCampus staff, obviously if 
they had a difficulty where their 
office wasn’t being cleaned, they 
might send an electronic email 
to P, who would, in turn then, 






IV 1.1 - Performance Communication Signals - Case A (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
CP Communicating 
Performance -  
principal 









(A-21)  But if you are too 
business-orientated and you 
don’t build any relationship I 
think it can be detrimental to 
your actual relationship 
working with somebody…But 
if you are too social as well, 
and you are going out 
socialising with people, that’s 
not good business practice 
either. 
 (A-23)  Yes I would, yes. If 
it’s a small problem again, and 
it’s dealt with on the ground 
but it’s getting that we’ve 
exchanged emails, and the 
problems we have a record of 
that, I would believe in 
bringing them in for a formal 
meeting. Perhaps, probably on 
our territory rather than 
meeting in the building, and 
sitting down formally across 
the desk with the documents in 
front of me and deal with it in 
that manner.   
(A-26) Any comment that 
would come back, positive 
comments, we would pass it on 
to them so that they could be 
passed back on to the staff.   
 
(A-23) If P wasn’t happy with 
services being delivered, or 
services being delivered were 
related back to P, and P came on 
the phone, she wouldn’t put any 
gloss on it. She would tell you 
straight ‘this is not acceptable’ 
or ‘that is not acceptable’. It 
would be very direct.  There 
wouldn’t be any need to try and 
read between the lines or 
wondering how something was 
being phrased. 
(A-23) Certainly in P’s case, if 
she has an issue she’ll tell you. 






IV 1.1 - Performance Communication Signals - Case A (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
CP Communicating 
Performance -  
principal 









(A-27)  But, definitely on the 
penalty side, if there is a 
problem that can’t be dealt 
with at a supervisory level, 
then we would set up a formal 
meeting. 
(A-26) … if there is a positive 
comment to be made, MP will 
put it onto the additional 
comments section which is 
lovely for my own managers 
because they know I’m going to 
see that. Actually signed and 
written by MP…. It’s sent to 
ourselves first then always 
passed on. It’s a lovely gesture. 
It doesn’t take a whole lot, but 
very seldom does the cleaning 
staff get thanked for the job. It’s 
usually when there is something 
wrong when they are contacting 
you. But it’s nice to get 
something positive.  
(A-27)  Certainly if I was 
meeting P to look at something 
new, or there was an additional 
requirement somewhere, there 
would always be a conversation 
about how things are going in 
the other buildings. So it’s more 









IV 1.2 – Contract Performance Communication Signals - Case B 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AA) 
CP Communicating 
Performance -  
principal 









(B-7)  Sometimes there was a 
glitch in the software. For 
example, we found that an 
element of duplicating case 
records and we wanted the case 
records shown accurately and 
we have since asked AB to fix 
that. 
(B-8) To be honest it happens 
much more informally now 
where somebody will email or 
ring up and say ‘AB we have a 
problem and can you come and 
fix it?’ And it seems to work 
that way. 
(B-12) This would be on an as 
needs basis. So if we had or 
discovered a glitch, and I gave 
you the example about, you 
know, some of the cases 
weren’t being counted 
correctly, we would certainly 
set that up.  
(B-13)  So this made us a little 
bit worried for the VetServ 
servers, and was another 
incident where we need 
communicate to AB in VetServ 
our concerns over this issue. 
 
(B-4)  I’ll answer that by saying 
that on-going meetings are more 
to do with the system than the 
contract.  
(B-6)  The meetings are 
informal. The meetings weren’t 
part of the contract as such. 
(B-8) Yes, but again I suppose I 
would be surprised if the end 
user themselves or people higher 
up are even thinking on a 
contract basis. I think, well I 
shouldn’t be saying what other 
people think, but I would I 
would speculate that they are 
thinking let’s see what we can 
do to develop the system rather 
than the contract itself. I don’t 
think anyone would want to go 
back and quote the contract. I 
would feel very worried if 
anyone started quoting the 
contract at any stage, you know.  
(B-15) I would find them very 
useful because, at the end of the 
day, if the client is there wanting 
something else, and we can’t 
discuss it or aren’t willing to 
discuss it or considering 
delivering it then the client isn’t 




IV 1.2 – Performance Communication Signals - Case B (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 
CP Communicating 
Performance -  
principal 









 (B-13)  Absolutely I do 
because if you lose that 
personal contact, that 
closeness, the relationship, 
then I think things just get put 
up with and we don’t 
communicate our needs clearly 
to VetServ.   
(B-16)  And, in fact, we have a 
lot better level of service now 
than when we did have 
someone who was 
knowledgeable about technical 
things managing the contract. 
(B-18)  And I know that we did 
have some formal written 
communication around the 
time of the deadline for going 
live on the system if you like, 
and we were worried about 
some levels of progress. And I 
think a balance between the 
very friendly and the more 
formal written communication 





 (B-16)  But their other general 
expertise is extremely good. 
Yes, certainly somebody with 
good management expertise is 
important because it means it’s 
likely that things get done. 
 (B-18) I think that if there was 
something going wrong it would 
just be said. I don’t think the 




IV 2.1 – Message Reinforcement Signals - Case A 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
MR Principal 
behaving in ways 
consistent with 
the commitment 





(A-8) Yes, our supervisor 
would conduct a joint audit on 
a monthly basis. And she 
would report back the results 
of that audit to me. 
(A-30) Starting with the 
contract areas, we hope to put 
into place so that we’re not just 
auditing the cleaning services, 
so that we’re auditing the 
whole operation and the value 
of the contract. So that no 
invoices will be paid until the 
product is correct.   
(A-8)   Again, we would do our 
own reports that are electronic 
audits that we would do, 
setting the sort of standard that 
we do for all buildings. We 
don’t have one particular kind. 
We have a customised one for 
each particular building. So 
when we would do an audit on 
a building, it’s done on a hand-
held device which is signed by 
the customer, or the customer’s 
representative, and is emailed 
to the customer and to our own 
office here. 
(A-19)  The invoice goes to the 
Housekeeping; I presume P 
may sign it off. 
(A-28) She had a job to do. If 
the building isn’t up to 
standard, she’s going to say it 
because she’s not signing off 
on her fortnightly audit if it’s 









IV 2.1 – Message Reinforcement Signals - Case A (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
MR Principal 
behaving in ways 
consistent with 
the commitment 





 (A-31) And I feel that that’s 
what happens because that’s 
the type of person I think MP 
is, and obviously by getting it 
signed and getting the 
comment onto the audit forms, 
both MP and the person, in this 
case P, get to see us and the 


















IV 2.2 – Message Reinforcement Signals - Case B 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AA) 
MR Principal 
behaving in ways 
consistent with 
the commitment 





(B-15)  I think the fact they 
know the budget is under the 
control of the Vet School 
rather than a contracts manager 
from some other part of the 
university means that they 
know and we know that we are 
looking at their service, I think, 
calibrates their service based 
on success of the service we 
got. And also I think that they 
know that they were nearly not 
awarded this contract. So I 













(B-21) Yes, well I suppose as 
well we have implemented an 
IT system for tracking 
technical issues and so on. We 
would discuss those on a 
regular basis, you know. That’s 
a little information system of 
its own that’s separate from the 
system and which is available 
to them. We can view it as 
well. We can jointly review it. 
212 
 
IV 3.1 – Authority Signals - Case A 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
A  Authority -  
agent’s 




capacity to make 
the commitment 
(A-2)  The set-up of the 
contract is normally done by 
myself and the owner of the 
company. 
 (A-13) I wouldn’t see many of 
the contractors that often. 
(A-18)  If things aren’t being 
looked after and it seems 
they’re not listening sometimes 
to the supervisor, then if 
myself or one of the other 
managers would step in. And it 
must be frustrating, I think, for 
the supervisor because we’d 
step in and everything’s right 
the next day.  So you put up 
with that. That’s the hierarchy 
isn’t it, that’s where the power 
is. It’s the balance of power, 
isn’t it? 
(A-20) I think that sometimes 
if myself or the actual 
Managing Director of the 
contract start getting involved 
that we can upset the applecart 
in some ways because things 
have been running smoothly 
and you could go in and not 
know what we are talking 
about on a daily level. Some 
things are better left sorted out 
at a supervisory level.    
(A-12) … the client would 
very soon say “this is not 
working and you could lose the 
business or we’ll put it to 
tender”.   
(A-13) Never socially…. But 
normally there’s not a huge 
amount of interaction between 
myself and P in this case. It 
would be more so if there was 
a requirement or a problem, P 
would come straight on to 
me…. I would meet P, agree 
the service that was required, 
and I would implement that 
with my managers.  I also feel 
that you don’t want to be 
pestering the client all the time.  
(A-18)  Once MP has faith in 
the service that we are 
delivering on, and that my 
manager can support her with, 
I think that’s the most 
important issue. Because there 
is no escalation to P. I think 
that’s the most important thing. 
(A-19)  But it’s very important 
that my manager liaises well 
with the UniCampus person, in 
this case MP, and for MP to be 
happy with the service. That’s 
very important, because after 
that it goes to the next stage 




IV 3.1 – Authority Signals - Case A (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
A Authority -  
agent’s 




capacity to make 
the commitment 
(A-22)  From the service 
provider’s point of view, in this 
case I think they would know 
that the supervisor would be 
reporting back to me on a 
regular basis 
(A-23)  If it’s a small problem 
again, and it’s dealt with on the 
ground but it’s getting that 
we’ve exchanged emails, and 
the problems we have a record 
of that, I would believe in 
bringing them in for a formal 
meeting. Perhaps, probably on 
our territory rather than 
meeting in the building, and 
sitting down formally across 
the desk with the documents in 
front of me and deal with it in 














IV 3.1 – Authority Signals - Case A (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
A Authority -  
agent’s 




capacity to make 
the commitment 
(A-24)  The only time I would 
meet the managing director of 
the business or people on the 
same kind of management 
structures as myself, would be 
if I was asking him to quote for 
a new building that was 
coming on stream, or to tell 
them that we are going into the 
tender process, or that we are 
now going to set up formal 
quarterly meetings, which we 
haven’t done before, with the 
senior management of the 
contract company.  
(A-28)  So I went over and met 
with all the contract staff, and 
you could see they may have 
















IV 3.1 – Authority Signals - Case A (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
A Authority -  
agent’s 




capacity to make 
the commitment 
(A-28) It highlighted a 
problem, and by actually going 
over and saying “which button 
did would press, where were 
you” So, it highlighted an issue 
where we’d fallen down, the 
contract had fallen down, and 
the staff had highlighted their 
position, but actually which 
was dealt with on the ground 
by me, rather than the 
managers getting involved. It 
was maybe, quite informal. I 
went over to the girl, I said 
“look, I’m not here to beat 
anyone up, but I just want to 
know where did this happen, 















IV 3.2 – Authority Signals - Case B 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 
A Authority -  
agent’s 
perceptions of 






(B-16)  But certainly there is a 
level of awareness of things 
that we know what we want 
and that we are going to be 
quite active in ensuring that we 
get it. 
(B-17) Certainly I do have 
access to the Bursar, the 
President and the Registrar, 
and I think it would have to be 
serious for that level of 
discussion to occur. 
(B-17) But it would have to be 
a really serious issue for them 
to attend. I think the 
knowledge that that influence 
and access is present certainly 
has been an influence. 
(B-17)  And I think our ability 
to issue the tender and get that 
contract passed, where there 
had been no investment in this 
region, where the service 
provider had been told there 
was no money for upgrades for 
the last ten years, was seen as 
very influential and a 
demonstration by the 
university to the service 
provider.    
 
(B-10) It would be essential in a 
contract this size, that it would 
have a point of contact that 
would be at a senior level.  
(B-10) In fact I would go so far 
as to say that the person we are 
dealing with and others I 
suppose, has enough of, I hate 
using the word power, but power 
and respect within the 
organisation that they can get 
things done. 
(B-16) Obviously you would 
want to keep someone happy if 
you know that they might 
influence a future contract. But 
as it happens, that situation, the 
person we are dealing, I am sure 
has significant influence on the 
contract. 
(B-20) Probably in the early 
days ….oh gosh more senior 
than them? I don’t know the 






IV 3.2 – Authority Signals - Case B (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 
A Authority -  
agent’s 
perceptions of 






(B-21)  No. I haven’t been 
directly in contact with 
anybody really from the 
service provider’s team except 


















IV 4.1 – Agent’s Individual Dispositions - Case A 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case B (AA) 









(A-22)  But I suppose it 
depends on the size of the 
organisation. If we’re talking 
about a relatively small 
organisation, I know in one of 
our other contracts which 
would be a very big 
organisation, you don’t get as 
good service because they 
don’t really value the contract. 
So, and no matter how much 
they know that this person is 
my supervisor and would be 
having problems, I don’t think 
that they weight it because I 
don’t think they feel value 





(A-6) And the great thing about 
any work from any government 
contract is you never have to 
worry about getting paid. They 
pay on time.  
(A-8)  But once the contract is 
awarded, there doesn’t seem to 
be much follow-through from 
the awarding authority. Where 
are the quality meetings? Or 
where are the reports? 
(A-9) The drawback is that it’s 
exceptionally price competitive 
at the detriment of the service 
element. 
(A-10) The other benefit … is 
the actual reference. It’s great to 
have government work and you 
can use some contracts as a 
reference 
(A-10) Certainly on government 
contracts it’s very nice to know 
that you’re undertaking a job 
that you know you are going to 
get paid for at the end of every 
month. Whereas with private 
sector work you don’t have that 
guarantee. The drawback is that 
it’s exceptionally price 
competitive at the detriment of 




IV 4.1 – Agent’s Individual Dispositions - Case A (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case B (AB) 









 (A-11)  So, again it’s very hard 
to know if people are actually 
measuring like for like. And I 
think that there are major 
drawbacks in public 
procurement. 
(A-16)  There are no additional 
hours carried out, or subject to 
some charge. What we have are 
our standards for a cleaning 
service. 
(A-18)  So, I feel that because of 
being able to manage the 
previous job, that they had 
requested, when something more 
came on, they wanted us.    
(A-20) With our contract 
managers, we try to give them 
all the information that we can. 
Whether that be methods of 
cleaning carpets in UniCampus, 
so that they can provide that 
service, that knowledge, to do 
the job without having to bring 
in the industrial crew to do extra 
jobs. We also train all our 
managers in communicating 
with our front line people, our 






IV 4.1 – Agent’s Individual Dispositions - Case A (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 









 (A-22)  If any customer ever 
needs me to come along, or the 
supervisor, or the client services 
manager, requires me to go 
along and look at the way 
something is being cleaned, or 
there is an issue regarding a 
stain, or something like that, any 
of the managers will ring me and 
I am available at any time to 
come in and see them. So I can 
only say it from my point of 
view, but I am sure it’s the same 
in other organisations as well. 
(A-27)  We are always very 
conscious that we don’t want to 
have any confrontation because 
we have a number of public 
contract buildings. 
 (A-31) So the important thing is 
for the point of contact in the 
client to be completely happy 
that the service we’re giving is 
the best that it possibly can be 
because they’re going to relay 
that to the people in the 








IV 4.1 – Agent’s Individual Dispositions - Case A (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 









 (A-32) The superintendent of 
OtherOrg, who would be our 
principal awarding the contracts, 
we would only see him probably 
on a once every two months 




















IV 4.2 – Agent’s Individual Dispositions - Case B 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 









(B-4)  Obviously we were in 
competition with other providers 
as well. But I suppose our on-
going relationship helped 
somewhat and the fact we knew 
exactly what it was we were 
looking for. 
(B-4) Because they were 
throwing everything into the pot, 
and seeing whether they were 
going to make a radical change 
here, or should they stick with 
VetServ.   So I suppose, from 
their point of view, it made 
sense to look elsewhere at the 
same time, you know. But we 
obviously had the knowledge, 
the workings of the operation 
there, which an operation of that 
size, tends to be somewhat 
unique. 
(B-4)  You know, the UniVet 
college is the qualifying college 
for all veterinary surgeons 
throughout Ireland and most of 
our customers have gone 
through there, and it is a flagship 
site for our business. 
(B-6) I would like to think we 





IV 4.2 – Agent’s Individual Dispositions - Case B (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 







 (B-6) We are all interested in 
progressing the system’s ability 
and to meet as many people’s 
requirements. We are talking 
about 40, 50, or 60 users maybe. 
Invariably they will have their 
own little requirements or 
wanting to know how to do 
things. It’s quite a complex little 
system, you know, an elaborate 
system. 
(B-10) We find that there are 
other things outside of the 
relationship to do with the 
contract that are useful or 
beneficial to both parties. 
(B-16) And we would like to 
feel that we have quite an easy 
manner ourselves and it reflects 
in all our conversations with all 
our clients. 
 (B-18)  A lot of that would go 
on whereas we are probably not 
at a stage of negotiating for the 
future. I would be hopeful, that, 
come that time, we would be 







IV 4.2 – Agent’s Individual Dispositions - Case B (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case B (PB) Agent – Case B (AB) 







  (B-19) Obviously it’s in their 
benefit rather than changing 
everything that they could 
continue with the relationship in 
operation assuming that they are 
quite happy with it. 
(B-20)  But we have discussions 
about other things that influence 
both our organisations.  So I 
might ring up and ask, you 
know, what’s the best 
organisation to phone in relation 
to this? Or, do you have any 
contacts in this organisation? 















IV 5.1 – Agent’s Obligations - Case A 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
BJ Agent’s 
decision on the 
required actions 










(A-24)  But I would say that 
the relationship between our 
two supervisors has been very 
good, where in fact they’ve 
actually shown us some 
initiatives that we have been 
able to use inside, and actually 
trained our supervisors in a 





(A-6) But obviously in the 
intervening years carpets would 
need to be cleaned, there has 
been new processes put into X 
Street at no additional cost. Then 
things would be a little bit quiet 
during the breaks and we would 
do extra things like carpet 
cleaning and floor machine 
scrubbing that wouldn’t 
necessarily be perceived as 
being part of a contract, but it’s 
that extra bit and the bit that gets 
noticed. And I think we’ve 
probably shown MP a few ways 
of cleaning carpets and using 
different pads. But again, 
making ourselves indispensable 
is the entire way we try to do it. 
(A-7) I don’t think it would 
generate an additional job that 
would involve an additional 
charge. If there’s enough 
resources there at certain times 
of the year that we can actually 








IV 5.1 –  Agent’s Obligations - Case A (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
BJ Agent’s 
decision on the 
required actions 










 (A-7) If it’s we have a routine, 
where we might say clean 
computers or shampoo the 
carpets, which some people 
would see as an extra or 
additional chargeable job, we 
would have seen that as, 
certainly in the case of 
UniCampus, as just a part of the 
job. 
(A-12) Because that’s where any 
issues that have come up are 
resolved there and then, or if a 
client is getting a number of 
complaints and they’re not being 
addressed by the client services 
manager, the client would very 
soon say this is not working and 
you could lose the business or 
we’ll put it to tender. 
(A-16) So I suppose that would 
be the way that additional 
communication would happen if 
there was an additional request 
or an additional requirement. 
There are no additional hours 









IV 5.1 –  Agent’s Obligations - Case A (continued) 
Code Description Principal – Case A (PA) Agent – Case A (AA) 
BJ Agent’s 
decision on the 
required actions 










 (A-19) So, the manager has a 
certain number of hours per 
week, per building. And if there 
is an additional requirement for 
anything extra, we have to try 
and do that within those hours. 
(A-19) My point is we don’t 
raise additional invoices for 
additional requirements. We 
have to manage within the hours 
we have.  
(A-20)  It’s equipping our 
managers with the knowledge of 
how to clean the carpets with the 
new methods, or how to do the 
job on the floor with the new 
pads that we have done in 
UniCampus using diamond pads 
that restore floors, stone floors. 
Because we have shown our 
managers how to do it, when 
they in turn demonstrate it to 
UniCampus representatives, they 
in turn roll it out to their own 






IV 5.2 –  Agent’s Obligations - Case B 








(B-10)  And anytime he is in, I 
think he a very good friendly 
relationship with many staff on 
the ground, and he would go 
out of his way, from time to 
time, to help an individual with 
problems with our system. 
(B-19)  They might just 
sponsor continuing education 
events, and they have been 
generally very happy to do so. 
 (B-21)  So I think that would 
be an opportunity for the 
service provider to be invited 
to come in and talk to the 
students, and they are happy to 
do so. 
(B-22)  Similarly there might 
be an opportunity in continuing 
education where the software 








(B-9) But on top of that, you 
know, they have a programme 
which is about business for 
veterinary practice, and we have 
contributed to that, showing how 
VetServ could be used to 
manage the business, and what 
KPIs and so on they should be 
looking for through something 
like VetServ. 
(B-11) Only recently we were 
recommending someone for 
them to use in an accounting role 
that would have familiarity with 
our software. 
(B-18) Because we have this on-
going relationship we are 
willing, well I like to think we 
are quite helpful to them in 
making some small changes here 
and there that we don’t charge 
for, you know.  
